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Executive Summary
There is a temptation to look at the U.S.-Georgia 
relationship as an enduring alliance between two 
countries that share similar values and goals. It is also 
tempting to view Georgia as a democratizing country 
which, while still not fully consolidated, continues to 
generally move in the right direction. If these narratives, 
which U.S. policy makers seem to support at least 
publicly, serve as the foundation for U.S. policy toward 
Georgia, then the United States should simply continue 
to unequivocally support Georgia financially and 
politically. Similarly, the United States should publicly 
praise the Georgian government, reserving any criticism 
for private settings, and wait patiently for Georgia's 
democracy and economy to flourish so that Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia feel compelled to rejoin Georgia.
Although appealing to some, this report will show 
that this approach is not only grounded in questionable 
assumptions, but it also risks entangling the United States 
into a long-term patron-client relationship with Tbilisi 
that could, in turn, drag the United States into a number 
of possible crises in Georgia and the South Caucasus. 
The United States must actively avoid developing this 
patron-client relationship.
There is political space for the United States to 
craft a better relationship with Georgia, one that is built 
on true partnership rather than dependency, which will 
further the sovereign interests of both states. Such a new 
partnership would better reflect the internal dynamics in 
Georgia as well as acknowledge and confront the new 
complex dynamics that have emerged between Georgia, 
Russia, and the disputed territories.
Taken together, the following big-picture goals can 
form a vision for the United States to guide its role in 
Georgia's development:
■ Reducing tensions between Georgia and 
Russia and preventing another conflict from 
erupting in the South Caucasus;
■ Arresting and reversing the assimilation of 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia into Russia;
■ Reducing Georgia's dependence on foreign 
assistance;
■ Moving Georgia towards greater democracy 
and true political pluralism;
■ Ending the low level instability that has 
plagued Georgia for more than two years; and
■ Accelerating Georgia's integration and 
partnership with Euro-Atlantic organizations.
These should be the central components of the U.S. 
vision for Georgia. Public statements made by Georgian 
leaders on many occasions suggest that these goals, in 
fact, are also held by the Georgian government. The 
government has repeatedly articulated its concern over 
Russian expansion and the annexation of Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia; it has also expressed interest 
in becoming more democratic, joining NATO, and 
reducing overall tensions with its northern neighbor. 
In addition, the United States should be clear on what 
its own strategic goals are in Georgia and in the South 
Caucasus, more broadly. These goals are distinct from 
the vision that the United States and Georgia share for 
their bilateral relationship, but they may be furthered by 
it. Key U.S. priorities in Georgia and the South Caucasus 
include:
■ Avoiding further military conflict in general, 
but more specifically between Georgia and 
Russia;
■ Limiting the expansion of exclusively Russian 
influence in the region and encouraging the 
integration of the region into the international 
economy and institutions of global 
governance;
■ Ensuring ongoing movement of energy 
resources from Central Asia and the Caspian 
Sea region to Europe;
■ Re-establishing U.S. credibility in the South 
Caucasus as a key regional actor and potential 
external partner;
■ Continuing access for the U.S. military and 
military transport in support of the war in 
Afghanistan; and
■ Ensuring internal stability in all countries in 
the region.
Four Foundations of the U.S-Georgia 
Relationship
The U.S.-Georgia relationship is, and will likely 
continue to be, built upon four major areas of 
engagement and concern: the U.S.-Georgia Charter on
9
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Strategic Partnership, the conflict with Russia and the 
territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, democratic 
development and democracy assistance, and postwar aid 
and reconstruction assistance.
U.S.-Georgia Charter on Strategic Partnership
The U.S.-Georgia Charter on Strategic Partnership 
was signed in January 2009 and now serves as an anchoring 
document for much of U.S.-Georgian engagement. The 
agreement received very little attention and scrutiny in 
the United States, as it was concluded in the waning days 
of the Bush administration, but in Georgia it was viewed 
as a significant development and a major achievement 
of Saakashvili's government. Moreover, the agreement 
has been received asymmetrically; whereas in Georgia 
the partnership has been presented as evidence of U.S. 
support of the government and even as the advancement 
of a security commitment, the United States has 
understood the document as a method of routinizing 
and institutionalizing ties across a number of important 
issues. Although the Charter provides a solid basis for 
structuring U.S.-Georgian relations, commitments of this 
type might also raise problems for the United States if 
the agreement is not adequately monitored and if the two 
sides do not share a common understanding of the exact 
scope and aims of the partnership.
Recommendations for the United States
■ Institutionalize regular working group meet­
ings established by the Charter.
■ Ensure that U.S. defense cooperation with 
Georgia is developed under the auspices of the 
Charter and its goals.
■ Clarify publicly that the Charter does not pro­
vide a U.S. security guarantee to Georgia.
■ Avoid publicly over-inflating Georgia's impor­
tance as a security partner and energy transit 
state.
■ Clarify the Charter's goals, provisions, and 
processes for the international community.
Abkhazia and South Ossetia
At first glance, the August war strengthened 
Russia's influence in these two regions. Paradoxically 
for both Sukhumi and Tskhinvali, their recognition as 
“independent states” by Moscow has only served to 
accelerate their annexation by the Russian Federation. 
While it is extremely unlikely that these territories will 
become part of Georgia in the near future, certain steps 
can be taken to slow their assimilation into Russia. The 
current U.S. policy of non-recognition of independence is 
the right position and a good foundation for a policy, but 
such a policy needs to be further elaborated and developed. 
A policy of engaging Abkhazia without recognizing its
independence can begin to slow the strengthening of ties 
between Abkhazia and Russia. However, South Ossetia 
is a more difficult case because it lacks even the most 
basic attributes of political autonomy, let alone potential 
sovereignty. Differentiating U.S. policy toward Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia is an important step in formulating a 
more effective and independent U.S. strategy regarding 
the breakaway territories. In general, the United States 
must approach these issues within the framework of 
conflict resolution rather than the restoration of Georgia's 
territorial integrity. In the long run, ironically, the best 
way to achieve the latter may be to focus on the former.
Recommendations for the United States:
■ Commit to developing a strategy towards 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia that is based on 
U.S. interests and capacity, and is not driven 
exclusively by Tbilisi.
■ Distinguish between engaging with Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia.
■ Realize that the Russian Federation is rapidly 
annexing Abkhazia and the time for action is 
now.
■ Adopt a policy of “engagement without recog­
nition” towards Abkhazia.
Democracy
Georgia's post-Rose Revolution democratic 
development has been uneven; while few gains were 
made after the initial breakthrough in late 2003, troubling 
signs of backsliding in this area becoming more serious 
beginning in late 2007. The failure of democracy to 
develop adequately in Georgia has become a larger 
problem for the United States because Georgia, particularly 
between 2004 and 2008, was cited so frequently by U.S. 
policymakers as a success story for democracy and U.S. 
democracy assistance. This obviously flawed assertion 
contributed to a view throughout the region that the 
United States was not serious about democracy and that 
it saw the promotion of “democratic values” as a means 
of pursuing its own regional strategic goals by securing 
the loyalty of a political client. In fact, the United States' 
refusal to comment on Georgia's democratic backsliding 
has seriously eroded U.S. credibility with regard to its 
commitment to democracy, both in the South Caucasus 
and more broadly. For Georgia, democracy is tied directly 
to national security; membership in NATO, for example, 
will remain a dream so long as Georgia falls short of most 
democratic measures. Similarly, Georgia's democratic 
shortcomings, such as the dominance of a single political 
party, the lack of free media, and the concentration of 
power within the office of the president, have come 
to characterize the last few years in Georgia and have 
contributed to instability and economic stagnation both
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within and beyond its borders. Thus, improving the 
quality of Georgia's democratic governance is as much 
a strategic goal as it is a normative one.
Recommendations for the United States:
■ Recommit to supporting Georgia's independent 
media and civil society.
■ Publicly state expectations for national 
elections early, and broadly engage with the 
election process.
■ Maintain realistic expectations, but retain 
credibility for their fulfillment.
■ Maintain engagement with a variety of 
political figures, not just the government.
■ Leverage U.S. assistance for greater progress 
on democratization issues.
Postwar Assistance
Immediately following the war in August 2008, 
the United States put together an assistance package of 
roughly one billion dollars to help Georgia rebuild and 
recover from the effects of the conflict. Nearly a quarter 
of this package was used for direct budget support, 
a nearly unprecedented move in the history of U.S. 
foreign assistance practice. Other supporters of Georgia, 
primarily in Europe, pledged several billion dollars more 
in assistance. These funds will help Georgia rebuild, but 
the financial relationship is now a cornerstone of U.S.- 
Georgian relations. The provision of assistance links the 
United States even more closely with Georgia and has 
helped insulate the Georgian government from the dual 
internal shocks of a failed military conflict and a deep 
financial crisis. This assistance package also ensures 
that U.S. influence in Georgia, if properly leveraged, will 
remain strong. Therefore, understanding how the money 
can be used more effectively to encourage democracy 
and stability is critically important for a sound U.S. 
policy on Georgia.
and pluralism.
■ Expand monitoring to examine how Georgia is 
making progress toward its own political goals.
■ Develop a strategy for reducing the level of 
U.S. assistance to Georgia.
Recommendations for the United States:
■ Establish substantial, dedicated funding 
streams for Georgian NGOs beyond 2011­
2012.
■ Fund journalists who report on politics or other 
important issues, and provide that content to 
televisions stations or websites. Provide low- 
interest loans to media entrepreneurs for the 
establishment of information outlets such as 
television stations.
■ Monitor Georgian media and the media 
environment.
■ Find ways to ensure that assistance money is 
not used, even indirectly, to undermine the 
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Source: Modified from the United Nations map found here: http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/georgia.pdf
INTRODUCTION
In August 2008 war broke out between Russia 
and Georgia. The ostensible reason for the war was, 
according to the Russian side, the need to defend South 
Ossetia from Georgian aggression, and according to 
the Georgian side, Russia's unwillingness to have a 
democratic and Westward-leaning Georgia on its border. 
The origins of that war have been extensively researched 
and debated, but they are not the focus of this report.1
The lengthy debates over the war's origins should 
not overshadow the conflict's manifold impact, which 
has extended far beyond the borders of Georgia. The 
war has raised concerns about possible future Russian 
aggression elsewhere in the region - notably, in Ukraine 
- and about the stability of the Georgian state. It has 
created tensions within NATO and has forced the United 
States to revisit its role in the region. The war has also 
served as an unequivocal reminder that Russia will no 
longer allow itself to be treated as a weak and vanquished 
country, challenged the established international regime 
for the recognition of sovereign states, and raised 
questions about Georgia's future as a Western-oriented 
democratic state.
The United States, while not responsible for the war 
itself, played a substantial and not always productive 
role in Georgia and the South Caucasus during the 
years immediately preceding the conflict. In addition 
to helping Georgia reform and build state capacity, the 
United States provided substantial financial and political 
support for Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili's 
government, and it took unproductive public positions 
on Abkhazia and South Ossetia that mirrored those of 
the Georgian leadership. The United States also provided 
weapons and military training to Georgia and failed to 
publicly condemn either Georgia's increasingly martial 
rhetoric regarding Abkhazia and South Ossetia or its 
retreat from the initial democratic gains of the Rose 
Revolution. Most important from the U.S. perspective,
1. The most comprehensive exploration of the origins of the war is the 
Tagliavini report which, while extremely critical of Russia's conduct 
before, during, and after the war, finds that Georgia was most directly 
responsible for starting the war. Report of the Independent Interna­
tional Fact-Finding Mission on the Confl ict in Georgia, September 
30, 2008, http://www.ceiig.ch/Report.html. See also The Guns of 
August 2008, a collection of essays edited by Cornell and Starr that 
argues that Russia had planned the war well in advance and was 
primarily responsible for the war. Svante Cornell and S. Frederick 
Starr, The Guns of August 2008: Russia's War in Georgia (New York: 
M.E. Sharpe, 2009). See also Ronald Asmus, A Little War That Shook 
the World: Georgia, Russia, and the Future of the West (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).
the policy of unwavering support for Tbilisi failed to 
provide U.S. policymakers with sufficient leverage to 
deter Georgian authorities from initiating the disastrous 
August 2008 attack on South Ossetia.2
After the war, the United States immediately put 
together an enormous assistance package to help rebuild 
areas damaged in the war, assist with the humanitarian 
fallout, and support the Georgian economy. Washington 
also has continued to express its support for Georgia's 
sovereignty and territorial integrity, a position that 
necessarily implies the return of Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia to the Georgian state. Additionally, in January 
2009 the United States and Georgia signed a strategic 
partnership agreement. Clearly, the U.S.-Georgian 
relationship remains close, multifaceted, and important.
In the coming years, determining and properly 
structuring the relationship with Georgia will be critical 
to U.S. interests in the region, as well as to U.S. relations 
with Russia and Europe. Moreover, the nature of the 
relationship between Washington and Tbilisi will play a 
major role in Georgia's future development, which, in 
turn, will have a significant impact both within Georgia 
and beyond its borders.
This report focuses on neither the origins of the 2008 
conflict nor the role of the United States in the run-up to 
war; instead, it examines possible ways to get the U.S.- 
Georgia relationship back on track so that shared goals 
can be achieved. In a healthy U.S.-Georgian relationship, 
the United States not only would help Georgia develop 
peacefully and democratically, but would clearly 
articulate and pursue its own interests in the region.
Before turning to the pillars on which the U.S.- 
Georgia relationship should be built and understood, it is 
useful to examine the history of the relationship between 
the two countries.
The United States and Georgia: Partners and Friends?
The United States and Georgia have generally 
had a close relationship since Georgia regained its 
independence in 1991. The two countries established 
formal diplomatic ties in March 1992, shortly after former 
Soviet foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze returned to 
Georgia to lead a new government seeking to stabilize 
the country. The relationship became closer during 
the mid-1990s as then president Shevardnadze initially
2. Alexander Cooley and Lincoln Mitchell, “No Way to Treat Our 
Friends: Recasting Recent U.S.-Georgian Relations,” Washington 
Quarterly 32, no. 1 (2009): 27-41.
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appeared to be a reformer, and Georgia began to receive 
substantial American assistance. The development of the 
BTC (Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan) pipeline, the first significant 
hydrocarbon export pipeline from the Caucasus to 
bypass Russian territory, also brought the two countries 
closer together.
As the 1990s progressed, it became clear that the 
Shevardnadze regime was not going to be a decisive agent 
of reform or democracy. This development, however, did 
not have a major impact on relations between the two 
countries; the United States continued to support Georgia 
throughout Shevardnadze's presidency, which ended 
in November 2003 when he was toppled in the Rose 
Revolution. In addition to providing financial assistance, 
the United States has maintained strong military ties 
with Georgia through a train-and-equip program and the 
presence of a Marine detachment that was stationed in 
the country following the terrorist attacks of September 
11, 2001.3
During the latter years of Shevardnadze's presidency 
in particular, democracy assistance emerged as an 
important component of U.S. assistance to Georgia, on 
top of the United State's economic and humanitarian 
support.4 Throughout this period, the United States 
supported efforts to strengthen Georgian media, civil 
society, and political parties, as well as projects to reform 
and streamline its parliament and government.
The Rose Revolution of 2003-2004, which brought 
Saakashvili to power, was a turning point in the U.S.- 
Georgian relationship. After the Rose Revolution, the 
United States and Georgia grew even closer, and the 
relationship took on a very personal tone as presidents 
Saakashvili and Bush developed a close and mutually 
beneficial bond.
Accordingly, from 2004 until the outbreak of war 
in August 2008, U.S. assistance to Georgia not only 
increased, but moved in a slightly different direction. 
Democracy assistance funding, for example, shifted 
from being oriented mainly toward civil society 
development to being focused on supporting the 
Georgian government. In most other areas unrelated 
to civil society development, funding went directly to 
the government. Throughout this period, the Georgian 
government leveraged its strong personal ties inside the 
U.S. government to ensure that assistance was provided 
in this way. The funding changes were underpinned by 
a U.S. public stance toward Georgia that was unfailingly 
supportive of the Georgian position on the frozen
3. Howard Cincotta, “U.S. Military Aid to Georgia Was Never Di­
rected at Russia,” America.gov, Octobe 6, 2008, http://www.america. 
gov/st/peacesec-english/20081006142300dmslahrellek4.056948e-02. 
html.
4. Lincoln Mitchell, Uncertain Democracy: U.S. Foreign Policy and
Georgia's Rose Revolution (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 2009)
conflicts and correspondingly unsympathetic to, and 
perhaps even unaware of, the views and concerns held 
in Sukhumi and Tskhinvali. Throughout these years, 
the United States continued to view and discuss Georgia 
as an exemplary case of democratic reform, even as the 
reality in Georgia grew to look starkly different. Thus, 
to a substantial extent, U.S. policy toward Georgia was 
driven by an ideologically skewed perception of the 
country's importance that was based significantly on 
overestimating Georgia's democratic credentials and its 
strategic value to the United States.
Recalibrating the Relationship and 
Developing a Vision
Since the war in 2008, the United States and Georgia 
have remained close. U.S. political and financial 
assistance has continued, and it still directly supports the 
state budget, while the Obama administration has issued 
persistent but moderate exhortations to the Georgian 
government to follow through on promises of political 
reform. In January 2009 the two countries signed a new 
Charter on Strategic Partnership, which asserts that 
“we intend to deepen our partnership to the benefit of 
both nations and expand our cooperation across a broad 
spectrum of mutual priorities.” The basis of the bilateral 
relationship, according to the Charter's preamble, is that:
cooperation between our two democracies is 
based on shared values and common interests... 
expanding democracy and economic freedom, 
protecting security and territorial integrity, 
strengthening the rule of law and respect for 
human rights, including the right of dignified, 
secure and voluntary return of all internally 
displaced persons and refugees, supporting 
innovation and technological advances, and 
bolstering Eurasian energy security.5
The basic relationship between the two countries 
has not changed since the war. Georgia remains a friend 
of the United States and continues to receive substantial 
assistance from Washington. The United States remains 
committed, at least rhetorically, to upholding both the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia and 
helping Georgia further integrate into Western and Euro­
Atlantic organizations such as NATO and the EU.
This framework, however, raises questions about 
the sustainability of the relationship and needs to be 
developed into a more complete policy rather than simply
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a combination of a lot of money and a few platitudes. 
The United States needs to build a policy based on a 
sober understanding of what it wants - for both Georgia 
and itself - and what its real interests in the region are. 
This approach should begin with a clear understanding 
of the Georgian context, the U.S.-Georgian bilateral 
relationship, and the United States' capacity to influence 
Georgia in a positive and productive manner.
The United States' postwar policy towards Georgia is 
not altogether wrongheaded, but it lacks strategic vision, 
is not sufficiently grounded in mutual interests, and 
fails to fully appreciate the rapid changes that the war's 
aftermath has brought to the region. Key components 
of U.S. policy, such as the refusal to recognize the 
independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the need 
for greater democracy in Georgia, and the need to rein in 
Russian influence in Georgia and the region, are sound. 
These principles should be the starting points for U.S. 
policy towards Georgia; instead, they currently constitute 
the entire policy.
A useful way to approach crafting a policy is to 
identify the major desirable and realistic outcomes that 
the United States wants to see in Georgia in both the short 
and intermediate terms. Taken together, the following 
big-picture goals can form a vision for the United States 
that could guide its relations with Georgia:
■ Arresting and reversing the assimilation of 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia into Russia;
■ Reducing tensions between Georgia and Russia 
and preventing another conflict from erupting in 
the South Caucasus;
■ Reducing Georgia's dependence on foreign 
assistance;
■ Moving Georgia towards greater democracy 
and political pluralism;
■ Ending the low-level instability that has plagued 
Georgia for more than two years; and
■ Accelerating Georgia's integration and 
partnership with Euro-Atlantic organizations.
These should be the central components of the 
U.S. vision for Georgia. However, these goals are only 
relevant if they are also shared by the Georgian leadership 
and people. Public statements made by Georgian 
leaders on many occasions suggest that these goals are, 
in fact, held by the Georgian government as well. The 
government has repeatedly articulated its concern over 
Russian expansion and the annexation of Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia; it has also expressed interest in becoming
more democratic, joining NATO, and reducing overall 
tensions with its northern neighbor.
The United States also must develop a vision for the 
evolution of the U.S.-Georgian relationship. The major 
goals driving that vision should include:
■ Grounding an alliance on the shared interests 
and values of two sovereign states;
■ Continuing Georgian support for U.S. and 
international military efforts in Afghanistan; 
and
■ Helping Georgia develop several stable 
alliances, rather than relying on the United 
States as its primary patron.
Last, the United States should be clear on what its 
goals are in Georgia and in the region. These goals are 
distinct from both the vision that the United States and 
Georgia share for Georgia and the vision that the United 
States has for its relationship with Georgia. Key U.S. 
priorities in Georgia and the South Caucasus include:
■ Avoiding further military conflict in general, but 
more specifically between Georgia and Russia;
■ Limiting the expansion of Russian influence in 
the region and encouraging the integration of 
the region into the international economy and 
institutions of global governance;
■ Ensuring ongoing movement of energy 
resources from Central Asia and the Caspian 
Sea region to Europe;
■ Re-establishing U.S. credibility in the South 
Caucasus as a key regional actor and potential 
external partner;
■ Continuing access for the U.S. military and 
military transport in support of the war in 
Afghanistan; and
■ Ensuring internal stability in all countries in the 
region.
This is a complex and ambitious vision, but it also can 
guide U.S. policy toward Georgia in a more holistic and 
thoughtful way. It will not be easy to turn this vision into 
reality, so a strategy for achieving this vision needs to be 
developed; this is the goal of our project.
AFTER THE AUGUST WAR
Four Foundations
of the U.S.-Georgia Relationship
The U.S.-Georgia relationship is, and will 
likely continue to be, built upon four major areas of 
engagement and concern: the U.S.-Georgia Charter on 
Strategic Partnership, the conflict with Russia and the 
territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, democratic 
development and democracy assistance, and postwar aid 
and reconstruction assistance.
U.S.-Georgia Charter on Strategic Partnership
The U.S.-Georgia Charter on Strategic Partnership 
was signed in January 2009 and now serves as an anchoring 
document for much of U.S.-Georgian engagement. The 
agreement received very little attention and scrutiny in 
the United States, as it was concluded in the waning days 
of the Bush administration, but in Georgia it was viewed 
as a significant development and a major achievement 
of Saakashvili's government. Moreover, the agreement 
has been received asymmetrically; whereas in Georgia 
the partnership has been presented as evidence of U.S. 
support of the government and even as the advancement 
of a security commitment, the United States has 
understood the document as a method of routinizing 
and institutionalizing ties across a number of important 
issues. Although the Charter provides a solid basis for 
structuring U.S.-Georgian relations, commitments of this 
type might also raise problems for the United States if 
the agreement is not adequately monitored and if the two 
sides do not share a common understanding of the exact 
scope and aims of the partnership.
Abkhazia and South Ossetia
At first glance, the August war strengthened 
Russia's influence in these two regions. Paradoxically 
for both Sukhumi and Tskhinvali, their recognition as 
“independent states” by Moscow has only served to 
accelerate their annexation by the Russian Federation. 
While it is extremely unlikely that these territories will 
become part of Georgia in the near future, certain steps 
can be taken to slow their assimilation into Russia. The 
current U.S. policy of non-recognition of independence is 
the right position and a good foundation for a policy, but 
such a policy needs to be further elaborated and developed. 
A policy of engaging Abkhazia without recognizing its 
independence can begin to slow the strengthening of ties 
between Abkhazia and Russia. However, South Ossetia 
is a more difficult case because it lacks even the most 
basic attributes of political autonomy, let alone potential 
sovereignty. Differentiating U.S. policy toward Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia is an important step in formulating a 
more effective and independent U.S. strategy regarding 
the breakaway territories. In general, the United States 
must approach these issues within the framework of
conflict resolution rather than the restoration of Georgia's 
territorial integrity. In the long run, ironically, the best 
way to achieve the latter may be to focus on the former.
Democracy
Georgia's post-Rose Revolution democratic 
development has been uneven; while few gains were 
made after the initial breakthrough in late 2003, troubling 
signs of backsliding in this area becoming more serious 
beginning in late 2007. The failure of democracy to 
develop adequately in Georgia has become a larger 
problem for the United States because Georgia, particularly 
between 2004 and 2008, was cited so frequently by U.S. 
policymakers as a success story for democracy and U.S. 
democracy assistance. This obviously flawed assertion 
contributed to a view throughout the region that the 
United States was not serious about democracy and that 
it saw the promotion of “democratic values” as a means 
of pursuing its own regional strategic goals by securing 
the loyalty of a political client. In fact, the United States' 
refusal to comment on Georgia's democratic backsliding 
has seriously eroded U.S. credibility with regard to its 
commitment to democracy, both in the South Caucasus 
and more broadly. For Georgia, democracy is tied directly 
to national security; membership in NATO, for example, 
will remain a dream so long as Georgia falls short of most 
democratic measures. Similarly, Georgia's democratic 
shortcomings, such as the dominance of a single political 
party, the lack of free media, and the concentration of 
power within the office of the president, have come 
to characterize the last few years in Georgia and have 
contributed to instability and economic stagnation both 
within and beyond its borders. Thus, improving the 
quality of Georgia's democratic governance is as much 
a strategic goal as it is a normative one.
Postwar Assistance
Immediately following the war in August 2008, 
the United States put together an assistance package of 
roughly one billion dollars to help Georgia rebuild and 
recover from the effects of the conflict. Nearly a quarter 
of this package was used for direct budget support, 
a nearly unprecedented move in the history of U.S. 
foreign assistance practice. Other supporters of Georgia, 
primarily in Europe, pledged several billion dollars more 
in assistance. These funds will help Georgia rebuild, but 
the financial relationship is now a cornerstone of U.S.- 
Georgian relations. The provision of assistance links the 
United States even more closely with Georgia and has 
helped insulate the Georgian government from the dual 
internal shocks of a failed military conflict and a deep 
financial crisis. This assistance package also ensures 
that U.S. influence in Georgia, if properly leveraged, will 
remain strong. Therefore, understanding how the money 
has been spent and how it can be used more effectively is 
critically important for a sound U.S. policy on Georgia.
I.
THE U.S.-GEORGIA CHARTER 
ON STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP
The U.S.-Georgia Charter on Strategic Partnership 
was signed in Washington on January 9, 2009, by outgoing 
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Georgian 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Grigol Vashadze. The 
Georgian government and media hailed the agreement as 
a major foreign policy triumph, with President Mikheil 
Saakashvili claiming during his New Year's address that 
“a new stage is beginning for Georgia's international 
relations by the signing of the agreement.” On the U.S. 
side, although there was little public discussion or media 
attention on the agreement, the incoming administration 
of President-elect Barack Obama not only accepted 
the agreement, but moved decisively to implement its 
various directives, goals, and institutional ties. Thus, even 
in the context of pursuing the “reset” of U.S.-Russian 
relations, the Obama administration has emphasized its 
commitment to Tbilisi and has channeled much of this 
engagement through the Charter.
For the United States, the U.S.-Georgia Charter is a 
rather idiosyncratic document. Comparatively speaking, 
the United States has signed a number of similarly titled 
bilateral strategic agreements - 17 by one analyst's 
estimate - with other countries, including Afghanistan, 
Australia, Brazil, India, Indonesia, Israel, and Pakistan.1 
Just three weeks before the signing of the U.S.-Georgia 
Charter, Washington signed a charter on strategic 
partnership with Ukraine. The 1998 U.S.-Baltic charter 
was the first such agreement concluded with Soviet 
successor states. However, the U.S.-Georgia Charter is 
distinct in terms of form, substance, and its vision for a 
broad degree of U.S. engagement in Georgia's internal 
affairs, particularly on matters of democratization; 
therefore, the charter merits closer scrutiny.
The U.S.-Georgia Charter comprises five articles.2 
The Preamble and Article I articulate the broad principles 
of friendship and cooperation for the U.S.-Georgian 
relationship, including the United States' commitment to 
upholding the principles of democracy, independence, and 
territorial integrity and deepening Georgia's integration 
into the Euro-Atlantic community. The remaining articles
1. Cory Welt, “How Strategic is the US-Georgia Strategic Partnership?” 
(unpublished paper part of the series of seminars on Limited Sover­
eignty and Soft Borders in Southeastern Europe and the Former Soviet 
States: The Challenges and Political Consequences of Future Changes 
in Legal Status, Harriman Institute, New York, 2010), 3.
2. See United States-Georgia Charter on Strategic Partnership, Janu­
ary 2009.
are dedicated to the topics of “Defense and Security 
Cooperation” (Article II); “Economic, Trade, and Energy 
Cooperation” (Article III); “Strengthening Democracy 
[in Georgia]” (Article IV); and “Increasing People-to- 
People and Cultural Exchanges” (Article V).
The Charter's article on Georgia's democratization 
is especially noteworthy. Article IV includes itemized 
commitments to support Georgia's independent media, 
strengthen the rule of law and the independence of the 
judiciary, promote good governance and transparency, 
increase political pluralism both within and outside 
of the party system, and strengthen the capacity of 
Georgia's civil society. An observer would be hard- 
pressed to find such an exhaustive list of goals regarding 
the domestic democratization of a U.S. partner in any 
other of the United States' bilateral strategic agreements. 
For example, the charter with Ukraine includes an article 
on democracy, but it makes no mention of promoting 
Ukrainian civil society or expanding pluralism within 
Ukraine's party system. The 1998 U.S. charter with the 
Baltic states contained no separate article dedicated to 
democracy, but it did contain an entire article dedicated 
to promoting the Baltic states' integration into formal 
Euro-Atlantic institutions, including the OSCE, EU, 
and NATO - something that is conspicuously absent in 
the U.S.-Georgia Charter.3 As Cory Welt observes in his 
assessment of the Charter, “Georgian democracy is an 
essential foundation for the success of the partnership.”4 
This perception is shared by many members of Georgia's 
political opposition, several of whom have called for the 
inclusion of concrete benchmarks in the Charter so that 
the United States can assess Georgia's progress on its 
democratic commitments.5
The Form of the Charter:
Institutionalization and Asymmetry
Both the United States and Georgia should view the 
Charter as a positive development. For the United States,
3. A Charter of Partnership among the United States of America and 
Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania, January 1998, http://www.latvia-usa. 
org/usbalchar.html.
4. Welt, “How Strategic is the US-Georgia Strategic Partnership?” 11.
5. “Georgian Opposition Appeals to U.S. to promote, Guarantee Po­
litical Reform,” Rferl.org, July 22, 2009, http://www.rferl.org/content/ 
Georgian_Opposition_Appeals_To_US_To_Promote_Guarantee_Po- 
litical_Reform/1783010.html.
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the document establishes an institutional framework for 
engaging Georgia across a number of important issues. 
Furthermore, institutionalization offers a welcome break 
from relying excessively on individual relationships, a 
practice that often allowed the U.S.-Georgian relationship 
to be driven by personalities and ideology rather than 
clear articulations of mutual interests.6 For Georgia, the 
Charter provides a much-needed public commitment 
from the United States and a psychological boost as it 
deals with a devastating military defeat and the apparent 
end of its aspirations to join NATO.
However, U.S. policymakers should be mindful 
that, in the year following the signing of the Charter, 
Tbilisi has trumpeted the significance of the document 
while misrepresenting many of its provisions and 
goals, especially in the area of security, for domestic 
political reasons. In practice, two noteworthy features 
characterize the Charter: its institutionalization within 
the respective bureaucracies of the signatory states, and 
the considerable asymmetry of obligations imposed upon 
the partners.
First, the Charter places Georgia's engagement with 
Euro-Atlantic institutions and the United States within 
a series of concrete institutions and processes. The U.S. 
reaffirms its commitment to Georgia's candidacy for 
NATO membership and critically places U.S.-Georgian 
military cooperation within the framework of the NATO- 
Georgia Commission, which itself establishes a set of 
benchmarks and periodic reviews that in many ways 
resemble a Membership Action Program (MAP). The 
Charter's security article emphasizes the importance 
of “[strengthening] Georgia's candidacy for NATO 
membership” and places “enhanced training and military 
equipment for Georgian forces” and the “[increased] 
interoperability and coordination of capabilities” within 
the framework of the NATO-Georgia Commission.
The charter establishes four working groups to 
discuss U.S.-Georgian bilateral relations in terms of 
economic and energy issues, defense and security, 
democracy, and people-to-people exchanges. On the U.S. 
side, the working groups are comprised of high-level 
interagency delegations from differing bureaucracies. 
For example, Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, 
Human Rights, and Labor Michael Posner led the U.S. 
delegation that was sent to the November 2009 meeting 
of the working group on democracy. Similarly, Assistant 
Secretary of State for Economic, Energy, and Business 
Affairs Jose Fernandez headed the U.S. delegation 
at the February 2010 meeting of the economic and 
energy working group, and both Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for International Security Affairs Alexander 
Vershbow and Assistant Secretary of State for European
6. See Alexander Cooley and Lincoln Mitchell, “No Way to Treat Our 
Friends: Recasting Recent U.S.-Georgian Relations.”
and Eurasian Affairs Philip Gordon co-chaired the June
2009 meeting of the security working group. Interagency 
cooperation on the U.S. side is particularly striking and 
ensures that a variety of policymakers can bring their 
perspectives to bear on the working groups' agendas. 
By comparison, the U.S. charter with Ukraine yielded 
only working groups on the topics of non-proliferation 
and export controls and energy security. Neither of these 
working groups has featured the same level of high- 
ranking officials on the U.S. side.7
Second, notwithstanding the language of 
partnership, the structure of the Charter remains 
fundamentally asymmetrical. For almost all issues, 
the working groups have focused on fostering specific 
reforms and institutional changes in Georgia, sometimes 
on a quite detailed and specific level. For example, a 
central concern of the November 2009 meeting of the 
democracy working group was ensuring that the May
2010 local elections in Georgia, specifically the Tbilisi 
mayoral race, would be conducted under a set of rules 
that guarantees a level playing field.8 In January 2010 
the economic group announced a plan for the United 
States to invest up to $124 million on projects to improve 
Georgia's infrastructure, including the development of a 
new hydropower plant and a new domestic gas pipeline, 
and the upgrade of two electric power transmission lines. 
The agreement included a Georgian commitment to 
undergo external arbitration as an adjudication procedure 
in case of a dispute with investors; this type of procedure 
is widely seen as interfering in the sovereignty of a host 
state.9 Thus, despite the language of partnership, the 
United States' considerable involvement in Georgia's 
internal affairs, as institutionalized by the Charter, 
makes the U.S.-Georgian relationship more akin to a 
patron-client arrangement rather than an alliance or a 
traditionally understood symmetrical partnership.
7. Writing about the Charter, David Smith observed that “the charter 
is a framework that must be filled in by intertwining diverse bureau­
cracies in both countries. That is not a bad thing - given the breadth of 
the document, it could not have been otherwise.” Quick comparisons 
with other U.S. charters, however, such as that with Ukraine, suggest 
that other less rigorous formats of implementation are actually the 
norm. See David Smith, “The Prospects for the U.S.-Georgia Charter 
on Strategic Partnership,” Central Asia - Caucasus Institute Analyst, 
February 25, 2009, http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5049.
8. Moreover, the mayoral race was regarded by the United States 
as another test of Georgia's commitment to democratic reform. 
However, the U.S. failed to get involved in the negotiations around 
the electoral system for the race thus allowing the government to set 
a 30% threshold to avoid a runoff all but insuring a victory for the 
government candidate.
9. See Gus Van Harten, Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).
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The Asymmetric Security Partnership
The asymmetrical nature of the partnership is 
clearly visible in the uneven commitments (and their 
interpretation) outlined in the security article of the 
Charter. The final clause of the security article states 
that, “building on the existing cooperation among their 
respective agencies and armed forces, the United States 
supports the efforts of Georgia to provide for its legitimate 
security and defense needs, including development of 
appropriate and NATO-interoperable military forces.”
The phrase “legitimate security and defense needs” 
has already been subject to differing interpretation 
between the two sides. Georgia has made a point 
of supporting the United States in all of its overseas 
military missions, including the Obama administration's 
current troop surge to Afghanistan. For Tbilisi, Georgia's 
contribution, which will increase to nearly 1,000 troops, 
makes it a significant participant because it is sending 
the most troops per capita of any country. Underscoring 
Georgia's reliability as a coalition partner and referring 
to the security elements of the Charter, the Georgian 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Grigol Varshadze made the 
following statement in June 2009:
Georgia has shown its commitment to our 
American partner during its most difficult times. 
We have always supported the U.S. in the fight 
against terrorism. We have already partnered 
with the U.S. in Iraq, where Georgia was one 
of the largest contributors to the coalition 
forces. Additionally, despite the fragile security 
environment in Georgia, we have made the 
decision to contribute to the International 
Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, and 
will send a re-enforced company there in the 
coming months.10
Despite Tbilisi's commitments to support U.S. 
and NATO overseas campaigns, the relationship falls 
well short of actually providing Georgia with the 
concrete guarantees that it believes are necessary to 
secure its “legitimate defense and security needs.” The 
institutionalization of the NATO-Georgia commission in 
a type of parallel MAP framework is noteworthy, but it 
offers neither the promise of a future MAP nor any sort 
of common defense commitment akin to Article V of the 
North Atlantic Treaty. As Matthew Bryza, the outgoing 
deputy assistant secretary of state for European and 
Eurasian Affairs, stressed during an interview for Imedi
10. Remarks by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Georgia H.E. Mr. 
Grigol Vashadze at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
June 23, 2009, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/Minister_Va- 
shadze%20Prepared%20Remarks.pdf.
TV in January 2009, the U.S.-Georgia Charter did not 
represent “a security guarantee.” Bryza further explained 
that “security guarantees will come along with NATO 
membership.”11
Nevertheless, some officials in Tbilisi talk about the 
Charter as if it does contain a U.S. security guarantee. In 
March 2009 in an interview with Georgian TV, Interior 
Minister Vano Merabishvili stated that the chief reason 
why Russia and Georgia would not engage in another 
military conflict is that the Charter provides Georgia 
a “serious security guarantee.”12 Based on public 
discourse in Georgia, the degree to which Washington 
has committed, formally or otherwise, to assist with 
Georgia's territorial defense has been exaggerated. Welt 
observes that the tone of statements made by U.S. defense 
officials on the nature of the United States' commitments 
outlined in the Charter seems to have shifted since the 
document was signed. In February 2009 Carter Ham, 
commanding general of the U.S. Army Europe, stated 
that Georgian military planning had shifted in the 
direction of “territorial defense.” However, General 
James Cartwright, vice chairman of the U.S. military's 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, explained one month later in 
Tbilisi that U.S. military training would be “focused on 
the defense of Georgia, on ... internal defense.”13 The 
Obama administration has distanced itself from such 
statements since summer 2009.
Uncertainty over the exact scope of U.S. support for 
Georgia's “defense needs” has been fueled by ongoing 
disagreements between Washington and Tbilisi over 
U.S. military assistance and its potential rearmament of 
Georgia.14 In prepared remarks for the Senate Committee 
on Foreign Relations in August 2009, Assistant Secretary 
of Defense for International Security Affairs Alexander 
Vershbow stated that “this is an opportunity to clarify 
both what we are doing and what we have not done. The 
U.S. has not ‘rearmed' Georgia as some have claimed.
There has been no lethal military assistance to Georgia 
since the August confl ict. No part of the $1 billion U.S. 
assistance package went to the Ministry of Defense 
[emphasis added].”15
11. “Georgia, U.S. Sign Strategic Partnership Charter,” Civil.ge, Janu­
ary 9, 2009, http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=20248.
12. Quoted in Liz Fuller, “Does U.S. Charter Protect Georgia Against 
Renewed Conflict With Russia?” Rferl.org, March 11, 2009, http:// 
www.rferl.org/content/Does_US_Charter_Protect_Georgia_Against_  
Renewed_Conflict_With_Russia/1508110.html.
13. Welt, “How Strategic is the US-Georgia Strategic Partnership?” 
7-8.
14. See “US may rearm Georgia, despite Moscow's opposition,” 
theage.com.au, July 24, 2009, http://news.theage.com.au/breaking- 
news-world/us-may-rearm-georgia-despite-moscows-opposition- 
20090724-dv9t.html.
15. Testimony of Ambassador Alexander Vershbow, Assistant Secre­
tary of Defense for International Security Affairs before the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee for Europe, August 4, 
2009, http://foreign.senate.gov/testimony/2009/VershbowTestimon-
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Georgia's Involvement in the Northern Distribution 
Network
A more recent development related to the United 
States' campaign in Afghanistan involves Georgia's 
position in the emerging Northern Distribution Network 
(NDN). The NDN was developed by U.S. defense 
planners in response to a series of attacks on U.S. logistics 
routes in Pakistan in 2008 that threatened to seriously 
disrupt U.S. supply lines for the Afghanistan campaign. 
After negotiating with individual governments, including 
Russia and countries in the Caucasus and Central Asia, 
the U.S. Department of Defense's Transportation 
Command and Central Command in spring 2009 unfurled 
a plan to ship hundreds of containers per week through 
NDN North (originating in the Baltics and then heading 
southwards via Russia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan) and 
NDN South (from Georgia to Uzbekistan via Azerbaijan 
and Kazakhstan). NDN South originates at the Georgian 
port of Poti, where shipments are loaded onto railcars 
that traverse Georgia and Azerbaijan. Once the shipments 
reach the Caspian Sea, they are ferried to the Kazakh port 
of Aktau and then shipped by truck across Kazakhstan 
and Uzbekistan to the distribution point at the logistics 
y090804p.pdf, 3.
hub of Termez.
Overall, defense and logistics planners hope that up 
to 30% of all Afghanistan-bound U.S. military cargo can 
be delivered through the NDN. Of the two branches, the 
Southern route is more expensive, as it involves multiple 
changes in the mode of transportation. However, NDN 
advocates claim that NDN South may offer additional 
strategic benefits beyond the Afghanistan campaign. For 
example, a report on NDN from the Center of Strategic 
and Institutional Studies, the main organization studying 
and advocating for NDN, states:
the immediate purpose of the NDN and the Cau­
casus corridor is to provide for supply route 
diversification for U.S. and NATO forces in 
Afghanistan. But, for the long-term goal of stabi­
lizing and developing Afghanistan, the blossom­
ing trade and transport route through the Cauca­
sus will play no small part. Despite and because 
of its major pitfalls, the corridor through Georgia 
and Azerbaijan is of strategic significance beyond 
its current role as a supply alternative.16
16. Andrew Kuchins and Thomas Sanderson, “The Northern Distribu­
tion Network and Afghanistan: Geopolitical Challenges and Op­
portunities,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, January
20
A NEW STRATEGY FOR U.S. ENGAGEMENT IN GEORGIA
Georgia's involvement in NDN is important, but so 
too is avoiding a scenario in which Georgia's integration 
in the NDN supersedes the aims and provisions of the 
Charter.
In sum, while Georgia is an ally of the United States in 
its overseas military and stabilization campaigns, neither 
the United States nor NATO reciprocate by providing 
for Georgia's territorial defense. Maintaining the 
delicate balance between integrating Georgia into NATO 
structures and the international effort in Afghanistan 
while refraining from committing to Georgia's direct 
defense remains a logical, but ultimately precarious, 
position that the Charter has established. Accordingly, it 
is vitally important that all branches of the U.S. defense 
policy establishment, including the regional commands 
and logistical agencies involved in NDN, understand 
this state of affairs and work actively to maintain this 
balance.
Georgia's Democratic Significance 
vs. Strategic Significance
Clearly, the Charter fosters engagement on a broad 
array of issues and provides a useful blueprint for 
structuring U.S.-Georgian interactions. We have noted 
that, while a bilateral strategic partnership agreement 
is not uncommon from a U.S. perspective, the degree 
of institutionalization, asymmetry, and emphasis on 
democracy in the U.S.-Georgia Charter are unique.
The emphasis on democracy is warranted as 
democratic consolidation is critically important for 
Georgia's own international future. Consolidating 
political reforms is not only a prerequisite for Georgia's 
aspirations for partnership, and perhaps eventual 
membership, in NATO or the European Union; it also 
represents Georgia's own best justification for why 
it should be further integrated into the transatlantic 
community.
On the other hand, it is important to soberly assess 
and avoid exaggerating Georgia's strategic importance. 
The country's contribution to the international effort 
in Afghanistan, both as a supplier of troops and as the 
origin of the NDN South supply corridor, is welcome but 
not indispensable to the U.S. war effort. For example, 
the United States currently pays the expenses associated 
with the deployment of Georgian forces in Afghanistan, 
as it did earlier for Georgian troops serving in Iraq. 
Furthermore, Georgia's position as a state wishing to 
break free from Russia's sphere of influence is laudable 
but no longer unique. In fact, contrary to analysts' dire 
predictions that the August 2008 war would re-establish
2010, http://csis.org/files/publication/091229_Kuchins_NDNandAf- 
ghan_Web.pdf, 17.
Russian influence and control over the former Soviet 
space, quite the opposite has happened; since summer 
2008, Moscow has faced increasing public confrontations 
with countries such as Belarus, Moldova, Turkmenistan, 
and Uzbekistan, as most Eurasian countries are now 
vigorously pursuing some form of multivectorism in 
their foreign policies.17
Similarly, it is important to not overstate Tbilisi's 
overall importance to the Eurasian energy distribution 
architecture. The energy picture in Eurasia, especially 
in terms of natural gas, is rapidly changing.18 The 
broad perception that was dominant in 2007-2008 
held that Russia would consolidate its monopolistic 
position as a regional gas provider, thereby threatening 
Europe's energy supplies and making Southern Energy 
Corridor projects, such as Nabucco, vital for Europe's 
energy security; however, this theory no longer holds. 
The December 2009 opening of the China-Central 
Asia pipeline, which is expected to deliver 40 bcm of 
Turkmen gas per year to China via Uzbekistan and 
Kazakhstan, dealt a major blow to Moscow's dominance 
over energy infrastructure, as it is the first Eurasian 
gas pipeline to serve as a significant alternative to the 
old Soviet network that is firmly controlled by Russia. 
Furthermore, the financial crisis has severely depressed 
European energy demand, thereby curtailing Gazprom's 
supplies to Europe, and has precipitated the import of 
new quantities of liquefied natural gas (LNG), especially 
from Qatar, as part of Europe's emerging energy mix. 
These factors have already empowered Central Asian 
and Caspian suppliers, as well as European customers, in 
their negotiations with Gazprom.
These developments neither mean that Georgia's 
role in the Southern Energy Corridor is unimportant 
nor suggest that Nabucco should not be built. However, 
they demonstrate that energy security in Eurasia is 
highly dynamic. Thus, continuing to present Georgia as 
the linchpin of European energy security unnecessarily 
presents the energy sector in dated zero-sum geopolitical 
terms that may actually be politically counterproductive.
Most importantly, overstating Georgia's strategic 
importance - either as a security partner or as an “energy 
corridor” - risks raising expectations among Georgian 
authorities, as happened during the lead-up to the 
August 2008 war, and potentially generating an inflated 
expectation of U.S. strategic commitments to Georgia. 
Moreover, it may encourage Georgian authorities to 
more aggressively pursue the defense and security
17. On the erosion of Russia's influence over the Central Asian states, 
see Alexander Cooley, “Behind the Central Asian Curtain: the Limits 
of Russia's Resurgence,” Current History (2009): 325-332.
18. For an overview on energy infrastructure in Eurasia, see “Natural 
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aspects of the Charter commitments at the expense of its 
democratic commitments. Such an outcome would not 
only reverse steps toward Georgia's democratization but 
could once again distort the mutual expectations about 
the relationship that are carefully laid out in the Charter.
To reiterate, Georgia's greatest “strategic asset” 
is not its location or its role as an energy hub but its 
actual democratic potential, Western orientation, and 
commitment to Euro-Atlantic values and principles. 
Accordingly, while it is important to develop the U.S.- 
Georgian partnership on a number of issues, including 
defense and energy, Georgia's democratic development 
must remain central to the relationship and should serve 
as the long-term foundation for the bilateral relationship. 
As such, the Charter's emphasis on Georgia's 
democratization may be unusual, but it is also warranted 
and its terms must be upheld.
Recommendations
■ Institutionalize regular working group meetings
established by the Charter.
The U.S.-Georgia Charter on Strategic Partner­
ship is an important attempt to institutionalize the 
various dimensions of U.S.-Georgian relations in 
a transparent and cooperative manner. The suc­
cess of the Charter will be determined by whether 
it continues to deepen bilateral cooperation across 
a number of issues.
■ Ensure that U.S. defense cooperation with Geor­
gia is developed under the auspices of the Charter 
and its goals.
U.S. defense commitments and policies toward 
Georgia should be developed within the context 
of the Charter and its commitments. Regional 
(EUCOM, CENTCOM) and functional (TRANS- 
COM) commands should ensure that their coop­
eration and contacts with Georgia are consistent 
with the Charter's aims and goals. The commands 
should be careful not to strike separate bargains 
or understandings with Georgian defense officials 
that could undercut the now-established U.S. 
policy stance on issues like U.S. security commit­
ments to Georgia and the country's rearmament.
■ Clarify publicly that the Charter does not provide
a U.S. security guarantee to Georgia.
While the Charter provides for security coopera­
tion, training, and the improvement of Georgian 
capabilities to meet NATO inter-operability re­
quirements, U.S. officials should clarify that such 
cooperation does not include a U.S. guarantee to 
defend Georgia. This issue has been misrepre-
sented by members of the Georgian government 
and remains misunderstood by the Georgian press 
and general public.
■ Avoid publicly over-in fl ating Georgia's impor­
tance as a security partner and energy transit 
state.
■ Georgia's relative importance lies not in its 
military contributions or its role as an energy hub, 
but in its Western orientation, democratic poten­
tial, and demonstrated desire to join transatlantic 
institutions. There are some strategic dimensions 
to the relationship, but the more that they are em­
phasized by U.S. officials, the less likely it is that 
Georgian authorities will view upholding their 
democratic commitments as a key part of their 
bilateral agreement with the United States.
■ Clarify the Charter's goals, provisions, and 
processes for the international community Adher­
ing to the Charter's goals embeds U.S.-Georgian 
relations in a more secure, institutionalized, and 
transparent framework and gives a clear signal of 
the scope and substance of the relationship to our 
European allies and the Russian Federation.
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II.
Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
Before and After the War
Background
Since the Russia-Georgia war in August 2008, the Unit­
ed States and Europe have provided significant financial 
support to help rebuild Georgia but have failed to develop 
a forward-looking strategy towards Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia. Western countries responded appropriately by 
refusing to recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia after 
the war. However, this does not constitute a strategy. On 
the other hand, the West's pledges of enduring support 
for Georgia's territorial integrity, even as that Georgian 
dream lays in tatters after the war, is well-intentioned but 
has little meaning now that Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
are no longer in any real sense part of Georgia.
The Abkhaz and South Ossetian conflicts did not 
emerge full-blown in the summer of 2008; rather, they 
had been festering since the early 1990s, when both ter­
ritories engaged in wars of secession.1 For most of the 
mid-1990s and 2000s, the Western, particularly U.S., po­
sition on these issues dovetailed with Tbilisi's stance.2 
From this perspective, South Ossetia and Abkhazia were 
integral parts of Georgia, so policies were oriented to­
ward restoring Georgia's territorial integrity under some 
type of federalist formula rather than resolving the con­
flict.
Although Georgian sovereign claims on these ter­
ritories should be taken seriously, and restoring Georgian 
control over a portion of these regions may be the best 
eventual outcome, the post-Soviet history of Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia is complex and requires close con­
sideration. For example, when Georgia voted for inde­
pendence in 1991, Abkhazia voted to stay in the Soviet 
Union. Thus, from the very beginning of Georgia's inde­
pendence, its control of Abkhazia was tenuous. Accord­
1. For an analysis of the background causes and a timeline of the 
lead-up to the conflict, see the Report of the Independent Interna­
tional Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, 2009. Further 
analyses of Russia's intentions and the causes of the conflict are 
given in Charles King, “The five-day war: Managing Moscow after 
the Georgia crisis,” Foreign Affairs, November/December 2008.; and 
Asmus, A little war that shook the world: Georgia, Russia and the 
future of the West, 2010.
2. On how the U.S.-Georgian relationship evolved before the war,
see Alexander Cooley and Lincoln Mitchell, “No Way to Treat Our 
Friends,” The Washington Quarterly. On EU policy towards Georgia, 
see Richard G. Whitman and Stefan Wolff, ‘The EU as a conflict man­
ager? The case of Georgia and its implications,' International Affairs 
86:1 (January 2010): 87-107.
ingly, post-Soviet Georgia has never really exercised 
sovereignty over Abkhazia, except perhaps for a few 
months in 1991; even before the war in 2008, Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia were a long way from being pulled 
back into Georgia's orbit.3 Thus, while Georgia may 
see itself as the rightful ruler of Abkhazia, the view in 
Sukhumi has always been quite different.
By 2008 the notion of Georgia's control over these 
territories was largely aspirational; nonetheless, the war 
with Russia has changed some basic political dynamics 
pertaining to South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Due to the 
war, these territories almost certainly are lost to Georgia 
for the short and medium terms - possibly for a period 
of decades - and Russian influence has increased sub­
stantially in both regions. Russia has formally recog­
nized the independence of these regions and has sought 
international support (particularly from Latin American 
nations) for the policy. At the same time, Russia has 
strengthened its military, political, and economic control 
over Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Thus, since 2008, any 
change to the status of either Abkhazia or South Osse­
tia means taking something concrete away from Russia, 
which makes resolving the legal status of the territories a 
much more difficult task.
The speed at which Russia has forged new ties with 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia underscores the urgent need 
for the Western community to formulate a forward­
looking strategy towards the territories, particularly 
Abkhazia. In this section, we propose a basic outline of 
a new approach that we call “engagement without rec­
ognition.” According to this strategy, Abkhazia would 
be given the opportunity to engage with the West on a 
number of political, economic, social, and cultural issues 
for the purpose of lessening Russia's influence in the re­
gion while giving the West more leverage in Sukhumi. 
While undertaking this strategy, officials must make it 
clear that Abkhazia's status as an independent state will 
never be accepted by either the United States or the Eu­
ropean Union.
3. For background and proposals for various sovereign arrangements, 
see Bruno Coppieters and David Darchiashvili et al., eds. Federal 
practice: Exploring alternatives for Georgia and Abkhazia (Brussels: 
VUB University Press, 2000).
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The First Step: Differentiating Strategies
Towards Abkhazia and South Ossetia
Frequently, Abkhazia and South Ossetia are linked 
together in the minds of policy makers and observers. 
Both territories fought wars of secession against Georgia 
in the early 1990s; both were viewed as frozen conflict 
areas for many of the past 15 years; and both were recog­
nized simultaneously and unilaterally as independent na­
tions by Russia in August 2008. However, any forward­
looking policy towards these territories must recognize 
that there are major differences between them, and the 
West should develop a unique policy towards each ter­
ritory.
Abkhazia's population (roughly 220,000 people) is
much larger than that of South Ossetia (40,000-60,000 
people). Unlike South Ossetia, Abkhazia displays at 
least some viability as an independent, or even autono­
mous, polity. Independent statehood for South Ossetia, 
with its tiny population, isolated geographic location, 
and lack of any economic base is prima facie absurd. The 
specific challenges facing South Ossetia, including the 
heavy, concentrated presence of Russian military forces 
and the very real security dilemma caused by its proxim­
ity to Tbilisi, make crafting a policy toward the region 
a particularly confounding task.4 South Ossetians have 
evinced some interest in exploring arrangements with 
North Ossetia, which is located just across the border 
in the Russian Federation, or even a union with Russia 
along the lines of the Russia-Belarus Union State.5 For 
all practical purposes, Russia controls South Ossetia's 
leadership and all strategically sensitive appointments in 
its cabinet and security services.6
The idea of an independent Abkhazia is plausible, 
and it reflects the desire of most current residents of the 
territory. Abkhazia's long Black Sea coastline, which 
could facilitate contacts with foreign nations other than 
Russia, and limited natural resource endowments lend 
it some attributes of statehood. Moreover, the more de­
veloped state of its political institutions, including semi­
competitive elections, multiple political parties, civil 
society groups, and some nominally independent media 
outlets, suggests that Abkhazia has the capacity for self­
governance or at least political autonomy.7 Interestingly
4. On the particularities of South Ossetia, see “Georgia's South Osse­
tia Conflict: Make haste slowly.” International Crisis Group, June 7, 
2007, http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4887&rss=1.
5. The Union of Belarus and Russia was established in 1996 with the 
intention of integrating the two countries and eventually creating a 
federation of the two states.
6. See “'Exotic Schemes' in Russia's Georgia Policy,” Jamestown 
Foundation, February 4, 2010, http://jamestownfoundation.blogspot. 
com/2010/02/exotic-schemes-in-russias-georgia.html.
7. For example, Freedom House's 2009 assessment of Abkhazia's
political institutions, which it characterizes as “partly free.” See
http://freedomhouse.org/inc/content/pubs/fiw/inc_country_detail.
cfm?year=2009&country=7744&pf
enough, the Abkhaz leadership seems split on whether 
or not to highlight the differences between South Osse­
tia and Abkhazia. Officially, Abkhazia recognizes South 
Ossetia's independence, and the two territories have con­
cluded a mutual defense pact, but some members of the 
Abkhaz leadership believe that Georgia - and by exten­
sion, the West - would rather present the image of South 
Ossetia, a weak and dependent polity, as the face of Ab­
khazia's political aspirations in order to deny them.8
At the same time, the issue of Georgian internally 
displaced persons (IDPs) still looms large in Abkhazia. 
During the war in Abkhazia in the early 1990s, approxi­
mately 250,000 ethnic Georgians living in Abkhazia 
were forced to flee their homes and seek refuge else­
where in Georgia.9 These people remain displaced more 
than 15 years after the conflict, despite receiving promis­
es from Tbilisi in recent years that they would be able to 
return to their homes imminently. The expulsion of eth­
nic Georgians from Abkhazia means that the territory's 
aspiration of independence, however strongly felt, rests 
substantially on ethnic cleansing. Abkhaz officials still 
do not have a coherent strategy or policy regarding how 
to facilitate repatriation or otherwise resolve the prob­
lem of IDPs; this is mainly because accepting the return 
of hundreds of thousands of people would compromise 
the demographic make-up - and by extension, the politi­
cal viability - of the nascent Abkhaz state.10 Any future 
referendum on the legal status of Abkhazia that does not 
involve the participation of at least a significant percent­
age of expelled residents cannot be accepted as valid. For 
this reason, the West should not waver from its refusal to 
recognize Abkhaz independence. Interestingly, although 
almost all of Abkhazia's ethnic Georgians, which consti­
tuted a plurality of the population in 1991, were forced to 
flee, the territory has remained a multi-ethnic area with 
sizeable Abkhaz, Armenian, and Ukrainian communities 
and small numbers of Jews, Greeks, and representatives 
of ethnic groups from the North Caucasus.
In sum, South Ossetia and Abkhazia present differ­
ent challenges that require the Western community to 
design specific policies for each territory rather than a 
unified policy toward both regions. In this report, we 
focus on tailoring a strategy for Abkhazia.
8. Authors' interviews with Abkhaz officials in Sukhumi (April 15 - 
16, 2010).
9. See “Abkhazia: Ways Forward,” International Crisis Group, Janu­
ary 18, 2007, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/europe/cauca- 
sus/georgia/179-abkhazia-ways-forward.aspx.
10. Reactions from Abkhaz officials on the status of IDPs range from 
the defensive, noting that Abkahzia did accept the return of 
30,000 residents of Gali, to simply admitting that the return of 
IDPs is an impossibility as it would threaten the demography 
and Abkahzia's aspirations to statehood. Author's interviews 
with Abkhaz officials in Sukhumi (April 15-16, 2010).
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Moving from Platitudes to Policy
in Abkhazia
Since the conclusion of the war, the West has been 
firm in its refusal to recognize the independence of Ab­
khazia. In total, four countries - Russia, Nicaragua, 
Venezuela, and Nauru - have recognized the indepen­
dence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. For the latter 
three countries, recognitions seem to have resulted from 
Russian lobbying and bilateral deals promising Russian 
aid or broader investment in their respective energy sec­
tors. Russia appears determined to secure recognition 
for Abkhazia and South Ossetia from additional Latin 
American states, especially Bolivia and Ecuador, while 
Belarus, under competing pressure from Moscow and 
Brussels, seems to be deferring its decision for as long 
as possible.11 Although refusing to recognize Abkhaz in­
dependence and challenging Russia's new “recognition 
diplomacy” represents a good starting point for Western 
policy towards Abkhazia, the current approach is far 
from a strategic vision.
U.S. and EU policy towards Abkhazia, while far 
from fully developed, also includes a commitment to 
Georgia's territorial integrity that is usually described as 
supporting, respecting, or even protecting this principle. 
International policymakers and observers use the phrase 
“territorial integrity” in various speeches about Georgia, 
but they rarely consider that the phrase has a very specif­
ic meaning: that all of the territory that was part of Geor­
gia at the end of the Soviet period should be governed by 
Tbilisi. However, Georgia's territorial integrity currently 
cannot be supported, protected, or respected because it 
does not exist. Ultimately, restoring Georgian territorial 
integrity may be the best way to resolve the conflicts in 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia, but it is at best a long-term 
project.
Nonetheless, U.S. officials continue to publicly sup­
port Georgia's territorial integrity. In a meeting with 
Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili in September 
2009, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said that 
the United States supported Georgia “both in terms of 
[its] territorial integrity and sovereignty.”12 A few weeks 
prior, while testifying before Congress, U.S. Assistant 
Secretary of Defense Alexander Vershbow remarked, 
“United States policy [towards Georgia] rests on the 
continued support of Georgia's territorial integrity, inde-
11. Belarus sent fact-finding delegations to South Ossetia, Abkhazia, 
and undisputed Georgia to investigate the issue and make recommen­
dations to President Alexander Lukashenko. Some have suggested that 
Lukashenko accepted an emergency economic aid package from Mos­
cow in 2009 on condition that he recognize the breakaway territories, 
but such a decision has not been forthcoming.
12. Remarks With Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili at Camera 
Spray Before Their Meeting, September 21, 2009, http://www.state. 
gov/secretary/rm/2009a/09/129442.htm.
pendence, and sovereignty.”13 The preceding month, dur­
ing a summit in Moscow, U.S. President Barack Obama 
told reporters that he had “reiterated [his] firm belief that 
Georgia's sovereignty and territorial integrity must be 
respected.”14
EU officials also consistently pledge their support 
for Georgia's territorial integrity. Following an EU 
Troika15 visit to Georgia in July 2009, former Swedish 
Foreign Minister Carl Bildt, the leader of the delegation, 
announced: “Our Troika reiterates the EU's position that 
Europe supports Georgia's sovereignty and territorial 
integrity.”16 Similarly, following the December 2009 
Abkhaz elections, an official EU statement declared that 
“the European Union continues to support Georgia's ter­
ritorial integrity and sovereignty, as recognized by inter­
national law.”17
Constantly speaking of territorial integrity, however, 
risks suggesting that the United States and the European 
Union are more open to proactive, or even military, ef­
forts to bring Abkhazia and South Ossetia back under 
Georgia control. This rhetoric clearly contributed to the 
belief in Tbilisi in 2008 that, in spite of official warnings, 
the United States would support Georgia in the August 
war. The same Georgian leaders, facing the same domes­
tic pressure, are still in power and they are hearing the 
same public rhetoric from the U.S. officials. While un­
likely to occur, another war between Russia and Georgia 
would come at a far greater cost for all parties, includ­
ing the United States, compared to the previous con­
flict. Changing what is said about Georgia's territorial 
integrity is an easy way to further reduce the chance of 
another war. 18 For example, supporting Georgian “sov­
ereignty” rather than “territorial integrity” would justify 
and support Georgia's valid international legal and ju­
ridical claims while also acknowledging the cold truth 
that the country's territorial integrity remains fractured.19
There are other drawbacks associated with consis­
13. Testimony of Ambassador Alexander Vershbow, Assistant Secre­
tary of Defense for International Security Affairs before the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee for Europe, 2009.
14. “Obama says Georgia's territorial integrity ‘must be re­
spected',” RIA Novosti, July 6, 2009, http://en.rian.ru/rus- 
sia/20090706/155449210.html.
15. The “Troika” represents the European Union in external relations 
that fall within the scope of the European Union's common foreign 
and security policy.
16. “EU Troika reiterates support to Georgia's territorial integrity,”
Rustavi 2, July 18, 2009, http://www.rustavi2.com/news/news_text.
php?id_news=32798&im=main&ct=25.
17. “EU, U.S. Reject Abkhaz Elections,” Civil.ge, December 15, 
2009, http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=21782 .
18. On Georgia's strategic use of historical narratives to gain U.S. 
support, see Lincoln Mitchell, “Georgia's story: Competing narratives 
since the war,” Survival 51:4 (August-September 2009): 87-100.
19. On important distinctions among different elements of sovereign­
ty, see Stephen Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princ­
eton: Princeton University Press, 1999).
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tently issuing public commitments to support Georgia's 
territorial integrity. Although support for territorial in­
tegrity is understood in Washington as support for Geor­
gia generally, in Abkhazia this phrase connotes support 
for further Georgian military action against Abkhazia. 
If the United States continues to declare its support for 
Georgia's territorial integrity, it will sow fear in Abkha­
zia that the United States is seeking to back a military so­
lution to the territorial conflict, which then will drive Ab­
khazia further into the arms of Russia. This is the precise 
scenario that needs to be avoided if Georgia is to ever 
restore its territorial sovereignty. Ironically, if the inter­
national community is serious about restoring Georgia's 
territorial integrity, one of the first things that it should do 
is to stop talking about it so much.
To the extent that the United States has an Abkhazia 
policy, it is one of strategic patience, or “stratpat.” The 
policy of stratpat was described by U.S. Assistant Secre­
tary of State Philip Gordon as “the best way forward. 
whereby Georgia shows itself to be an attractive place, a 
stronger, democratic [state]. It's part of the same over­
all approach to make Georgia a stronger, more attractive 
place and better partner of the West.” U.S. Vice President 
Joseph Biden summarized stratpat similarly during an 
address to the Georgian parliament in July 2009, when 
he said:
It is a sad certainty, but it is true [that] there is no 
military option to reintegration, only . a peace­
ful and prosperous Georgia that has the prospect 
of restoring [its] territorial integrity by showing 
those in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, a Georgia 
where they can be free and their communities can 
flourish; where they can enjoy autonomy within 
a federal system of government, where life can 
be so much better for them than it is now. Show 
them the real benefits of your nation's motto: 
Strength is in unity.20
Stratpat seems to be based on the notion that the 
future for Abkhazia lies in willingly rejoining Georgia 
because Georgia will demonstrate that it is a better, more 
prosperous and democratic home for the Abkhaz. The 
stratpat model is not very different from the approach the 
United States and the EU used in the years immediately 
following Georgia's Rose Revolution. However, it did 
not work then, when Georgia was becoming more pros­
perous and democratic, so it is difficult to imagine how it
20. It is striking that Biden described the certainty that Georgia can­
not retake Abkhazia through military force as “sad,” suggesting an 
unwillingness, or inability, to recognize that for the Abkhaz, this is 
a happy certainty. See Speech by Vice President Biden to Georgian 
Parliament, July 23, 2009, http://www.america.gov/st/texttrans-eng- 
lish/2009/July/20090723115911xjsnommis0.2602045.html.
will work considering Georgia's current democratic and 
economic difficulties. Moreover, going back to the pre­
war strategy on Abkhazia does not recognize some of the 
important consequences of the war. Abkhazia has signed 
a defense pact with Russia to guarantee its security, and 
has turned to Moscow for patronage and support. Rus­
sia's substantially increased presence in Abkhazia means 
that any strategy that does nothing with Abkhazia itself 
in the short term will only will increase Russia's links 
with Abkhazia and control over its territory. Though pa­
tience towards Abkhazia makes sense, it would be a seri­
ous mistake to isolate the breakaway region; the United 
States must engage with Abkhazia.
Stratpat also is based on an unrealistic vision of 
Georgia's own regional image. Whereas most in the 
United States correctly believe that Georgia was the vic­
tim of excessive Russian aggression and understand the 
threat and danger Georgia's northern neighbor poses, 
Abkhaz views towards Georgia are rarely considered in 
either Tbilisi or in Washington. In Abkhazia, Georgia is 
viewed - rightly or wrongly - as the source of aggres­
sion and instability in the region. Abkhaz fear a Geor­
gian leadership that, like that of Gamsakhurdia in the 
early 1990s, they see as hyper-nationalist, impulsive, and 
ready to use military force. These fears were only con­
firmed by the August war and Georgia's shelling of Tskh­
invali. Thus, it is extremely unlikely that Abkhazia will 
want to rejoin Georgia in the foreseeable future, even if 
the conditions there improve.
The stratpat approach also seems to overlook dis­
turbing political trends within Georgia itself. As we show 
in the next chapter of this report, democracy has been in 
retreat in Georgia in recent years. According to Freedom 
House, Georgia was less free in 2007-2009 than in the 
earlier years of the Saakashvili regime and now has the 
same level of democracy as it did at the end of Shevard­
nadze's years in office.21 The lack of a free media or 
an independent judiciary as well as the concentration of 
power in the hands of the presidency have contributed to 
these downward ratings. Similarly, the country's impres­
sive economic reforms that led to increased investment 
and a rapidly growing economy from 2005 to 2007 are 
being eroded. Georgia's economy suffered a great deal 
because of the war and the global economic downturn, 
and has not yet begun to recover. The central premise 
of stratpat is that things are getting better in Georgia 
and that eventually the Abkhaz will see this. This no­
tion, however, does not stand up under closer scrutiny. 
Indeed, based on economic trends alone, it seems unclear 
why the Abkhaz would prefer to join Georgia's economy 
over Russia's, especially given that in the lead-up to the 
2014 Olympic games just north of Abkhazia, Moscow is
21. “Nations in Transit: Georgia,” Freedom House, 2009, http://www. 
freedomhouse.org/uploads/nit/2009/Georgia-final.pdf.
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investing substantially in the region.
Finally, another key component of stratpat is that the 
Georgian leadership should do nothing actively about 
restoring their country's territorial integrity. Patience, 
however, is not a word that quickly comes to mind when 
thinking of Saakashvili and his government. In fact, im­
patience has been a defining characteristic of the Geor­
gian government in recent years, one that has served 
them very well in their efforts to speed through reforms, 
fight corruption and even push out Georgia's kleptocratic 
rulers in 2003; Saakashvili's impatience has also contrib­
uted to his biggest mistakes, including his decisions to 
violently disperse peaceful demonstrations in November 
2007, to go to war with South Ossetia in August 2008, 
and to simulate a Russian invasion on Georgian televi­
sion in March 2010 that spread fear and panic.22
For all of these reasons, pursuing a policy of stratpat 
and counseling Georgian patience is, at best, unlikely to 
work, and at worst, a recipe for renewed conflict and in­
stability in the region. Stratpat puts the emphasis on what 
happens in Georgia, while viewing what happens in Ab­
khazia as largely peripheral. It allows the United States 
and the West to continue the policy from before the war 
of both refusing to engage with Abkhazia and accepting 
Tbilisi's view of Abkhaz preferences. Failing to engage 
with Abkhazia, however, will only solidify Abkhazia's 
security and economic ties to Russia. Thus stratpat will 
ameliorate nascent Russian-Abkhaz tension at a time 
when U.S. policy should seek to exploit and increase this 
tension.
Be Careful What You Wish For:
Abkhazia's Growing Russian Dilemma
Western policy towards Abkhazia should also 
consider the profound changes that have taken place 
in the Russian-Abkhaz relationship since the war. The 
Abkhaz leadership greeted President Medvedev's 
recognition of the independence of Abkhazia in 
August 2008 as a defining moment. Though we in the 
West generally assumed that Russia was committed 
to supporting Abkhazia in its proxy conflict against 
the Saakashvili regime prior to the August 2008 war, 
Sukhumi itself remained uncertain about the degree of 
Moscow's commitment to defend and support Abkhazia.
Since Moscow's recognition of Abkhazia's 
independence, Russia's commitment has been affirmed 
and demonstrated along a broad range of issues. 
Over the last two years, Moscow and Sukhumi have 
been negotiating over 30 bilateral agreements.23 Yet,
22. See Lincoln Mitchell, Uncertain Democracy: U.S. Foreign Policy 
and Georgia's Revolution, 2009, especially 79-111.
23. See Appendix 4 of this volume for a list of these agreements. Also 
see the discussion in “Abkhazia: Deepening Dependence,” Interna-
Abkhazia's overwhelming dependence on Russia as its 
principal security and economic partner is also raising 
concerns about excessive dependence among Abkhaz 
politicians, media commentators, and civil society.24 In 
essence, Abkhazia has swapped the de facto independence 
it enjoyed as an unrecognized state for heavy dependence 
on Russia now as a supposedly independent state.
In the security realm, first and foremost, Abkhazia 
has become completely dependent on Russia and has 
codified this domination through a number of lopsided 
security accords. These accords have provided Sukhumi 
with a renewed sense of security, but have also raised 
questions about Russia's intentions in the territory. In May 
2009, Moscow and Sukhumi signed a border protection 
agreement through which the Abkhaz side agreed to have 
800 Russian troops exclusively guard its border. The 
substance of the agreement was expected by Sukhumi, 
however its sudden adoption created some political 
rumblings. The treaty was signed without warning by the 
Abkhaz authorities and the Russian Ministry of Defense, 
and was not submitted to the Abkhaz parliament for 
ratification or deliberation, leading to vocal criticisms by 
Abkhaz parliamentarians and journalists.25
Russia's military role in Abkhazia was further 
solidified in September 2009 by the signing of a treaty 
of military cooperation, which granted Russia access to 
military facilities and bases in Abkhazia (including the 
airbase at Gudauta and naval facilities at Ochamchire) for 
a period of 49 years.26 Under the treaty, Russian troops 
will retain the right of unrestricted mobility through 
Abkhazia and will remain immune from Abkhazia 
criminal law as well as taxation. Though reports indicate 
that Moscow is now only maintaining about half of its 
announced commitment of 7,500 Russian troops, the 
Russian military presence is estimated to cost $500 
million, and is much more visible throughout Abkhazia 
than were the previous Commonwealth of Independent 
States mandated peacekeepers. During an interview 
in March 2010, one opposition member of the Abkhaz 
parliament recounted how he was accused of being “anti­
Russian” when he pointed out that, in the implementation 
of the joint defense agreement, Russian troops seemed to 
have completely taken over functions that were meant to 
be jointly carried out with Abkhaz counterparts.27
tional Crisis Group, 2010.
24. Authors' interviews with Abkhazian media representatives con­
firmed that this internal debate about growing dependence on Russia 
is now the primary foreign policy concern in Abkhazia.
25. See “Bozbuzhdayushaya Druzhba,” Kommersant, June 6, 2009. 
http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?fromsearch=4b6cfe8f-0847- 
4245-808a-54b658638948&docsid=1173036.
26. “Russia signs agreement to station military bases in Abkhazia,” 
Mosnews.com, March 10, 2009, http://www.mosnews.com/mili- 
tary/2009/03/06/abbases/.
27. The parliamentarian also expressed the view that Abkhazia's de­
fense agreement with Russia should operate under the same guidelines
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Beyond the security realm, the Abkhaz leadership 
has also agreed to transfer various strategic economic 
and transportation assets to Russia and to adopt several 
Russian standards. The Russian ruble remains Abkhazia's 
official currency; in October 2009 the territory accepted 
Russian telephone prefixes (with the code +7) to replace 
its Georgian ones (+995).28 Russian-Abkhaz tensions 
first arose in October 2008 when the Russian company 
Inter RAO UES announced its intentions to privatize its 
stake in the jointly-operated (with Georgia) Inguri Valley 
hydroelectric generator. De facto Abkhaz President 
Sergei Bagapsh angrily reacted to not being consulted by 
the company and proclaimed that the Inguri project “has 
always been and will remain ours, and we will dictate 
terms in any negotiations.”29 The Russian company 
backed down from its original plans and subsequently 
reached a compromise deal with Georgia's Ministry of 
Energy to operate the plant for the next 10 years.
However, soon after casting himself as a defender of 
Abkhazia's strategic assets, Bagapsh came under intense 
criticism for another series of commercial transfers 
to Russia. In May 2009, Bagapsh announced a plan to 
transfer the management of Abkhazia's railways and 
Sukhumi airport to Russia for ten years in exchange for 
investment and loans.30 In October 2009, the two sides 
readied a formal transportation agreement that would 
also transfer responsibility for Abkhazia's air-traffic 
control and navigation to Russia.31 Furthermore, in a 
high-profile announcement in May 2009, the Abkhazia 
de facto Ministry of Economy signed an agreement with 
the Russian state-owned oil company Rosneft that ceded 
the rights to explore the Abkhaz continental shelf for five 
years, as well as to sell Rosneft's products in Abkhazia. 
Most controversially of all, Bagapsh has hinted over the 
course of the year that Sukhumi is considering giving 
Russian citizens and organizations the limited right to 
purchase land in Abkhazia, which if enacted, would 
lead to an almost instantaneous transfer of Abkhazia's 
coveted coastline to wealthy Russian buyers. Other 
Abkhaz officials, in private, express concerns that if such 
a measure were to be adopted, all Abkhaz real estate
and principles as Russia's defense agreement with Armenia or Tajiki­
stan. Authors' interviews at the Abkhaz parliament (April 15, 2010).
28. See Samantha Shields, “Russian Presence Grows in Abkhazia,”
Wall Street Journal, December 14, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB126070743647789499.html.
29. See “Inguri Hydroelectric Plant: Compromise reached?” Georgia 
Times, January 12, 2009, http://www.georgiatimes.info/en/ar- 
ticles/5887.html.
30. “Georgia: Abkhazia Hands Airport, Railway Over to Russian
Management,” Eurasianet.org, March 17, 2009, http://www.eur-
asianet.org/departments/news/articles/eav051809b.shtml.
31. “Russia's Ministry of Transport Prepares a Whole Range of
Intergovernmental Russian-Abkhaz Agreements Covering the Entire
Cooperation Spectrum,” Government of Abkhazia, October 7, 2009,
http://www.abkhaziagov.org/en/news/detail.php?ID=23701.
would be owned by Moscow in a matter of weeks.32 
An increasing number of Abkhaz opposition figures
and media commentators are uncomfortable with their 
leadership's transfer of key strategic assets to Russia. 
Abkhaz presidential candidate in 2009 and businessman 
Beslan Butba (Economic Development Party) strongly 
criticized the Abkhaz authorities, stating that
the decision to transfer the Abkhaz railway to 
the sole management of a major company, the 
Russian Railways, may ultimately lead to the 
takeover of a strategic object . and a large 
amount of land - virtually the entire Black Sea 
coast of Abkhazia - in the interest of a foreign 
commercial entity. Similar concerns are raised 
by the President's [Bagapsh's] plans to introduce 
in Abkhazia the unrestricted sale of real estate 
to foreign citizens and organizations, and to 
transfer oil and gas fields for development by the 
corporations Rosneft and Gazprom. Such a policy 
will inevitably lead to the transfer of natural 
resources of the Republic of Abkhazia to foreign 
ownership, to the loss of economic, and in the 
future - political independence.” 33
In subsequent interviews, Butba also warned that the 
transfers were likely to fuel anti-Russian sentiment 
among the Abkhazian population.
In a similar fashion, another opposition presidential 
candidate Raul Khadzhimba, a former vice president who 
resigned in May 2009, accused the Abkhaz leadership 
of selling Abkhazia's sovereignty for its own economic 
gain. Speaking at an opposition forum on July 24, 2009, 
Khadzimba warned that “the authorities have taken 
the new realities, not as a basis for strengthening our 
statehood, but as a signal for realizing their own material 
interests. Such an approach strips our people, which 
bought its independence at great cost, of any chance of 
free development.”34
The Abkhaz dilemma regarding Russian control 
of its security and economy grows more acute by the 
day. Economically, Russia is responsible for 95% of 
Abkhazia's trade, and directly subsidizes more than 50% 
of Sukhumi's central budget, so it will inevitably play a
32. Authors' interviews with Abkhaz officials in Sukhumi (April 15 - 
16, 2010).
33. Quoted in, “Abkhazia: Russia's Headache,” Northern Caucasus,
June 2009, http://en.sknews.ru/main/print:page,1,1795-abkhazia- 
russias-headache.html.
34. Quoted in “Abkhaz Opposition Fear Growing Russian Influ­
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dominant role in the territory.35 A senior Abkhaz official 
said in an interview that Russia will provide a total of 
$120 million in budget support to Sukhumi in 2010, and 
has committed a similar amount for 2011 and 2012.36
The vast majority of Abkhaz are grateful to Russia 
for providing it with security forces to deter Georgian 
aggression. Abkhazia no longer fears for its security 
and is no longer concerned about the intentions of the 
Saakashvili government. But the one-sided terms of the 
Russian presence serve as a daily reminder that Sukhumi 
has delegated some very basic state functions to Moscow. 
This is, however, a trade-off that the Abkhaz leadership 
seems perfectly willing to accept in return for its security. 
Perhaps most tellingly, Sukhumi's greatest current fear is 
neither that Abkhazia will be re-integrated into Georgia 
nor that Russia will continue to annex it, but rather that a 
future reconciliation between Russia and Georgia - after 
Saakashvili and Putin have left their respective positions 
- might prompt Moscow to withdraw its recognition 
of Abkhazia's independence and effectively divide the 
territory between Moscow and Tbilisi.37
A New Strategy of Engagement
without Recognition
With these considerations in mind, now is the time 
for the Western community to consider increasing its 
political engagement with Abkhazia. The West should 
continue to make clear that it will never recognize 
the independence of Sukhumi, however it can and 
should carve out a number of openings through which 
Abkhazia's political elites, business community, and civil 
society can build ties to people in Europe, the broader 
Black Sea region, and North America. The alternative is 
to continue to offer Abkhazia the current binary choice 
of partnering with Russia or returning to Georgia, an 
easy choice for Abkhazia that only further accelerates 
Sukhumi's absorption by Moscow. Abkhazia should be 
given the alternative of pursuing international options. 
The availability of such a path will strengthen the hand 
of Abkhaz political leaders, media commentators, and 
civil society leaders interested in crafting a “multivector” 
foreign policy, and offer Abkhaz decision-makers 
credible alternatives when negotiating with Russia on 
the management and governance of critical “sovereign”
35. Estimates quoted in October 2009 to the authors by multiple Rus­
sian journalists who cover the breakaway territories. Abkhaz officials 
themselves estimate that the customs venues they collect from the 
Russian border constitute about 40% of their budget. Thus, Rus­
sia remains Abkhazia's almost exclusive economic partner, be it for 
investment, commerce or as a source of customs duties.




First, it is essential that Abkhaz officials be issued 
visas to travel within the European Union and the United 
States, and participate in study tours and organized 
visits. There are numerous possible ways to facilitate this 
travel, but it will probably be necessary to arrive at some 
kind of compromise on this visa issue. Because of its 
closer proximity to Abkhazia and its active involvement 
in brokering and now monitoring the Georgia-Russia 
ceasefire, the European Union is better positioned to take 
the lead in such efforts. Accordingly, Abkhaz officials, 
media, and civil society could be offered study tours of 
Brussels to better understand the institutions and values 
of the European Union. These should not involve formal 
negotiations with any specific institution or agency, but 
could be organized as educational visits and precursors 
to creating a regular EU-Abkhaz dialogue mechanism. 
At the same time, such tours could include a visit to 
NATO headquarters where alliance representatives 
would explain the organization's regional priorities and 
reassure the Abkhaz that NATO harbors no belligerent 
designs on Abkhaz territory.
The European Union should also consider opening 
an information office in Sukhumi that could liaise 
with Brussels and provide information about such 
engagement opportunities and application procedures. 
As far as the United States is concerned, Abkhaz political 
figures should be allowed to participate in regional 
conferences and seminars in the Washington D.C. think 
tank community, where contacts with U.S. officials could 
be made informally but constructively. It is particularly 
important that Abkhaz officials be allowed to participate 
in fora in the United States that address regional concerns 
and common challenges.
Travel on Abkhaz passports, which will be issued 
by Sukhumi to Abkhaz residents starting in June 2010, 
remains an especially sensitive topic, as it pertains 
directly to an actual symbol and practical aspect of 
sovereignty. To this end, the Georgian government has 
proposed that the Abkhaz accept a travel document 
known as a “gray passport,” which would be issued by 
the Georgian government, but would not commit the 
holder to affirm his or her Georgian citizenship. Though 
Georgian concerns about the Abkhaz issuing travel 
document are perfectly understandable and Tbilisi's 
position remains consistent with international law, in this 
case, on the balance, we believe that the international 
community should not rule out allowing some Abkhaz 
to travel on their new self-styled passports, at least for
38. Both Abkhazian de facto President Sergei Bagapsh and de facto 
Foreign Minister Sergei Shamba have consistently affirmed their com­
mitment to pursue a “multivector” foreign policy. See, for example, 
the interview by Ben Judah, “Abkhazia: Optimism and Tension,” ETH 
Zurich, August 27, 2009, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/ 
Security-Watch/Detail/?lng=en&id=105219.
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the initial period during which the “engagement without 
recognition” strategy is in effect. There is some recent 
precedent for such a policy. The United States and the 
United Kingdom allow residents of the Turkish Northern 
Republic of Cyprus (TRNC) to apply for visas and travel 
on their TRNC passports, even though the TRNC's 
sovereignty remains recognized only by Turkey itself.
On the economic dimension, much more should be 
done to diversify Abkhazia's economic links. Certainly, 
Abkhazia's tourism sector will be a natural target for 
Russian investment; however, creating economic links 
with the entire Black Sea community will give Abkhazia 
greater economic options and opportunities. The Abkhaz 
diaspora, particularly in Turkey with its regional 
economic networks, offers perhaps the best alternative 
to exclusive economic dependence on Russia; Georgia 
has prevented these links, however, by embargoing 
Abkhaz ports from Turkish commerce. This policy of 
isolating Abkhazia reached a high-profile climax in 
August 2009 when the Georgian coast guard intercepted 
and detained a Turkish fuel tanker bound for Abkhazia. 
Georgian courts subsequently tried and convicted the 
ship's captain under the Law on Occupied Territories, 
sentencing him to a 24-year prison sentence and 
sparking an outcry from the Turkish Foreign Ministry.39 
After some shuttle diplomacy, Georgian officials agreed 
to release the captain, but the episode underscores the 
practical difficulties that Abkhazia faces in cultivating its 
economic relations with Turkey.
Accordingly, establishing procedures by which 
Turkish vessels can routinely visit Abkhazia should be 
a regional economic priority, one that Georgian officials 
privately acknowledge needs to be ironed out to provide 
alternative commercial routes to Abkhazia.40 Opening a 
regular ferry link between Sukhumi and Trabzon, Turkey, 
is an important step toward enhancing the Abkhaz 
diaspora's link with the territory and further increasing 
commerce. In addition, both Turkey and Georgia should 
be encouraged to allow “day-trip” tourism to Abkhazia 
from specific, regulated points of access for third party 
nationals, as is the case in Northern Cyprus. Perhaps 
most controversially, the international community 
should also consider appealing to the International Civil 
Aviation Organization (IACO) to approve an equal 
number of weekly flights between Sukhumi airport and 
Istanbul, as between Sukhumi and Moscow. Ultimately, 
upgrading Abkhazia's transportation links with Turkey
39. Charles Recknagel, “Smuggling Dispute Between Sukhumi, 
Tbilisi Enters Uncharted Waters, Legally” Rferl.org, September 4, 
2009, http://www.rferl.org/content/Smuggling_Dispute_Between_ 
Sukhumi_Tbilisi_Is_In_Uncharted_Waters_Legally/1814822.html.
40. Georgian officials have affirmed that they are committed to find­
ings a mutually beneficial procedure through which Turkish vessels 
could visit Abkhazia, but subject to a customs inspection stop by 
Georgian officials beforehand.
and the greater Black Sea region should be a Western 
priority.
In addition, international financial institutions 
such as the World Bank and the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development should be encouraged 
to identify and develop projects that will forge links 
between Abkhazia and other countries in the Black Sea 
region, including Georgia. As the Abkhaz economy 
develops, there are a number of technical and legal 
areas (capital market formation, accounting standards, 
regulatory harmonization) relating to the economy 
where Abkhazia will require capacity building and where 
Western actors could play an important consultative role. 
For example, Abkhazian officials have expressed interest 
in upgrading and developing the North-South rail corridor 
through Georgia, which would also potentially allow 
travel and commerce between Abkhazia and Armenia.
On the civil society side, Abkhaz NGOs should 
be connected with broader international networks on 
issues of common concern. Previously, the international 
NGO presence has been limited to those working on 
humanitarian issues as well as a few organizations that 
were facilitating conflict resolution between the Abkhazia 
and Georgian communities. Yet, there are a number of 
urgent advocacy issues that Abkhaz civil society could 
flag for the broader transnational community, and through 
this engagement, benefit from international expertise. 
On the environmental front, the rapid development of 
Sochi and the Abkhaz Black Sea coast, including the 
opening of a massive new cement plant in Tkvarcheli 
slated to supply construction for the 2014 Olympic 
Games, provide an opportunity for concerned Abkhaz 
environmental organizations to present their campaign 
to a broader international audience. Questions about 
corruption and good governance stemming from recent 
Russian investments in the region would make an ideal 
entry point for Transparency International and other 
similar good-governance oriented NGOs to consult with 
local groups and even consider opening a local chapter. 
Human rights and democracy NGOs, such as Freedom 
House, should consider generating separate reports 
on the state of political freedoms and human rights in 
Abkhazia. Many NGOs, such as the International Crisis 
Group, have experience operating in disputed territories 
or post-conflict environments. Finally, Abkhazia's media 
and journalists, recently under severe pressure from the 
leadership in Sukhumi because of their critical stories 
about domestic corruption and governance, would greatly 
benefit from the opportunity to participate in exchange 
programs and join international journalist networks. 
All of these international linkages with Abkhazia civil 
society and media should be encouraged and can be 
forged without broaching the question of Abkhazia's 
political status.
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In the field of education, the West should afford 
opportunities for Abkhaz students to travel to and study 
in the European Union and the United States, even if 
they choose to travel on Russian or the future Abkhaz 
passports. The U.S. Fulbright and Muskie Fellowships, 
and the State Department's International Visitor's 
program could be extended to Abkhaz residents, 
while the EU should include Abkhaz students and 
universities in their Erasmus Mundus programming. 
Both Washington and Brussels, as well as interested 
NGOs and international organizations, could increase 
their sponsorship of Georgian-Abkhaz student dialogues 
in third countries. Given the relatively small population 
of the region, offering even a few opportunities in the 
area of education has the potential to make a significant 
impact on how the next generation of Abkhaz leaders, 
educators, and entrepreneurs views the West.
Initially, the sequencing of these projects should 
not be tied to progress or benchmarks in the Geneva 
talks or any other status negotiations. Rather, the aim 
of EU and U.S. policymakers should be to encourage 
the establishment of a wide variety of contacts through 
which the Abkhaz can better understand the priorities and 
political values of the West and offer a real alternative to 
dependence on Russia. Over the medium term, however, 
the nature and degree of these contacts could be adjusted 
or even explicitly tied to an actual status process or certain 
reconciliation initiatives with Georgia. Once an array of 
international links has been created, the West will have 
considerably more leverage over Abkhaz actors in future 
status negotiations than they do now.
The Perspective from Georgia: The Law of 
Occupied Territories and a New Strategy
A policy of engagement without recognition, while 
probably the only way to preserve hope for a reunified 
Georgia, will likely be met with sharp disapproval from 
Tbilisi. Since the war, Tbilisi has maintained a hard-line 
position on Abkhazia and South Ossetia, stressing that 
they are occupied parts of Georgia, and has sought to 
isolate Abkhazia and South Ossetia from the rest of the 
world.
But the long-term interests of Georgia need to be 
untangled from the short-term political interests of the 
current Georgian government. In Georgia, Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia are deeply intertwined with domestic 
politics. Taking a strong stand on the inviolable and sacred 
nature of Georgia's territorial integrity is good political 
rhetoric for the Georgian government. Paradoxically, the 
government's short-term interests may be better served 
by taking a hard line and isolating Abkhazia, but these 
are the policies which will continue to make territorial
integrity little more than a dream for Georgia. Therefore, 
being seen as holding the line on territorial integrity is 
essential for the survival of the Saakashvili regime, but 
actually solving the problem, which nobody genuinely 
expects them to do, is not.
In Georgia there is currently little debate about policy 
towards Abkhazia. Although there is broad agreement 
that Abkhazia should be returned to Georgia, there is 
not much serious discussion about how this can happen. 
The Geneva process, which began after the war as an 
attempt to bring Abkhaz and Georgians to the negotiating 
table, has for the most part stalled. In October 2008, 
Georgia passed the Law on Occupied Territories that 
spells out Georgia's intention to isolate Abkhazia.41 This 
Law makes it a crime to enter Abkhazia from Russia, 
outlaws any economic activity with Abkhazia that 
requires regulation or licensing in Georgia, and defines 
any governmental activity by the de facto authorities in 
Abkhazia as illegal. While this Law might be viewed 
simply as Georgia's attempt to clarify its position that 
Abkhazia is part of Georgia and is occupied by Russia, 
it has made it very difficult for any third country to 
have any civic or economic ties with any individuals or 
organizations in Abkhazia.
The Law on Occupied Territories has been a subject 
of concern by the Council of Europe's Venice Commis­
sion, which has expressed reservations about provisions 
regarding:
the criminalisation of irregular entry into the oc­
cupied territories with no explicit exclusion of 
humanitarian aid and no explicit exception for 
emergency situations, the restriction and crimi- 
nalisation of economic activities necessary for 
the survival of the population in occupied areas 
as well as a (potential) restriction and criminali- 
sation of humanitarian aid . [and] - the blanket 
limitation of freedom of navigation and overflight 
of third States' flag ships and aircrafts.42
Any nuanced Western and particularly U.S. policy to­
ward Abkhazia which moves significantly beyond the 
platitude of non-recognition will challenge the contro­
versial Law on Occupied Territories and will likely be re­
sisted by the hard line government in Tbilisi . However, 
if recent history of U.S. policy in the region teaches us 
anything, it is that sometimes it is necessary to craft an 
independent policy, rather than simply allowing Tbilisi 
to determine U.S. positions on Abkhazia.
41. Available on the Council of Europe's Venice Commission website. 
See Law on Occupied Territories, 2009, http://www.venice.coe.int/ 
docs/2009/CDL(2009)004-e.asp.
42. Venice Commission Opinion on the Law on Occupied Territo­
ries of Georgia, March 13 - 14, 2009, http://www.venice.coe.int/ 
docs/2009/CDL-AD%282009%29015-e.asp.
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The New Georgian Strategy Towards Abkhazia
On January 27, 2010, the Georgian government en­
dorsed a new “State Strategy on Occupied Territories: 
Engagement through Cooperation,” designed to achieve 
“de-occupation” of the breakaway territories, reverse 
Russia's annexation of these regions, and encourage 
their reintegration into Georgia. The Strategy, according 
to Georgian officials, marked the culmination of months 
of deliberations among various Georgian government 
agencies, analysts, and think tanks, and represents, for 
Tbilisi, a significant step towards achieving conciliation. 
The Strategy calls for a series of cooperative initiatives 
- such as the promotion of economic projects, the recon­
struction of North-South transportation infrastructure, 
freedom of population movements, and education and 
health programs - in order to promote “cooperative en­
gagement” between the Abkhaz and Georgian IDPs from 
Abkhazia.43 The Strategy also calls for international ini­
tiatives that will involve joint Abkhaz, South Ossetian, 
and Georgian participation along these various issue ar­
eas.
According to Georgia officials, two elements of the 
Strategy represent a sharp break from previous Georgian 
policy. First, the Strategy sets aside issues of status and 
any prerequisites concerning a status process in favor of 
encouraging an immediate series of contacts between 
Abkhaz groups and their counterparts in Georgia. Sec­
ond, the Strategy remains neutral on the issue of security 
and talks of the “peaceful” reintegration of the territories 
to Georgia. According to Georgian State Minister for 
Reintegration Temuri Yakobashvili, these two conces­
sions on the part of Tbilisi represent a major revision in 
Tbilisi's thinking and should signal that these proposals 
are being made in a good faith outreach effort to Sukhu- 
mi.44
The reaction in Sukhumi to the new Georgian Strat­
egy has been to either ignore it or to dismiss it entirely. 
When asked to comment on what aspects of the Strat­
egy they had issues with, leaders in Sukhumi cited the 
inflammatory language on “occupation” contained 
throughout the document and also dismissed the idea 
that they should still consider any plan whose end goal 
remains the “reintegration” of the breakaway territories 
into Georgia. One member of the Abkhaz team at the Ge­
neva talks observed that certain elements of the Strategy 
may have been viewed more favorably ten years ago, but 
that the situation had changed so much since the war and 
Russia's recognition of Abkhaz independence that the 
Strategy holds no interest for Sukhumi now.45 Leaders in
43. State Strategy on Occupied Territories: Engagement Through Co­
operation, 2010, http://www.civil.ge/files/files/SMR-Strategy-en.pdf.
44. Remarks made by Minister for Reintegration Temuri Yakobashvili
at his presentation of the strategy at Columbia University, March 5,
2010.
45. Authors' interviews with Abkhaz officials in Sukhumi (April 15-
Sukhumi also interpret the Strategy as an attempt by the 
Georgian Ministry of State Reintegration to exclusively 
control or mediate all proposed interactions between Ab­
khazia and the outside world, including international or­
ganizations and NGOs, another outcome that they view 
as unacceptable. Finally, Abkhaz officials expressed the 
view that the Georgian Strategy is less of a good faith at­
tempt to reconcile with Abkhazia, and more of an effort 
designed to appeal to the international community, espe­
cially the European Union and the United States; in the 
Abkhaz view, Georgia is trying to signal to the West that 
it is making a serious effort to promote reconciliation and 
conflict resolution, something that Tbilisi previously had 
been criticized of failing to do in good faith.46 The chal­
lenge for Tbilisi now is to find a way to implement the 
Strategy in a way that will assuage these fears and suspi­
cions in Sukhumi.
The unveiling of the Georgia Strategy also raises the 
question of whether our proposed new Western policy 
of engagement without recognition is compatible with 
Tbilisi's new Strategy. Our view on this issue is twofold:
1. U.S., or Western policy towards Abkhazia and the
South Caucasus more broadly, cannot be restricted 
by the preferences of Tbilisi, nor can Tbilisi's policy 
initiatives, however positive and welcome, func­
tion as substitutes for initiatives from Brussels and 
Washington. Regardless of its specific features, it is 
imperative that the United States draws up its own 
policy and strategy towards the breakaway territo­
ries and Abkhazia in particular.
2. Despite some voices of objection within the govern­
ment of Georgia, there is nothing in the language of 
the new Georgian Strategy that inherently makes it 
incompatible with the proposed strategy of engage­
ment without recognition. Key differences, how­
ever, may arise in how the Strategy is implemented. 
For example, Georgian officials may continue to in­
sist that Abkhaz travel on neutral or “grey” passports 
issued by Tbilisi, or they may condition inclusion of 
other countries on Abkhaz cooperation with Geor­
gian IDPs from Abkhazia. In our view, both medi­
ated and unmediated contacts between Abkhazia 
and the outside world are necessary if we are to halt 
Russia's annexation of the territories. In fact, estab­
lishing a set of unmediated contacts with the inter­
national community could itself become a source 
of Western leverage so that in the future the inter­
national community could demand greater Abkhaz 
cooperation on reconciliation initiatives or progress 
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Recommendations
The primary considerations for U.S. policymak­
ers should be to reduce the chances of further conflict 
and to halt Abkhazia's growing dependence on Russia. 
While the Georgian government may believe that its new 
Strategy offers compromises that are painful, and that the 
Georgian public would simply not tolerate any additional 
concessions, meeting the political needs of an embattled 
Georgian government should be at most a secondary 
concern for Washington and Brussels when formulating 
their own strategies towards the Georgian breakaway 
territories. The United States continues to have a great 
deal of leverage with Georgia, not least because of the 
enormous financial support it continues to provide to that 
country. At the same time, the EU's European Neigh­
borhood Partnership Initiative with Georgia, the EU- 
Georgia Cooperation Council, and the European Union 
Monitoring Mission in Georgia are all instruments that 
Brussels could use to impress upon Tbilisi the impor­
tance of accepting the “engagement without recognition” 
compromise on Abkhazia. Using the multiple levers that 
the West has to pursue a policy that engages Abkhazia 
and keeps alive the distant possibility of Georgia's future 
territorial integrity seems like a reasonable approach to 
pursue. Moreover, it is also now the only realistic policy 
available to prevent Abkhazia's full absorption into the 
Russian Federation. In sum, the United States should:
■ Commit to developing a strategy towards Abkha­
zia and South Ossetia that is based on U.S. inter­
ests and capacity and is not driven exclusively by 
Tbilisi.
The international community should remain 
steadfast in its policy of non-recognition of the 
independence of Abkhazia or South Ossetia. U.S. 
officials should certainly remain engaged with 
Tbilisi over the implementation of the Georgian 
new strategy; however, Tbilisi's policies towards 
the Abkhazia and South Ossetia cannot be treated 
as a substitute for the United States developing its 
own strategy.
■ Realize that the Russian Federation is rapidly an­
nexing Abkhazia and the time for action is now. 
U.S. officials do not have the luxury to wait a few 
years for “strategic patience” or for Georgia to 
implement its own strategy towards Abkhazia. It 
must act immediately to try and buy time and halt 
Russia's current annexation of Abkhazia.
■ Adopt a policy of “engagement without recogni­
tion” towards Abkhazia.
The only way to reverse the isolation of Abkhazia 
and break its dependence on Moscow is to offer it 
alternative partners and international opportunities 
for cooperation and engagement. These could be 
offered in a status neutral manner. Engaging with 
Abkhazia, moreover, is necessary for the West to 
gain some leverage over Sukhumi that it currently 
lacks.
■ Distinguish between engaging with Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia.
Abkhazia is a viable political entity with a set of 
functioning political institutions, political parties, 
media outlets and civil society. By contrast, South 
Ossetia's geographic isolation, extremely small 
population and infiltration by Russia, mean that it 
lacks the viability to become even an autonomous 
province of Russia, let alone an “independent 
state.” As such, U.S. engagement efforts should 




Political events in Georgia since the Rose Revolution are 
deeply entwined with a narrative of democracy. Because 
of Georgia's need and desire to be more closely aligned 
with the West, democracy takes on additional import in 
that country. For Georgia, the link between democracy 
and stability is clear and direct. Without the former, the 
latter will continue to be elusive. Without a firm basis for 
political stability, Georgia's security will not be ensured.
Given the internal politics of NATO, there is certainly 
no guarantee that if Georgia became a consolidated 
democracy, it would automatically become a member 
of NATO. However, the continued failure of Georgia 
to become democratic will make it very easy for NATO 
to keep Georgia out and perhaps preclude any serious 
discussion of how Georgia could join the alliance. The 
same is true of Georgia's aspiration to join the EU.
For Georgia and other Eastern European countries, 
most clearly the Baltic states, NATO membership is 
key to protecting themselves against the ongoing threat 
presented by Russia. Accordingly, attaining NATO 
membership is the central component of Georgia's 
security strategy. This will only be possible if Georgia 
becomes more democratic.
The persistent, if moderate, political instability in 
Georgia is also a hindrance to the country's growth and 
development. This instability has manifested itself in 
frequent street demonstrations, low- and medium-level 
government harassment of opposition political forces, 
resignations (not just of the prime minister in 2007, 
but of numerous government officials since 2004), 
frequent cabinet shakeups, and of course the military 
defeat in 2008. Instability also manifests itself in the 
government's manipulation of Georgian nationalism 
and the policy of maligning domestic and international 
political critics by branding them as “Russian spies” or 
agents of the Russian state company Gazprom, thereby 
attempting to paint legitimate political dissent as a 
national security issue. For Georgia, greater democracy 
will likely moderate political rhetoric and anger, disperse 
power, and contribute to better decision making, which 
in turn will reduce the chronic instability in Georgia.
Democracy in Georgia after the Rose 
Revolution
The Rose Revolution was initially viewed as a major 
democratic breakthrough for Georgia and a harbinger
of further democratization in the region. There was 
a great deal of genuine excitement in Washington 
surrounding the peaceful transition from the decrepit 
and corrupt Shevardnadze regime to the new and 
energetic Saakashvili administration in late 2003 and 
early 2004. In addition to coming to power through 
peaceful protests following a stolen election, members 
of the new Georgian government publicly stressed their 
desire to become a Western and democratic country. The 
impressive public statements, Western training, youth, 
and, not least, English-language skills of Saakashvili and 
many members of his government contributed to these 
optimistic expectations as well.
The initial enthusiasm for Saakashvili and the 
contrast between his administration and that of his 
predecessor obscured the more complicated reality of 
Georgia's democratic evolution since 2004. Early in 
Saakashvili's first term, the democratic promise of the 
Rose Revolution began to dissipate and its long-term 
impact became more ambiguous.
The first indication of democratic backsliding came 
when Saakashvili approved a set of constitutional 
amendments in February 2004, very shortly after he 
took office. The substance of the amendments and the 
process by which they were approved should have raised 
concerns about the democratic intentions of the new 
government.
Substantively, these amendments restructured much 
of the government and strengthened the presidency. 
The new constitution also created a prime minister who 
would be appointed by the president and preside over a 
Council of Ministers which he would directly appoint, 
thus weakening the Parliament. The president, however, 
retained the right to directly appoint the key ministers 
of defense, interior, and security. The president also 
retained the right to dissolve the entire cabinet. While 
the amendments allowed for the impeachment of the 
prime minister and his government if 60% of Parliament 
called for his removal, the vote would not affect the 
president. Additionally, the president was given the 
ability to dissolve Parliament if it failed to ratify the 
budget, effectively making the Parliament no longer 
an important participant in budgeting. Even after the 
constitutional amendments were passed, the president 
retained the authority to appoint governors and mayors 
throughout the country.1 In sum, these constitutional
1. See Sabine Freizer, “Georgia's Constitutional Amendments: A Set­
back for Democratization?” Central Asia- Caucasus Institute Analyst,
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amendments were the first of many troubling signs that 
one of the major challenges to Georgian democracy 
would be the centralization of power in the presidency.
Furthermore, the process by which the amendments 
were passed indicated the government's willingness to 
act quickly without paying sufficient attention to legal 
processes, adequate public deliberation, and democratic 
oversight; this shortcoming hindered Georgia's 
democratization throughout the post-Rose Revolution 
period. The constitutional amendments were passed in 
early 2004 by a rump Parliament that consisted of 75 
MPs who were elected to single mandate districts in 
the disputed 2003 parliamentary election and 150 MPs 
who remained from the previous Parliament. These 
150 members were not replaced until the March 2004 
parliamentary elections, but despite their questionable 
legitimacy, they were allowed to vote on matters of utmost 
constitutional importance.* 2 While this Parliament would 
not, on the surface, seem as friendly to Saakashvili as the 
one that was elected in March 2004, the returning MPs 
were eager to curry favor with the new president. Those 
who did not toe the line were cajoled and threatened, 
as needed, into supporting the new amendments, which 
were rammed through Parliament without allowing for 
sufficient - and legally required - debate and public 
discussion period. The constitutional amendments and 
the process by which they were passed attracted no 
attention in the United States and very little in Europe, 
but they served as a warning that the new Georgian 
government's dedication to democracy was not as strong 
as it had initially proclaimed.
Georgia's democratic development since the Rose 
Revolution can be divided logically into two periods, 
with November 2007 as the dividing line. Before 
then, Georgia had clear problems with democracy that 
included the hastily passed constitutional amendments, 
the emergence of a one-party system with strong ties 
between the ruling party and the state, a less-than-free 
media climate, the government's ongoing tendency to 
cut democratic corners in order to more quickly pass 
its legislative reforms, and a willingness on the part of 
the government to manipulate election law in order to 
strengthen their chances of winning elections.3 *
February 11, 2004, http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/1853.
2. The faulty elections that immediately preceded Shevardnadze's 
resignation in November 2003 were partially invalidated. The 75 
members who had been directly elected from single mandate districts 
were seated in the new Parliament, but those elected by party list were 
not recognized. Plans were made to redo the party-list portion of the 
election in early 2004. In order to maintain a functioning Parliament, 
the terms of the existing members elected by party list in 1999, were 
simply extended until the new Parliament was elected.
3. Areshidze and Lanskoy (2008) and Mitchell (2009) describe the
relationship between democracy and state-building in Saakashvili's 
Georgia. In an interview with the Financial Times in the early months 
of his administration, Saakashvili made his belief that state building
Table 1: Georgia's Scores in Freedom House's 




1991 6 5 Not Free
1992 4 5 Partly Free
1993 5 5 Partly Free
1994 5 5 Partly Free
1995 4 5 Partly Free
1996 4 4 Partly Free
1997 3 4 Partly Free
1998 3 4 Partly Free
1999 3 4 Partly Free
2000 4 4 Partly Free
2001 4 4 Partly Free
2002 4 4 Partly Free
2003 4 4 Partly Free
2004 3 4 Partly Free
2005 3 3 Partly Free
2006 3 3 Partly Free
2007 4 4 Partly Free
2008 4 4 Partly Free
2009 4 4 Partly Free
2010 4 4 Partly Free
Source: Data gathered from Freedom House's Freedom in the World 
yearly survey. The data can be found on Freedom House's website, 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/fiw09/CompHistData/FIW_ 
AllScores_Countries.xls.
During this period, however, the indicators of 
Georgian democracy were not entirely negative. The 
government took strong steps to reduce petty corruption, 
including in the law enforcement and education sectors, 
and to strengthen the institutions of the Georgian state. 
Such measures were supported and appreciated by 
the Georgian public. Television stations critical of the 
government, while harassed from time to time, were 
still allowed to broadcast nationally. Even though the 
country's election laws were often manipulated, elections 
initially were markedly better under Saakashvili's 
administration. Democratic development in Georgia 
was uneven and apparently was not a priority for the 
government; still, there was at least some reason to 
believe that Georgia was moving in the right direction.
The situation changed for the worse in November 
2007, when the Georgian government violently dispersed 
peaceful demonstrations in Tbilisi using water cannons, 
baton-wielding security forces, and sonic weaponry. 
International nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), 
such as Human Rights Watch, estimated that over 500
was the priority for his government clear as well. See Arkady Ostro­
vsky, “How to Be a Founding Father,” Financial Times, July 9, 20004. 
Giorgi Areshidze and Miriam Lanskoy, “Georgia's Year of Turmoil,” 
Journal of Democracy (2008): 154-168.
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people were injured in the crackdown.5 The dispersal 
of the demonstrations occurred alongside increased 
repression of the media; for example, Georgia's most 
powerful independent media outlet, Imedi TV, was raided 
by police who destroyed equipment and effectively 
shut down the station. These government actions were 
not a complete surprise, as Tbilisi's commitment to 
democracy had been weak for years; however, they were 
of a qualitatively different nature than anything that had 
occurred in the preceding three years.
Shortly after the November 2007 crackdown, 
Saakashvili resigned briefly before being reelected in 
a snap election in January 2008. Unfortunately, that 
election, as well as the parliamentary election that 
occurred in May 2008, were not of the same caliber as 
previous elections in post-Rose Revolution Georgia. In 
both cases, the ruling party won strong victories amid 
reports that government resources were used to help the 
ruling party, that opposition parties were granted unequal 
access to media, and that the government had undertaken 
efforts to guarantee the outcome they wanted.6
In the roughly two and a half years since the November 
2007 crackdown, in addition to conducting two elections 
in a manner that suggested the quality of elections in 
Georgia was not improving, there has been substantial 
cause for concern about media freedom, government 
surveillance, the continued concentration of power in 
the presidency and Interior Ministry, the absence of an 
independent judiciary, and a Parliament that has grown 
weaker since the years immediately following the Rose 
Revolution.
In April-July 2009, when street demonstrations 
often tied up parts of downtown Tbilisi, the government 
responded differently than in it had in November 
2007 and refrained from violently dispersing the 
demonstrators. The Georgian authorities sought, 
and received, much commendation for their restraint 
from Western authorities, though European observers 
expressed concern about the harassment and beatings of 
demonstrators that were carried out in the evenings by 
irregular groups with ties to the Interior Ministry.7
5. See, for example, Human Rights Watch's account. “Georgia: Riot 
Police Violently Disperse Peaceful Protesters,” Human Rights Watch, 
November 7, 2007, http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2007/11/07/georgia- 
riot-police-violently-disperse-peaceful-protesters.
6. Election reports by the domestic monitoring organization ISFED 
as well as by OSCE/ODIH provide some detail on this. ISFED 
reports can be accessed at http://www.isfed.ge/eng/elections/reports/. 
OSCE/ODIHR reports can be accessed at http://www.osce.org/odihr- 
elections/30930.html. In the presidential election, Saakashvili's 
victory was clear, but there was some concern that the government 
had increased Saakashvili's vote totals to ensure that the president 
received over 50% of the vote so as to avoid a runoff with challenger 
Levan Gachechiladze.
7. See, for example “Georgia: Violent attacks on peaceful demonstra­
tors in Tbilisi,” International Federation for Human Rights, April 24,
2009, http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,IFHR,,GEO,4562d8cf2
Taking Stock and Moving Georgia's 
Democratization Forward
The Georgian government appears, at least at its 
highest levels, to understand the country's democratic 
shortfalls. Since November 2007, Saakashvili has twice 
pledged to redouble his efforts to bring democracy to 
Georgia (these statements were given in September 
2008 and again in summer 2009, shortly before U.S. 
Vice President Biden's visit to the country), even 
calling for renewing the Rose Revolution. One sign 
of Saakashvili's supposed commitment came when 
he appointed a special minister for democracy issues.8 *
These gestures and statements, however, rarely translate 
into significant action, as promises of greater government 
efforts to strengthen democracy are seldom followed by 
meaningful steps or significant institutional reforms.
While there may still be a future for democracy in 
Georgia, and helping Georgia move in that direction 
should remain an important U.S. goal, it is important 
to recognize that Georgia is no longer a model of 
democracy for anybody. Although Georgia remains the 
most democratic country in the South Caucasus and one 
of the more democratic countries in the former Soviet 
Union, the country has become less democratic over the 
last few years and has failed to live up to its rhetoric and 
potential. Moreover, the state of democracy in Georgia 
does not compare favorably to that of the Baltic states, 
which were admitted to NATO and the European Union 
after demonstrating deep reforms along a number of 
dimensions.
While the deficiencies of the Georgian government are 
certainly one of the reasons for the failure of democracy to 
grow in Georgia following the Rose Revolution, they are 
far from the only reason. The Georgian government, for 
its part, has often blamed the opposition for the absence 
of democracy in Georgia; for example, the government 
faults the opposition for conducting ad hominem attacks 
and constantly making unrealistic demands, including 
calls for the president's resignation. The government has 
sometimes accused the opposition of being in cahoots 
with Russian security and intelligence forces; it also 
has criticized the opposition for neither maintaining
,4a2cd0cfc,0.html, and “Address by Holly Cartner at the Parliamen­
tary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) debate on the state of 
human rights in Europe,” Human Rights Watch, June 24, 2009, http:// 
www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/06/24/parliamentary-assembly-council- 
europe-pace-debate-state-human-rights-europe.
8. The minister, Dmitri Shashkin, had worked for the International Re­
publican Institute (IRI) in Georgia for many years and thus had ample 
experience working on democratic development. In an unfortunate 
decision, Saakashvili also gave him the prison and penitentiary port­
folio, thus creating perhaps the world's only Minister for Prisons and 
Democracy. Shashkin held this portfolio for less than a year before he 
was appointed Minister of Education.
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discipline nor making substantive demands.9 While 
these accusations are true in many cases, they obscure 
both the government's role in maintaining the weakness 
of the opposition as well as the larger structural problems 
which Georgian democracy faces. Additionally, because 
the political opposition is sufficiently weak and is likely 
to remain so for the near future, the government must 
take the leading role in instituting reform. In light of 
this reality, the United States must develop policy 
accordingly.
Blaming the major political actors in Georgia, 
however, overlooks some of the larger structural problems 
that democracy faces there. Since independence, the 
failure to develop a meaningful multiparty system has 
hindered democratic development in Georgia and has 
made it susceptible to dominant-party rule, as is currently 
the case. There are few substantive differences, such as 
fiscal policy or a vision for the economy, that divide the 
Georgian electorate and are reflected in the platforms 
of differing political parties; indeed, few political 
interests are represented through parties. Instead, nearly 
two decades after independence, political parties are 
personality-dominated and defined almost entirely by 
their relationship to the party in power.
Similarly, the weakness of Georgia's civil society 
and media - most evident in the increased government 
control and recent decline of so-called watchdog NGOs - 
is also manifested in the weakness of local organizations, 
the relative absence of community groups, and a critical 
shortfall of social capital.
As such, U.S. democracy policy toward Georgia 
must engage both the government and the opposition 
while reflecting the political reality and its bearing on 
democracy and the structural challenges facing the 
country. Many of these challenges have roots in the 
politics and history of Georgia since well before the Rose 
Revolution.
The Current Situation
Georgia entered 2010 with a political system that was 
dominated by Saakashvili's United National Movement 
(UNM). In addition to holding the presidency, the UNM 
had a large majority in Parliament and controlled every 
local government in the country. Additionally, almost all 
officials holding appointed office, including the mayors 
of Georgia's most populous cities, were either members 
of or sympathetic to the UNM. Currently, only two
9. For example, only three weeks before the violent crackdown in 
November of 2007, Saakashvili referred to the opposition as “truly 
weak” and “often rather destructive.” See “President Saakashvili 
Proposes Electoral Reforms,” President of Georgia, October 17, 2007, 
http://www.president.gov.ge/?l=E&m=0&sm=3&st=70&id=2375.
parties are represented in Parliament: the UNM and the 
Christian Democrats.
The second half of 2009 and first months of 2010 
were considerably calmer than the previous twelve 
months. There were fewer street demonstrations and 
calls for the president's resignation. The message sent 
by the new U.S. administration that it would not tolerate 
crackdowns similar to those seen in 2007 seemed to have 
been received by Georgian authorities. Moreover, during 
this period, no major figures in the Georgian government 
defected to the opposition, and there were few high- 
profile instances of abuse of power by the government.
Unfortunately, there was also little evidence that 
democracy was advancing in Georgia. The media did 
not become any more free during this period; instead, 
it remained mostly under the strong influence of the 
government.10 The government also abandoned a 
promise made by Saakashvili at the United Nations in 
2008 that the mayors of all big cities would be elected, 
instead only allowing the mayor of Tbilisi to be elected. 
The early negotiations regarding the Tbilisi mayoral race 
resulted in the government successfully setting a 30% 
popular vote threshold in the first round. Setting such a 
threshold was broadly understood as a way to ensure that 
UNM candidate Gigi Ugulava would not have a second 
round ballot against the leading opposition candidate, 
Irakli Alasania.
The recent absence of any major events, 
demonstrations, or immediate crises preceding what will 
be a tense three-year period with three major elections, 
has lent a calm-before-the-storm feeling to the Georgian 
political environment. The next three years, beginning 
with local elections in May 2010 and including the 
mayoral race in Tbilisi which occurred after this volume 
was completed, will be a critical period for Georgia's 
democratic development and overall stability.
The 2010 local elections and 2012 parliamentary 
elections will be important in their own right, but they 
will also help set the stage for the 2013 presidential 
elections that will determine the successor to Saakashvili, 
who is constitutionally barred from seeking another term 
as president. If Georgia makes it through the next three 
years with some stability, an increased level of political 
pluralism, and a successful transition to a new president 
in an election that is broadly viewed as free and fair,
10. See, for example, Human Rights Watch's World Report 2010, 
which states that “the media environment [in Georgia] remains mixed, 
with diverse print media, but nationwide television broadcasting 
limited to the state-owned public broadcaster and pro-government 
Rustavi 2 and Imedi stations. Transparency of media ownership 
remains a concern. Several journalists alleged pressure and attacks. 
Nato Gegelia, a journalist for the regional newspaper Guria News, 
was assaulted in a police station on June 10 in Chokhatauri, in western 
Georgia, as she investigated an opposition activist's detention.” See 
“Human Rights Watch World Report 2010: Georgia,” Human Rights 
Watch, 2010, http://www.hrw.org/en/node/87536.
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there will be real reason for optimism about Georgia's 
future. Achieving this, however, will not be easy, and the 
consequences for failure are quite severe.
It is imperative that U.S. policy reflect these 
challenges and begin to focus on helping develop the 
institutions necessary for this transition to occur. The 
upcoming elections and the periods between them are not 
just another test for Georgian democracy. Framing these 
events that way allows the U.S. to avoid recognizing how 
high the stakes are and the seriousness of the problems 
facing Georgia's democratic development. Accordingly, 
the time to test Georgian democracy has passed. It is now 
time to confront and seek to address the shortcomings. 
The United States must engage with Georgian institutions 
and political actors during this period in a sustained and 
strategic manner.
Democracy and National Security
In Georgia, democracy is a key component of 
national security. Membership in NATO or the EU is 
not a serious possibility until Georgia becomes more 
democratic. Similarly, Georgia's strategic value to 
the West is still somewhat based on a belief in shared 
political orientations and values. If Georgia is viewed 
as just another semi-authoritarian post-Soviet country, it 
will become increasingly difficult for Western countries, 
particularly in Europe, to continue to be interested in 
helping Georgia resolve its security threats and lingering 
conflicts. This precarious position is understood by the 
Georgian government; Georgian leaders visiting Europe 
and the United States frequently stress their country's 
Western values and democratic credentials, even as these 
credentials weaken. The credibility of Georgia's claim 
to share Western values and attributes, however, has 
diminished in Europe in the past several years. Georgia 
can combat this trend by finding better ways to tell its 
story or by changing the reality within its borders. The 
United States should help Georgia focus on the latter 
approach.
For Georgia, national security has been tied to 
several related goals since 2004, including rebuilding 
the state and restoring territorial integrity. It is difficult 
to disaggregate these issues, particularly given the 
centrality of South Ossetia and Abkhazia to Georgia's 
perception of its security, national identity, and territorial 
integrity. Similarly, the state that Saakashvili inherited 
in 2004 was simply too weak to deliver basic services 
or maintain a modicum of domestic order, let alone 
competently defend its borders. The leaders of the Rose 
Revolution, not without reason, made these three related 
goals their top priority when they came to office. They 
made the mistake, however, of believing that the pursuit
of democracy was in conflict with these goals. While 
in some countries there may be a trade-off between 
democracy and security, this was not true in Georgia, 
where Saakashvili and his party enjoyed enormous 
popular support and complete control of the government.
Taking a more democratic approach to state-building 
and national security policy in the period from 2004­
2007 would not have sidetracked these efforts. Greater 
adherence to democratic processes probably would have 
slowed these efforts down slightly, but they also may 
have led to better decision making. Significantly, the 
Georgian government, as noted above, was very clear 
about its intent to prioritize state-building and received 
almost no pressure from the United States or elsewhere 
to focus on democracy as well.
As the Georgian government began to cut corners 
on democracy and deliberation in the name of building 
the state and strengthening the military, its leadership 
developed bad habits. Policies requiring parliamentary 
debates and hearings were instituted by presidential 
decree, informal networks within the government 
became more powerful as they helped accelerate reforms, 
judicial processes were skirted, public input was limited, 
and opposing voices were ignored. Despite these bad 
habits, government policies were in many cases fine at 
first. By 2006 the Georgian state was by any measure, 
stronger, more competent, and more honest than it had 
been at the time of the Rose Revolution. This increased 
competence is illustrated by the fact that services were 
delivered more efficiently, ordinary citizens encountered 
less petty corruption, and state coffers grew because of 
more efficient tax collection.11
The bad habit of deemphasizing democracy in order 
to move more quickly to achieve policy goals, however, 
proved to be difficult to change. These habits tended 
to worsen with time. The government's willingness to 
overlook institutional checks and balances and ignore 
opposition voices contributed to the frustration that led 
to street demonstrations in November 2007 and spring of 
2009. Additionally, this attitude was undoubtedly used 
by the government to rationalize the abuses surrounding 
the elections in 2008.
These bad habits, however, are problems of 
democracy rather than of national security. However, 
they became problems of national security because they 
contributed to instability and poor decision making by 
the government. For Georgia, instability both reduces 
its chances of being integrated into organizations 
like NATO and makes it an easier target for Russian 
interference. The best way to address this instability is 
not by strengthening the Saakashvili regime, which was 
the United States' strategy from 2004 to 2008, but by
11. Lincoln Mitchell, “Compromising Democracy: State Building in 
Saakashvili's Georgia,” Central Asian Survey 28:2 (June 2009).
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helping Georgia become more democratic.
Democracy is not only necessary for Georgia to 
increase its chances of joining NATO or of being viewed 
by Europe as a valuable ally; it is also necessary in order 
to make better decisions on questions of national security. 
Georgia exists in a very difficult security context with 
little room for error. For example, the mistakes made 
by the Georgian government leading up to the 2008 war 
were neither indefensible nor criminal, but they were 
mistakes nonetheless, and Georgia has paid for them 
dearly.
It is very difficult to argue that the reasons for these 
mistakes lay in a decision-making process that was too 
inclusive or a government that stuck too rigorously to 
institutional constraints. Similarly, it is implausible 
that, had there been greater democracy in Georgia, the 
government would have made more serious mistakes. 
The opposite case is more likely: it was the absence of 
any checks on the relatively small and ideologically 
simpatico circle of advisors around Saakashvili that 
contributed to the flawed decision to begin shelling 
Tsinkhvali on August 7, 2008.
A more democratic Georgian government, 
characterized by greater accountability, transparency, 
and acceptance of oppositional viewpoints would make 
better decisions on national security. A freer media 
climate, for example, would not weaken Georgia but 
would allow citizens to understand more clearly what 
decisions their leaders are making and what bearing 
those decisions have on their country's national security. 
The current media environment allows the government 
to dominate the public discourse to the extent that issues 
of national security are often understood poorly and are 
skewed according to the government's wishes.
Such arguments are not mere speculation. In late 
September and early October 2008, the Georgian people 
believed overwhelmingly that the war had started because 
“Georgia reacted to Russian military aggression in South 
Ossetia” (84%), viewed the performance of the Georgian 
military during the war as “good” or “very good” (89%), 
and thought that Saakashvili's performance during the 
war was “positive” or “very positive” (77%).12 While 
some of these responses can be attributed to a rally- 
around-the-flag effect that was caused by the war, 
it is also clear that public opinion in Georgia was not 
developed with adequate access to a range of information 
or viewpoints. The limits on information available to the 
Georgian people meant that citizens were unable to hold 
their government accountable because they simply were 
unaware of what had actually happened. It also meant
12. “Georgian National Study: September 23 - October 1, 2008,” 
International Republican Institute, October 2008, http://www.iri.org. 
ge/eng/poll/October2009-eng.pdf.
that the government faced no consequences for losing the 
war because the people essentially thought they had won.
Democracy and Stability
The weakness of Georgian democracy has also 
contributed to the instability that has been a problem 
in Georgia since the war. This persistent instability has 
generally existed at a relatively low level and has never 
really threatened to bring the government down; still, it 
has created obstacles to governance, led to heightened 
tensions between the government and the opposition, and 
likely produced a negative effect on investor confidence 
in Georgia. Georgia is not a resource-rich country that 
would attract investors and businesses regardless of its 
politics; instead, it is a country that seeks to build its 
economy around being a transit hub where businesses 
can operate in a business-friendly, low-tax environment. 
Political instability of any kind jeopardizes this plan.
In the years immediately following the Rose 
Revolution, the Georgian government pushed through an 
ambitious reform program that included a number of bold 
and ultimately successful moves, such as firing the entire 
Tbilisi police force, radically revamping the education 
system, reducing the size of the bureaucracy, and creating 
a more friendly business climate. Each of these efforts, 
while good for Georgia's development, inevitably created 
groups of people who lost jobs, status, or even benefits 
that were gained through corruption. The shock caused 
by the reforms was made worse because the Georgian 
government rarely took a consultative approach to any 
of these decisions. Instead, the government often talked 
down to people or ignored all opposition. The country's 
leaders were confident that they knew best, and in many 
cases this was true. However, a more consultative and 
democratic approach probably would have resulted in less 
anger from citizens who considered themselves victims 
of Saakashvili's reforms and later joined demonstrations 
and other protests.
Much of the instability in Georgia is driven by 
tension between the government and some members of 
the political elite who have no access to the government 
or its decision-making processes. The willingness of the 
government to tamper with elections, beginning in earnest 
in 2006, has ensured the virtual monopoly on power held 
by Saakashvili's UNM. Opposition forces control no 
city councils and have only a few seats in Parliament. 
Saakashvili has also stacked the government, from 
cabinet members to mayors and university presidents, 
with political supporters, meaning that there are few 
opportunities for opposing voices to be heard or for 
opposition politicians to have an impact on policy. This 
disenfranchisement was exacerbated by the decision of
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a number of opposition parties to not take the few seats 
they had won in the 2008 parliamentary election as a way 
to protest government excesses. With all of the formal 
and institutional channels for involvement in politics 
blocked, it is no surprise that the streets often serve as 
the Georgia's main political arena.
The concerns raised by this alienated opposition 
political elite are also very political in nature. The 
country is not divided by regional, ideological, or ethnic 
differences; thus, only the views of the current government 
distinguish the government from the opposition. Not 
surprisingly, this leads to a very personal kind of politics 
in Georgia, where personal attacks and efforts to carry 
out character assassination are widespread on both sides, 
and almost any political dispute leads to calls for the 
president's resignation.
The weakness of Georgian democracy allows Russian 
influence, both real and imagined, to have a greater 
impact. There is ample reason to believe that Russia 
would like to destabilize Georgia, and the fact that it has 
contact with some members of the Georgian opposition 
understandably arouses suspicions of meddling. This, 
of course, does not help Georgia become more stable. 
However, the problem is exacerbated by the tendency 
of the Georgian government to accuse any opposition 
figure of collusion with Russia.13 Indeed, members 
of the Georgian government have regularly accused 
international figures, including members of the Tagliavini 
Commission, of being bought off by the Russians. Such 
accusations may score some short-term political points 
domestically, but they transform the very act of political 
criticism into a threat to national security and severely 
undermine the credibility of Georgia's government in the 
eyes of international observers.
One of the unique features of Georgian politics is 
that service in the government seems to be a radicalizing 
experience. Leaders of what is generally referred to as 
the “radical opposition” include a former prime minister 
(Zurab Nogadeli), a former foreign minister (Salome 
Zurabishvili) and a former chair of Parliament (Nino 
Burjanadze). A former ambassador to the United Nations 
(Irakli Alasania) is also a prominent opposition figure. All 
of these people were once visible and powerful members 
of the government, but they gradually grew disillusioned 
with Saakashvili and those around him. Because of the 
weakness of Georgian political institutions, these once 
powerful politicians have been forced to the political 
fringes and to the street. All of these individuals, with the
13. This dynamic is not new in Georgia and existed in the Shevard­
nadze period as well. One of the authors of this report was also ac­
cused of being in cahoots with Russia in the weeks preceding the Rose 
Revolution because of his relationships with Saakashvili, Zhvania, 
and other members of what was then the opposition.
possible exception of Zurabishvili, have been accused by 
the government of being Russian spies or stooges.
The United States' Role in Georgia's 
Democratic Development
Issues of democracy and political development are 
central to U.S. policy in Georgia and have been for many 
years. Over the next several years, as Georgia enters yet 
another critical political period, these issues may take on 
greater import. For the United States, the two principles 
guiding policy on Georgia's democratic development 
should be staying engaged and recognizing that nobody 
is helped when the United States does not confront the 
weaknesses of Georgia's democracy. Specific policy 
recommendations flow very neatly and clearly from 
these two principles.
Engagement on democracy issues is important 
to Georgia for several reasons. First, the Georgian 
government cares deeply about the opinion of the U.S. 
government with regard to its democratic development. 
It is no coincidence that since November 2007, the two 
major statements made by Saakashvili regarding the need 
for more democracy occurred in the United States and 
shortly before Vice President Biden's visit to Georgia in 
July 2009. If the United States continues to be visibly 
engaged in Georgia generally, and in its democratic 
development more specifically, it will be more difficult 
for the Georgian government to avoid taking democratic 
reform seriously.
Not surprisingly, a lack of U.S. engagement sends 
precisely the opposite message: that the United States is 
not particularly concerned about democracy in Georgia. 
For example, the failure of the United States to make any 
public statements during the debate over the threshold for 
the Tbilisi mayoral race was interpreted by the Georgian 
leadership as evidence that the United States was not 
going to push them too hard to conduct a fair election. 
Although the U.S. position that the threshold for a runoff 
in a mayoral election is a level of minutia with which the 
United States should not be concerned, this was not how 
it was interpreted by the government or the opposition.
A major reason why the United States must engage 
Georgia about its democratic development in the next 
several years is that only through a consistent, medium- 
range, and somewhat broad strategy can Georgia succeed 
in preparing for the upcoming elections and transitions 
in the next three years. The presidential election of 2013 
will be an enormously critical moment for Georgia. The 
parliamentary election of 2012 will be of almost equal 
import. For these events to help bring Georgia closer to 
democracy rather than instability or authoritarianism, it 
is essential that the United States becomes more heavily
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involved now and remains engaged at a high level 
through the election.
U.S. high-level engagement in Georgia should 
include programmatic support for democracy assistance, 
and a political focus on democracy. It also means that 
democracy should always be a central theme of the 
bilateral relationship between the two countries and 
that the U.S.-Georgia Charter's working group should 
continue its regular meetings and follow up with 
Georgian officials on its concerns and expectations.
The second major principle guiding U.S. democracy 
policy in Georgia should be the acknowledgment that 
an honest assessment of Georgian democracy must be 
the starting point for U.S. involvement in democratic 
development there. Being less than honest with Georgia 
- and frankly, with ourselves - about the state of its 
democracy helps neither Georgia nor the United States. 
An important component of this principle is that the 
U.S. assessment should be aired publicly so that the 
Georgian people may hear the United States' position 
directly from its representatives. Strong words about 
democracy shared in private meetings, combined with 
uncritical public statements, have time and again proved 
to be an ineffective way to push Georgia towards greater 
democratization.
The inability, or unwillingness, of the United States 
to ground its assessments of Georgia's democratic 
development in reality has contributed to the stalling of 
democracy in Georgia since the Rose Revolution. This 
has been a costly lost opportunity. By failing to take 
a more realistic and public position on democracy, the 
United States has sent the message that it was acceptable 
for Georgia to make democracy a lower priority, cut 
corners on questions of democratic processes, manipulate 
election laws, remove political programs from television, 
and consolidate power in the presidency. These actions 
contributed to an environment in which, by late 2007, 
the Georgian government believed it could violently 
disperse a crowd of peaceful demonstrators and ransack 
and shutter the major independent television station 
without a strong response from Washington.
The Georgian government was, unfortunately, right 
in this regard; Washington's silence contributed to the 
government's belief that the 2008 presidential election 
and subsequent parliamentary election did not have to 
be entirely free and fair, and that there would be very 
few consequences for manipulating those elections. 
The Georgian government was correct in this belief as 
well. By creating an environment in which democratic 
shortfalls are either ignored or downplayed, the United 
States has enabled Georgia to move increasingly further 
away from democracy. The best, and probably only, way 
to reverse this development will be to speak more frankly 
and openly about democracy in Georgia.
Recommendations
The general guidelines regarding U.S. policy toward 
democracy in Georgia are remaining engaged and 
being frank about the state of democracy in the country. 
However, the United States also can take specific steps 
to ensure that the next three years are a period of positive 
democratic development for Georgia. A strategy that is 
grounded in ongoing engagement and a commitment to 
forthright assessments of democracy in Georgia will allow 
the United States to help Georgia's democracy evolve 
and will help both Georgia and the United States achieve 
their goals. The difficulty of working on democracy in 
Georgia is that the actual strength of Georgian democracy 
can be overstated in initial evaluations. Georgia remains 
freer and more democratic than its post-Soviet neighbors 
and most of the non-Baltic countries of the former Soviet 
Union. However, that status is not enough to get Georgia 
into NATO or to stabilize the country. Moreover, the 
state of Georgian democracy is not trending in the right 
direction. Ignoring this downward trend may open the 
door to a more authoritarian and less stable regime, 
particularly as Saakashvili's time in office winds down.
■ Recommit to supporting Georgia S independent 
media and civil society.
The most obvious way for the United States 
to address the weakening of Georgia's civil 
society is to return to a strategy of substantial 
funding for NGOs that are engaged in 
democratic development and government 
accountability. Similarly, providing resources 
for journalists to produce a range of serious 
news and political programming and loans 
for independent television stations would 
be valuable contributions from the United 
States. However, it is also necessary for the 
United States to provide political support 
to independent journalists and civil society 
organizations. When the United States is 
silent after an NGO is raided or a government- 
controlled television station censors its 
reporting or refuses to cover an opposition 
figure, its lack of response is interpreted across 
the Georgian political spectrum as approval of 
these actions. While getting involved at this 
level may be uncomfortable for the United 
States, it is critical to Georgia's democratic 
future. If the United States ignores these 
problems, they will continue to occur and 
possibly grow worse. This is a clear lesson 
from 2004-2009.
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■ Publicly state expectations for national 
elections early, and broadly engage with the 
election process.
Georgia will hold national parliamentary 
elections in 2012 and a presidential election
in 2013. Early U.S. engagement could help
resolve questions about the health of Georgia's 
democracy well before the elections and 
foster a fairer campaign environment that
garners public confidence in the process. This 
kind of substantive engagement could also 
help the United States send an unambiguous 
message that election fraud of any kind will 
not be overlooked in 2012 and 2013, and that 
Georgia's future depends on transitioning 
smoothly to legitimate and fair elections.
The goal of U.S. engagement should be to 
help make the elections fair and to build the 
Georgian people's confidence in the election 
process. This will require consistent and long­
term engagement by the United States.
Efforts by the Georgian government to 
manipulate election rules, pressure wealthy 
Georgians not to support opposition parties, 
and limit media coverage of opposition 
candidates on state-supported television 
stations have occurred well in advance of 
all recent elections in Georgia. Should the 
Georgian government take similar steps again, 
the United States should draw public attention 
to their actions.
■Maintain realistic expectations, but retain 
credibility for their fulfi llment.
While the United States' commitment
to fair elections in Georgia is important, 
expectations about the impact of the
elections should be realistic. In the best-
case scenario, the parliamentary election 
will introduce a broader range of political
views to Parliament and will help build 
public confidence and institutions ahead of
the presidential election. However, even if
this occurs, the challenges facing Georgian 
democracy will be significant. The lack of 
experience with multi-party governance, the 
imbalance between the executive branch and
the legislature, and a political party system 
that is based on personalities and attitudes 
towards the president rather than genuine
policy differences will remain problematic
for Georgia regardless of how the elections 
take place. For this reason, the United States 
cannot overlook the need to remain engaged,
both programmatically and politically, in
helping develop Georgia's political institutions, 
including its political parties, national and local 
legislatures, and the state-party relationship.
■ Maintain engagement with a variety of 
political fi gures, not just the government.
A fourth step that the United States should take
is to continue to show willingness to interact 
with a range of Georgian political figures.
This is an important step primarily because it
is critical for the United States to demonstrate 
that it is an ally of the Georgian state and 
people and not just the current leadership.
What is more, given that it is common for the
government to charge that its opponents are
Russian stooges or spies, U.S. contacts with 
besieged politicians could weaken or preclude 
those attacks. When high-level visitors to 
Georgia meet with opposition figures and 
encourage their participation in politics, or 
when those Georgian politicians are treated 
as serious political figures when they travel 
to the United States, it sends the message that 
the United States does not believe they are 
Russian stooges. This message is not lost on 
the Georgian people.
■ Leverage U.S. assistance for greater progress 
on democratization issues.
Finally, the United States must recognize 
the impact that its assistance has on political 
developments in Georgia. For example, as this 
report was being completed, the incumbent 
mayor of Tbilisi was basing his reelection 
campaign on several accomplishments, 
ranging from successful service delivery to 
improvements made to the city. Few of these 
advances would have been possible without 
support from the United States. While the 
United States' decision to provide this support 
was the right thing to do, the political impact 
cannot be ignored. One of the responsibilities 
that comes with providing this assistance 
is recognizing that the United States, like it 
or not, is now deeply involved in Georgian 
politics. It is understood this way in Georgia 
as well. U.S. policy in Georgia, particularly 
with regard to democracy, cannot ignore this 
deep involvement. As such, the United States' 
refusal to get involved in an issue because it is 
something that Georgia should resolve on its 
own may be interpreted in Georgia as lending 
support to or agreeing with the government's 
position or recent actions.
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IV.
U.S. Assistance to Georgia
Background—1991 to 2008
U.S. assistance has always been at the center of the 
U.S.-Georgia relationship. Close personal relationships, 
not only between Saakashvili and the Bush administra­
tion but also between Saakashvili's predecessor Eduard 
Shevardnadze and U.S. leaders from both sides of the 
aisle, have facilitated U.S. support for Georgia. During 
Shevardnadze's presidency, particularly in the later years, 
there was growing concern in Washington that a corrupt 
and incompetent Georgian government was wasting or 
stealing substantial amounts of aid. Accordingly, begin­
ning in the early 2000s, the United States shifted much 
of its assistance to Georgia from direct support of the 
central government to support of Georgian NGOs. Some 
of the NGOs that received U.S. assistance provided pub­
lic services directly, while others acted as watchdogs and 
kept tabs on the increasingly corrupt government.1
During the Shevardnadze years, Georgia's economy, 
despite some reforms, was generally weak and needed 
the assistance that the United States and several Euro­
pean countries provided. Throughout the roughly 11 
years of Shevardnadze's presidency (1992-2003), unem­
ployment was high, foreign investment was scarce, and 
tourism and food exports, which had been the founda­
tions of the economy of Soviet Georgia, never returned 
to pre-1991 levels. By the end of Shevardnadze's term in 
office, foreign assistance, mostly from the United States, 
and remittances, primarily from Georgians working in 
Russia, were major parts of the Georgian economy.
Interestingly, during the Shevardnadze years, the 
United States asked for and received little in return for its 
assistance to Georgia. Georgia generally sought to align 
itself with the United States and the West, but it was not a 
particularly important ally or security partner. The Unit­
ed States did not need Georgia's support on any key for­
1. The impact of NGOs on Georgian politics during this period was
strong. Beachain (2009) is among several scholars who partially
attribute the Rose Revolution to “a myriad of (sic) foreign-funded
NGOs [that] undermined Shevardnadze's credibility.” A USAID
Strategy Document for FY 2004-2008, written shortly before the Rose 
Revolution, made the U.S. emphasis on working with NGOs rather 
than the Georgian government explicit, and states that greater reliance 
on grassroots organizations (NGOs) “seems necessary” and that “the 
new Country Strategy would take these grassroots initiatives to the 
next level of cohesion by explicitly coordinating more of this activity 
at the local or operational level for maximum total effectiveness” (em­
phasis in original). “USAID/Caucasus - Georgia Country Strategy (FY 
2004 - 2008),” United States Agency for International Development, 
August 2003, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDABY768.pdf, p. 8.
eign policies or military campaigns, and it did not lever­
age its assistance to push Georgia toward implementing 
democratic or other reforms. U.S. assistance clearly con­
tributed to the pro-Western feelings of many Georgian 
leaders and citizens, but it did not help the U.S. achieve 
any critical goals in the region. Georgia did, however, 
play a useful role as a transit country for the shipment of 
Caspian oil to the West, most notably through the land­
mark Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline.
U.S. Aid after the Rose Revolution:
From Supporting NGOs to Supporting the
State
Following the Rose Revolution and Saakashvili's 
election in January 2004, Georgia began to receive even 
more U.S. assistance. Assistance from the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID), as well 
as direct government support, increased. Likewise, Geor­
gia jumped to the head of the queue for support from 
the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), becom­
ing eligible almost immediately for special MCC funds 
that had been set aside for countries that were viewed 
by Washington as particularly deserving of U.S. support. 
These MCC funds were an alternative to the sometimes 
slow and overly bureaucratic USAID assistance pro­
grams.
Thus, post-Rose Revolution assistance to Georgia 
should be understood as part of a history of strong U.S. 
assistance to that country. While the close relationship 
between Saakashvili and Bush and the democratic ad­
vance that the Rose Revolution was perceived to be, 
at least initially, almost certainly contributed to the in­
creased support, U.S. support for Georgia did not begin 
with the Rose Revolution. Financial assistance from 
2004 to 2008 was quantitatively but not qualitatively dif­
ferent.
During this period, the U.S. government remained 
uninterested in conditioning assistance. As before, the 
United States did not appear to receive any direct ben­
efits as a result of its generous support of Georgia. Still, 
there were some key differences in U.S. financial assis­
tance to Saakashvili's Georgia, compared to that of his 
predecessor: First, more money was allotted. Second, 
and equally important, the money was allotted differ­
ently.
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Figure 3: U.S. Assistance to Georgia (1992-2004), the Shevardnadze Years (in millions)
Source: “FY 2009 Congressional Budget Justification: Europe and Eurasia Regional Overview,” Department of State, http://www.state.gov/
documents/organization/101440.pdf. See also “Striking the Balance: U.S. Policy and Stability in Georgia - A Report to the Committee on Foreign 
Relations, United States Senate,” December 22, 2009, http://lugar.senate.gov/sfrc/pdf/Georgia.pdf. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Operations 
Appropriated Assistance: Georgia, January 2009, http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/fs/108293.htm. “U.S. Government Assistance to and Coopera­
tive Activities with the New Independent States of the Former Soviet Union,” State Department, January 1997, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/
PCAAA881.pdf. “Fact Sheet: U.S. Assistance to Georgia, State Department, February 2004,” (http://www.america.gov/st/washfile-English/2004/ 
February/20040217161400XLrenneF0.920849.html. “State Department Recaps U.S. Aid to Georgia for Fiscal Year 2005,” State Department, 
August 2005, http://www.america.gov/st/washfile-english/2005/August/200508151255111CJsamohT0.5840723.html
Figure 4: U.S. Assistance to Georgia Since the Rose Revolution (in millions)
■ U.S. Assistance ■ Millenium Challenge Corporation Funds
Source: “FY 2009 Congressional Budget Justification: Europe and Eurasia Regional Overview,” Department of State. “Striking the Bal­
ance: U.S. Policy and Stability in Georgia - A Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate,” 2009. Foreign Opera­
tions Appropriated Assistance: Georgia, 2009. “U.S. Government Assistance to and Cooperative Activities with the New Independent 
States of the Former Soviet Union,” State Department, January 1997.
Figure 5: Assistance for Governing Justly and Democratically (in millions)
Policy and Stability in Georgia - A Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate,” 2009. Foreign Operations Appropriated 
Assistance: Georgia, 2009. “U.S. Government Assistance to and Cooperative Activities with the New Independent States of the Former Soviet 
Union,” State Department, January 1997. “Fact Sheet: U.S. Assistance to Georgia,” State Department, February 2004. “State Department Recaps 
U.S. Aid to Georgia for Fiscal Year 2005,” State Department.
The policy of sending assistance money to NGOs 
began in the 1990s, but was significantly reversed when 
Saakashvili took office. Reflecting the view that the 
Rose Revolution presented a major opportunity to ac­
celerate reform in Georgia and place a higher degree of 
trust in the Georgian government, U.S. assistance was 
provided directly to the Georgian government starting 
in 2004. Some of this money took the form of direct 
budget assistance; other money went to various agencies 
and ministries within the government. During this time, 
the United States also increased the number of technical 
advisors that it funded for the Georgian government.
Assistance to Georgia following the Rose Revo­
lution also declined in some areas, most strikingly in 
the field of democracy assistance. This suggests that 
the U.S. government either vastly underestimated the 
amount of work Georgia needed to accomplish in order 
to move toward democracy following the Rose Revolu­
tion, or simply no longer viewed democracy as a priority 
once Saakashvili took office. Chart 3 shows the support 
for the United States' “Governing Justly and Democrati­
cally” strategy in the five years preceding (2000-2004) 
and following (2005-2009) the Rose Revolution. Na­
tional elections in the fiscal years 2000 and 2004 explain 
some of the increase for those years, but the pattern of 
declining democracy assistance money is still clear.
Some U.S. financial and technical assistance during 
the post-Rose Revolution years contributed to the efforts 
of the Georgian government to rebuild its military, which 
had become quite weak following defeat and neglect in
the 1990s. Between 2003 and 2008, annual Georgian 
defense spending increased from $30 million to $1 bil- 
lion.2 *While the U.S. provided only some of that money, 
it facilitated Georgia's rearmament by selling it weapons, 
providing training to the Georgian military, and sharing 
intelligence with Georgia. For its part, Georgia was one 
of the few countries to support the U.S. war in Iraq by 
sending troops there. Importantly, Georgia's support 
for the war in Iraq began when Shevardnadze was presi­
dent; under Saakashvili, however, Georgia sent more and 
better-trained troops to fight alongside the U.S. military. 
Thus, among the outcomes of U.S. assistance to Georgia 
were both a strengthening of the Georgian military and a 
strengthening of the ties between the Georgian and U.S. 
militaries.
Therefore, Georgia's defeat by Russia in August 
2008 was, to a degree, a reflection of the quality and 
value of U.S. military assistance. It was not lost on Rus­
sia and other countries in the region that the military that 
Russia devastated in a matter of days was built with sub­
stantial U.S. support and assistance. Equally significant 
is the concern that U.S. support for the Georgian military 
did more to raise the likelihood of war than to prevent
2. Peter Rutland, “A Green Light for Russia: Policy missteps by Geor­
gia and its allies in Washington opened the door for Moscow's armed 
intervention,” Transitions Online, August 12, 2008, http://www.
tol.org/client/article/19836-a-green-light-for-russia.html.  Georgian
Ministry of Defence Strategic Defence Review, 2007, www.mod.gov. 
ge/files/cocqkdkeklgeo.pdf.
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Table 2: Amount of Postwar Assistance by Period (in millions USD)
Phase Amount Timeframe
I $61.7 August/September 2008
II $304.5 Fall/Winter 2008/2009
III $395.3 Spring 2009
IV $242 Fall 2009-Fall 2010
Total $1,003.5 2008-2010
Source: “U.S. Assistance to Georgia $1 Billion Pledge,” State Department, February 2010, unclassified memo.
conflict. This clearly should be borne in mind with re­
gard to postwar U.S. assistance for Georgia.
Postwar Assistance
Shortly after the conclusion of the 2008 war, the 
United States pledged $1 billion in assistance to help 
Georgia repair the damage caused by the war. This sig­
nificant aid commitment enjoyed bipartisan support and 
drew few questions in Washington. It was a timely and 
clear message to both Russia and Georgia that the United 
States was not going to abandon Georgia following the 
war. The postwar assistance package soon became one 
of the new foundations for the postwar relationship be­
tween Georgia and the United States, and it was followed 
quickly by an aid package from Europe of roughly $3.5 
billion in loans and grants.
U.S. assistance provided under the postwar pledge 
has been delivered over a period of roughly two years 
beginning in August 2008, when humanitarian assistance 
was delivered almost immediately after the war. Longer- 
term assistance continued through 2009 and will end 
sometime in late 2010. Table 2 describes approximately 
when different phases of the total transfer occurred.
U.S. and European assistance that followed the war 
grew out of a joint needs assessment that was facilitated 
by the United Nations and the World Bank with support 
from several other international donors and financial 
organizations. The assessment identified three primary 
areas where assistance was needed: support for the rapid 
restoration of confidence, support for social needs, and 
support for critical investments.3
According to the assessment, the major damage to 
Georgia was economic in nature, as “the conflict dealt 
a shock to the key pillars of economic growth.”4 This
3. The United Nations, Georgia: Summary of Joint Needs Assess­
ment Findings, October 2008, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/
INTGEORGIA/Resources/301645-1224598099977/GEJNA2008.pdf.
4. Ibid. It is likely that the focus of the economic impact of the war 
was largely a result of the heavy involvement of banks and other lend­
ing institutions in the needs assessment. However, disaggregating the 
impact of the war from that of the global economic downturn on the 
investment climate in Georgia is not easy. It is clear that investments 
were smaller in Georgia in the months following the war than they 
had been before the war, but by October of 2008 when the report was
contributed to an assistance strategy, particularly from 
international financial institutions (IFIs), which sought 
to prevent Georgia's economy from collapsing under 
the strain of the war and the global economic crisis that 
immediately followed the conflict. For example, the In­
ternational Monetary Fund (IMF) committed $750 mil­
lion in credit for “maintenance of economic stability,” 
primarily as a loan to the National Bank of Georgia in an 
effort to stabilize the Georgian lari.5
Postwar assistance to Georgia came from various 
sources and took different forms. The bulk of U.S. as­
sistance was delivered in the form of grants, rather than 
loans. By exception, the Overseas Private Investment 
Corporation (OPIC) provided $180 million dollars in 
loan guarantees to Georgian businesses and U.S. busi­
nesses with investments in Georgia.
A far greater proportion (approximately 63%) of the 
international assistance, primarily from Europe and inter­
national financial institutions, consisted of loans. When 
U.S. assistance is taken out of the equation, the propor­
tion of assistance in the form of loans approaches 80%. 
Of this roughly $3 billion, “about half. ..is being spent 
on public sector loans and about half is being loaned to 
private corporations.”6
Preplanned Assistance or Reactive Assistance?
Because Georgia had received ample foreign as­
sistance and loans before the war (in 2004-2008) from 
both Europe and the United States, the question of how 
much of the postwar assistance was new, and how much 
would have been provided had there not been a war, is 
difficult to answer, particularly with regard to European 
assistance.
Determining how much U.S. assistance was as a re­
sult of the war is not as difficult at first cut. Total U.S. as­
sistance for Georgia in 2007-2008 was roughly $140 mil­
lion per year. Assuming that the U.S. assistance would
prepared, investments were slowing down around the world.
5. Vladimer Papava, Refl ection of Donors' Financial Aid Within the 
Framework of Brussels Conference Decisions in the 2008 and 2009 
State Budgets of Georgia, Open Society Georgia Foundation, April 
2009, http://osgf.ge/files/news/news2009/Aid_in_2008-2009_bud- 
gets_Report_GEO_lGR5.oH3Ci.pdf, p. 5.
6. George Welton, The Loan Component of the Post-war Pledge: An 
Evaluation, Open Society Georgia Foundation, July 2009, http://www. 
osgf.ge/files/news/news2009/Loan_Geo_WEB_9voqioI1ns.pdf.
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Table 3: U.S. Assistance to Georgia by Category (in millions)
Sector Allocation
Restoring Peace and Security $44
Budgetary Support $250
Strengthening Democracy, Governance and the Rule of Law $48.1
Economic Recovery and Growth $466.64
Aid to Internally Displaced Persons and Social Recovery $189.18
Management Support (USAID) $5.5
Total $1,003.5
Source: “U.S. Assistance to Georgia $1 Billion Pledge,” State Department.
not have changed substantially had there not been a war, 
and that most of the postwar assistance will arrive by 
the end of 2010, we can conclude that the United States 
would have committed $280 million in assistance to 
Georgia had the war not happened, and that $720 million 
of the total $1 billion postwar pledge was new money. 
It is impossible to know for certain whether U.S. assis­
tance would have stayed at the same level had there not 
been a war, particularly because the MCC money was 
due to expire in 2010. Indeed, the United States might 
have provided more money to Georgia during the global 
financial crisis anyway. But it is reasonably clear that the 
difference would have been relatively small compared to 
the actual $720 million increase. Clearly, a significant 
proportion of postwar assistance from the United States 
is new money that otherwise would not have gone to 
Tbilisi.
This is not the case, however, with the rest of Geor­
gia's postwar assistance and international loans. George 
Welton argues that “most of the major IFIs or national 
development banks suggested that the war had not in­
creased the amount they expected to spend significantly” 
on Georgia and that “all of the branches of the World Bank 
explicitly acknowledged that the arrangements they have 
made fit in with the funding envelope that they expected 
before the war.”7 Thus, while these loans were provided 
more quickly, their size did not differ significantly from 
what Georgia otherwise would have received.
Georgia's total debt as of mid-2009 was $2.9 billion, 
which, while high, is not unmanageable. However, as 
these loans come due beginning in 2012, debt servicing 
will become an increasing burden on Georgia's budget. 
The need to repay these loans will coincide with the end 
of the special postwar assistance from the United States, 
raising potentially serious financial problems for Geor- 
gia.8
7. Welton, George. The Loan Component of the Post-war Pledge: An
E-valuation. Open Society Georgia Foundation. July 2009. http://www. 
osgfge/files/news/news2009/Loan=Geo=WEB=9voqioI1ns.pdf., p.
15.
8. According to the World Bank, debt service will represent 6.5%
The fact that U.S. postwar assistance came in the 
form of grants and not loans lends it different political 
significance than the assistance coming from other do­
nors. The United States has developed a deeper stake 
and a more involved relationship with postwar Georgia 
than other international actors, such as the EU and the 
World Bank. In addition to having a direct impact on 
the Georgian budget and alleviating adverse humani­
tarian conditions following the war, U.S. assistance has 
implications for the United States' role in Georgia and 
the region, and it raises a number of political questions.
The Impact of U.S. Postwar Assistance
U.S. assistance to postwar Georgia generally has 
been quite effective. Saakashvili's government, even 
before the war, deservedly earned a reputation for 
spending assistance money properly, with virtually 
none of the corruption that was rampant during the 
latter years of the Shevardnadze administration. The 
post-Rose Revolution Georgian government won the 
confidence of many donors, particularly of the United 
States, because assistance to Georgia, for example, to 
build a road was actually used to build a road. Under 
the previous administration, a large chunk of the funds 
earmarked for building a road, in most cases, would 
have ended up in the bank account of a corrupt gov­
ernment minister.9 Had the Georgian government not 
demonstrated before the war that it would use assis­
tance more responsibly than the corrupt Shevardnadze 
regime, it is unlikely that the United States would have 
provided such a generous assistance package follow­
ing Georgia's defeat in the August 2008 conflict.
of Georgian revenue in 2012 and 13.5% in Welton, “The Loan 
Component,” p. 25.
9. See (Areshidze 2008) and Don Hill, “Georgia: Saakashvili 
Raising Hopes That Corruption May Be Tackled In Earnest.” Rferl. 
org, January 9, 2004, http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1051130. 
html. Jonathan Wheatley, Georgia From National Awakening to 
Rose Revolution: Delayed Transition in the Former Soviet Union 
(London: Ashgate, 2005).
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According to USAID administrator Henrietta Fore, 
the goal of the postwar assistance was to “help inter­
nally displaced persons [IDPs] rebuild infrastructure, 
restore economic growth, sustain investor confidence in 
the Georgian economy, and foster continued democratic 
reform and energy security.”10 This is a broad array of 
goals. Moreover, while the first two goals are clearly 
related to the war, assuming that the IDPs to which Fore 
referred were displaced by the August 2008 war, the re­
maining goals are only partially connected to the con­
flict. Georgia's economy was suffering before the war as 
a result of the global economic crisis, but the war clearly
exacerbated these problems. USAID's other main con­
cerns - the need for greater democracy and energy secu­
rity - were long-standing and were not affected apprecia­
bly by the war.
Thus, the assistance package to Georgia has three 
distinct roots: a response to the war; a history of strong 
U.S. support for Georgia, particularly since the Rose 
Revolution; and assistance to Georgia as it began to face 
the international financial crisis of 2008-2009. Much of 
the support to Georgia's banking sector and efforts to 
lure back foreign investment, such as the loan guarantees 
from OPIC, are more clearly responses to the global fi­
nancial crisis rather than the war.
The funding decisions made by the United States 
also reflect its goals for and views toward Georgia. By 
allocating $250 million, or roughly 25% of its overall as­
sistance package, to direct budgetary support, the United 
States has sent a very strong signal of support for the 
Georgia government. However, it should also be noted 
that increased U.S. assistance for Georgia furthers the 
perception that Georgia is a U.S. project or client. If 
Georgia reignites the conflict with Abkhazia or South 
Ossetia or slips into a more authoritarian system, the 
United States will be viewed, rightly or wrongly, as hav­
ing contributed directly to such actions.
Of course, this is not the intent of the United States. 
USAID has indicated unambiguously how this budgetary 
support should be used:
The $250 million grant funds Georgia's budget 
expenditures to cover state pensions, state com­
pensation and state academic stipends ($163.3 
million), health care costs for people living be­
low the poverty line ($26.1 million), allowances 
to individuals displaced by the conflict in Abkha­
zia ($6.1 million), financial support to schools 
through a voucher system on a per-student basis
($24.2 million), and compensation and salaries 
for government employees of all ministries ex­
cluding the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of 
Interior ($30.3 million).11
This statement should make it clear that U.S. policymak­
ers do not want to see U.S. assistance applied either to 
rearming the Georgian military or to strengthening the 
state agencies most closely associated with domestic 
political repression. However, given the fungibility of 
budget funds, this position is little more than a statement 
of the United States' preferences.
The ample direct budgetary assistance means that 
the United States partially funds all Georgian govern­
ment expenditures. This is particularly interesting with 
regard to the roughly $3.5 million dollars that Georgia 
has spent on lobbying in the United States since the 
war.12 These lobbyists serve their client not only by rep­
resenting Georgian views on issues like territorial integ­
rity and NATO membership, but also by persuading U.S. 
lawmakers about the strength of Georgian democracy 
and the need for continued assistance to Georgia. The 
United States has put itself in the surreal position of help­
ing to fund the efforts of a foreign government to lobby 
U.S. lawmakers.
The assistance package also includes a two-year, 
$48.1 million grant to support an array of democracy- 
related programs, including work with political parties, 
support for Radio Free Europe and Voice of America, 
strengthening the parliament, and revising the election 
code. This is a substantial and laudable commitment 
by the United States. However, it should also be noted 
that many of these efforts have been funded in Georgia 
for years with very mixed results; clearly, simply pro­
viding financial support for programs of this sort does 
not guarantee their success. For this money to be used 
effectively, the programmatic work should be bolstered 
by political support, such as consistent and unambiguous 
messages about the importance of democracy. Addition­
ally, U.S. financing of such democracy-related programs 
still lags far behind the money dedicated to strengthen­
ing the Georgian government. This is probably unavoid­
able, but money sent directly to the budget has an effect 
on Georgian politics and democracy as well and can at 
times undercut democracy efforts supported by the Unit­
ed States.
A reasonable argument can be made that spending 
money on democracy assistance as part of a postwar re­
construction package does not make much sense. How­
ever, this argument is valid only if postwar assistance
10. United States Agency for International Development, Remarks 
by Henrietta H. Fore, Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance and 
USAID Administrator at the United States Mission to the Euro­
pean Union, October 23, 2008, http://georgia.usaid.gov/index. 
php?m=28&newsid=348.
11. United States Agency for International development, Transition 
Assistance to Georgia, http://georgia.usaid.gov/index.php?m=57.
12. See the section on The Domestic Political Impact: Supporting the 
Government in Tbilisi for data on lobbying expenditures.
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Table 4: Georgian Lobbying Contracts in the United States since 2008 (in thousands)
Principal Lobbyist Contract Period Amount
National Security Council of Georgia The Podesta Group 1/2010 - 12/2010 $600
Government of Georgia Gephardt Group Govern­ment Affairs LLC 1/2010 - 12/2010 $436.8
National Security Council of Georgia The Ithaca Group LLC 1/2010 - 12/2010 $270
National Security Council of Georgia Orion Strategies LLC 1/2010 - 12/2010 $420
National Security Council of Georgia Glover Park Group LLC 1/2009 - 1/2010 $360
National Security Council of Georgia Orion Strategies LLC 11/2009 - 1/2010 $10
National Security Council of Georgia Public Strategies, Inc. 8/2009 - 2/2010 $237
National Security Council of Georgia Arete Consulting 2/2009 - 12/2009 $485
National Security Council of Georgia Public Strategies, Inc. 2/2009 - 8/2009 $300
National Security Council of Georgia Glover Park Group, LLC 8/2008 - 10/2008 $200
National Security Council of Georgia Orion Strategies LLC 6/2008 - 12/2008 $200
National Security Council of Georgia Orion Strategies LLC 4/2004 - 5/2008 $590
Source: Data gathered from the U.S. Department of Justice's Foreign Agents Registration Unit database, accessible at http://www.fara.gov.
from the West comprised new money that resulted exclu­
sively because of the war. Because this is not the case, 
if the United States is seen as failing to provide politi­
cal support for its investment in democracy assistance, it 
will be interpreted as a clear sign that the United States 
is not interested in strengthening democracy in Georgia.
Overall, the main goals of U.S. assistance - help­
ing Georgia rebuild after the war and sending a message 
that the United States would not abandon its Georgian 
ally, regardless of Russian aggression - have been met. 
In this very basic way, postwar assistance has been suc­
cessful and has had an immediate and positive impact 
on postwar Georgia. Temporary housing was built for 
IDPs who had lost their homes in the war. A humanitar­
ian crisis was avoided, and the Georgian state did not 
collapse; much of the infrastructure that was damaged or 
destroyed in the war was rebuilt.
However, postwar assistance, while helping Georgia 
recover from the war and the global financial crisis, has 
not been used as an instrument to help craft a better U.S. 
policy toward Georgia and the region. One of the reasons 
why this is so important is that the assistance package, 
because of its size, has made the United States not only 
more influential in Georgia, but in some respects more 
responsible for the country's internal developments. If 
the only impact of the funding is assisting Georgia with 
its postwar recovery, then the United States will have 
wasted an opportunity; the assistance package should be 
one of the foundations upon which a new U.S. policy 
in Georgia is built. Nevertheless, providing resources 
through normal funding channels with the normal degree
of oversight and reporting will not be sufficient to lever­
age U.S. assistance to greater policy advantage.
The Domestic Political Impact: Supporting 
the Government in Tbilisi
The United States' enormous assistance package 
makes its role in Georgia complex. Although the package 
is intended to help the people of Georgia and to modern­
ize and democratize the Georgian state, the impact of the 
assistance will not, in fact, be limited to these laudable 
goals. Indeed, the assistance package also has distorted 
the political landscape in Georgia, most importantly by 
supporting a Georgian government that otherwise would 
have been weakened severely by the war.
The existence of this large amount of assistance par­
tially disrupted the usual political processes that would 
have been expected in the aftermath of such a military 
disaster. In most countries, a government would have 
faced almost immediate pressure to step down after los­
ing a war so disastrously. Even in presidential systems 
like Georgia's, where elections occur at fixed times rather 
than after a vote of no confidence, there would have been 
pressure on the government to recognize its mistakes and 
to make some kind of appropriate gesture. This pressure 
generally emerges from public anger and media scrutiny 
of the causes of military defeat.
Economic assistance from the United States and 
Europe, however, exceeded most estimates of Georgia's 
war-related costs. Thus, at least for the government and 
for most Georgian citizens, the war took a human toll and
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Table 5: Public Opinion about the Work of the President and Parliament
% Favorable % Unfavorable % No opinion
Nov. 2008
President 67 28 5
Parliament 65 30 5
Apr. 2009
President 49 43 8
Parliament 47 46 7
Aug. 2009
President 49 42 9
Parliament 46 45 9
Nov. 2009
President 62 31 7
Parliament 57 35 8
Source: Data gathered from polls conducted by the International Republican Institute, available at http://www.iri.ge.
inflicted great trauma, but it did not come at a great finan­
cial cost. Money to repair war damage arrived quickly, 
either as grants or as low-interest loans. The government 
did not have to raise taxes, postpone repairing destroyed 
infrastructure, or enact any emergency budgetary mea­
sures. Obviously, the human losses, as well as the pain 
inflicted on ethnic Georgians who were expelled from 
their homes in South Ossetia, are immeasurable. In strict­
ly economic terms, however, Georgian society did not 
have to absorb the full cost of its military campaign.
In addition to removing a potential source of popular 
discontent, the external assistance package allowed the 
Georgian government to continue functioning and de­
livering basic services, even during the global economic 
downturn that ensued. Without foreign support, particu­
larly from the United States, during these months, it is 
not at all certain that the Georgian government would 
have been able to stay in power. Additionally, U.S. sup­
port made it possible for Georgia to redouble its lobby­
ing efforts in the United States, a move that strengthened 
support for Georgia in Congress and improved its por­
trayal in the U.S. media.
Since late 2007, a series of street demonstrations, 
calls for elections, government crackdowns, and elec­
tions of questionable quality, combined with often in­
flammatory and foolish rhetoric by various leaders of 
both the government and opposition political forces, 
have contributed to a more or less constant, low-level 
political crisis in Georgia. Without U.S. assistance the 
government would most likely not have been able to 
pay pensions, rapidly repair war damage, or continue 
the country's modernization. This would probably have 
stretched Georgia's political fabric beyond the breaking 
point. Thus, the financial stability that the assistance 
package lent, while valuable, was not apolitical in na­
ture. The aid and reconstruction package clearly inter­
vened in Georgia's domestic politics. Postwar assistance
clearly worked to the benefit of the government which, 
naturally, took credit for accomplishments that would not 
have been possible without the money provided by the 
United States.
On balance, the United States most likely played a 
positive role in helping to ensure stability in Georgia, 
even if this role was political in nature. Political insta­
bility following a military defeat would not have been 
good for Georgian society and would have strengthened 
Russia's political hand in all of Georgia. Moreover, pro­
viding support to the government, and thus enhancing 
its political standing, was probably an unavoidable by­
product of seeking to stabilize Georgia. Conversely, an 
extra-constitutional change in leadership in late 2008 or 
early 2009 most likely would have made the domestic 
situation in Georgia even more volatile.
That said, it remains important for the United States 
to recognize the impact of its assistance on keeping 
Saakashvili's government in power and strengthening 
the government's hand, particularly as it prepares for 
a busy election cycle in 2010-2013.13 Without such a 
large amount of U.S. assistance, the governing United 
National Movement (UNM) would not be able to cam­
paign for mayor in Tbilisi by citing the list of municipal 
improvement projects that it has implemented since the 
war. Similarly, had this assistance not arrived when it 
did, the local fallout from the global economic down­
turn would have begun earlier and would have had a 
greater effect on the national economy; clearly, this turn 
of events also would have affected the popularity of the 
Georgian government. Indeed, Table 7 shows the popu­
larity of the president and parliament at various intervals
13. If the U.S. assistance shrinks to its pre-war size shortly before the 
national elections of 2012 and 2013, this too will have an effect on 
the elections as the government will no longer be able to deliver many 
basic services likely decreasing their support among the Georgian 
electorate.
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since the war. At no time since the war have negative 
views of the government been held by a plurality of 
Georgian citizens.
Planning for the Future:
Avoiding the Perils of Clientelism
U.S. postwar assistance to Georgia sought to provide 
support to a friend and ally during a difficult time while 
also sending a message of support to both Georgia and 
Russia. The assistance was a clear way to achieve both 
of these goals. However, a brief increase in assistance to 
Georgia is different from a more enduring commitment 
of the same amount. Keeping the level of assistance to 
Georgia at roughly $500 million per year would be ex­
pensive for the United States and would reinforce the 
view that Georgia is a U.S. client. Establishing a client 
state in Georgia was never the goal of the U.S. assistance 
package, but could easily become a consequence.
Avoiding this outcome will not be as easy as simply 
reducing the level of assistance. Absent U.S. assistance 
immediately following the war, the Georgian state would 
have been in danger of collapsing. This may turn out 
to be the case as well when the current assistance runs 
out. It is even more likely that the Georgian government 
will face a serious fiscal crisis if assistance is reduced to 
prewar levels. For this reason, the Georgian government 
will likely work to keep U.S. assistance at the immedi­
ate postwar level. The United States must find a way to 
avoid providing that degree of support indefinitely while 
not abandoning Georgia altogether. The process for de­
termining how to accomplish this goal must begin well 
before the assistance runs out.
In 2012-2013 the Georgian government will face an 
increasing debt burden, decreasing U.S. assistance, and 
two national elections. The first two conditions will like­
ly contribute to difficult economic conditions throughout 
the country as the government struggles to pay for social 
programs, such as pensions, while lacking the resources 
for needed infrastructure improvements. This situation 
will weaken the government's position ahead of the 2012 
and 2013 elections. In a sense, the effects of Georgia's 
military defeat and the global economic downturn of 
2008 will be felt most acutely in these years.
In order to avoid this scenario, the Georgian gov­
ernment may take out more loans and pursue more U.S. 
assistance. The argument for providing assistance will 
be compelling, not unlike the reasoning behind the is­
suance of the postwar assistance package. Georgia may 
again argue that failing to provide support would bring 
their country to the brink of collapse, strengthen Russia's 
influence in the region, send the wrong message about 
the United States' commitment to its friends, and cause
widespread human suffering. The argument will be com­
pelling because it is largely true, but the United States 
would be making a big mistake if it institutionalized a 
patron-client relationship with Georgia by continuing 
this level of assistance beyond the immediate postwar 
period.
Let us be clear: Unless the United States has a strat­
egy for winding down its assistance to Georgia, it is pos­
sible, and even likely, that by mid-2012 there will be 
need for another emergency assistance package. Accord­
ingly, a strategy of gradually reducing the level of assis­
tance in 2011-2014 from $500 million to the prewar level 
of roughly $140 million, while ensuring that important 
projects are completed, support for democracy programs 
continues through the 2013 elections, and that there are 
no sudden budgetary shocks, may cost the United States 
a little bit more up front, but it will save a great deal of 
money in the following years.
Because of the size and nature of the U.S. assistance 
package for Georgia, it is necessary that the United States 
approach assistance strategically and seek to use this aid 
to help achieve its goals in Georgia. This is particularly 
pertinent to issues of freedom and democracy, as well as 
the implementation of a strategy regarding Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia. While the United States must, of course, 
avoid approaching these issues in a heavy-handed way 
that overplays U.S. power in Georgia, it is clear that the 
United States can use its position and generosity to make 
some demands of the Georgian government.
The political environment in which this change must 
occur is further complicated by the Obama administra­
tion's desire to “reset” relations with Russia, an effort 
that has caused alarm and concern in Georgia, as some 
feared that Georgia would no longer enjoy the support of 
the United States. A major theme of the Obama adminis­
tration's interactions with Georgia, as with several other 
Eastern European governments, has been reassuring the 
country's leaders of the United States' support.14 Though 
assistance by itself should constitute clear evidence that 
the United States is neither abandoning nor trading off 
Georgia as part of the reset of relations with Russia, it 
has, in Georgia's view, not been entirely sufficient.
It is unusual for a country to challenge the loyalty of 
an ally that has provided substantial assistance,15 *but by
14. Vice President Joseph Biden travelled to Tbilisi in July 2009 to 
deliver this message personally. Other government officials have 
delivered similar messages. Biden has delivered essentially the same 
message in Ukraine as part of his trip there, and has had to deliver
a similar message in so many countries that he has been called 
the “Reassurer in Chief.” Joshua Keating, “Joe Biden: America's 
reassurer-in-chief,” Foreign Policy Passport, October 20, 2009, http:// 
blog.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/10/20/joe_biden_americas_reas- 
surer_in_chief.
15. See, for example, Anna Nemtsova, “Mikheil Saakashvili : Where
Are My Western Friends?” Newsweek, April 11, 2009, http://www. 
newsweek.com/id/193509.
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raising this issue, Georgia is able to avoid or minimize 
the United States' concerns about issues such as human 
rights, media freedom, and democracy, as well as the 
initiation of a renewed conflict with Russia, Abkhazia, 
or South Ossetia. The United States' actions since the 
war, and since the beginning of the Obama administra­
tion, have been consistently and unambiguously sup­
portive of Georgia; the United States should no longer 
feel compelled to reassure the Georgian government of 
its support.
Recommendations
Years of political and financial involvement in Geor­
gia have stripped the United States of the luxury of be­
ing uninvolved in the country's politics and government. 
The United States is deeply involved in Georgian poli­
tics if it gives money, withholds money, speaks out, or 
is silent. Policymakers must understand this reality and 
pursue strategies accordingly.
While deep U.S. involvement in Georgian domestic 
affairs may, at first glance, seem inappropriate, the Unit­
ed States is already considerably entrenched in Georgian 
politcs. The degree of assistance, and political support 
provided to the Saakashvili administration, means that 
the United States is deeply involved in Georgian domes­
tic political life.
Thus far, monitoring of U.S. assistance has shown 
that most of the money has been used as it was intended. 
Thus, further efforts to strengthen monitoring should 
not be a top priority for the United States.16 However, a 
more comprehensive approach to monitoring assistance 
and linking it to other political and policy benchmarks 
would be an effective way to move Georgia closer to the 
goals shared by the governments of both Georgia and the 
United States.
The United States should use its assistance to Geor­
gia to further the goals of democracy, stability, develop­
ment, and peace in the region. There are several ways to 
begin doing this: First, the United States should commit 
more money and political support to civil society devel­
opment, independent media, and democracy assistance 
with some guarantee that this money will not expire in 
2011 or 2012. Second, the United States should create 
mechanisms for ensuring that U.S. assistance is not used 
to fund the acquisition of weapons for the military or to 
support the Interior Ministry; the United States should 
also find ways to ensure that the amount of budget ex­
penditures for these types of items is limited. Third, the 
United States should work with international and do-
16. For more on aid to Georgia, see the website of the Open Society 
Georgia Foundation's project on “Transparent Foreign Aid to Geor­
gia” at http://www.transparentaid.ge.
mestic organizations to effectively monitor the progress 
made by Georgia in these key areas.
The goal here is not to hamstring Georgia or dictate 
its budget policies from Washington, but to recognize 
that the degree of U.S. support for Georgia makes the 
United States more than peripherally responsible - per­
haps even accountable - for what happens in Georgia. 
Public statements from USAID or other U.S. govern­
ment representatives are not enough to ensure that the 
Georgian government pursues spending policies that are 
central to avoiding another conflict into which the United 
States would inevitably be dragged.
■ Establish substantial, dedicated funding streams
for Georgian NGOs beyond 2011-2012.
Using this approach, the United States can help 
develop government accountability by promoting 
domestic scrutiny of the government and increas­
ing the range of political voices heard in Tbilisi. 
Additionally, the U.S. government can send a 
clear message about the value it places on civil 
society development by encouraging, supporting, 
and standing up for these types of organizations.17 
To some extent, the U.S. has already begun to do 
this through additional support for these pro­
grams. However, this support must be sustained; 
because extra postwar assistance is due to end 
in 2011, there is a real danger that U.S. funding 
of democracy-related programs will be reduced 
immediately preceding major national elections, 
when this money might be needed most.
■ Fund journalists who report on politics or other 
important issues, and provide that content to tele­
visions stations or websites. Provide low-interest 
loans to media entrepreneurs for the establish­
ment of information outlets such as television 
stations.
The United States could also agree to supply free 
legal counsel to television stations in order to help 
combat, or more desirably, avoid government 
harassment of these new stations.
■ Monitor Georgian media and the media environ­
ment.
This could include various means of documenting 
government harassment of television stations and 
journalists, as well as supporting organizations
17. The process and discussion around choosing a new CEC chair 
which occurred in early 2010 is a good example of the United States 
passing this type of opportunity by. The Georgian government created 
a shortlist of NGO candidates for the position which drew entirely on 
nominees chosen by pro-government NGOs. By ignoring the voices 
of independent NGOs, the United States sent a message that these 
organizations do not need to be taken seriously.
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that fact check news stories and draw attention to 
what stories have been covered and what stories 
have been overlooked.
■ Find ways to ensure that assistance money is not
used, even indirectly, to undermine the goals of
strengthening Georgian democracy and plural­
ism.
This will be particularly difficult, given the 
amount of direct budget aid provided to Georgia. 
Even so, the United States should consider link­
ing its budget assistance to some parameters in 
the Georgian government that limit, for example, 
the proportion of budget funds that may be used 
to support the military or purchase weapons and 
other equipment for the Interior Ministry. Bilat­
eral documents signed by the United States and 
Georgia should reflect these agreements, as should 
the Charter's working group meetings.
■ Expand monitoring to examine how Georgia is 
making progress toward its own political goals. 
The United States could help establish observer 
groups to work with local and international NGOs 
and other donor countries to follow, for example, 
democratic development in Georgia. The moni­
toring agencies could help provide donors with 
the information necessary for adjusting funding 
priorities as needed and working with implement­
ing partners to work more successfully toward 
the goals of the funding. Second, the monitoring 
group would act as an institutionalized presence 
that would guarantee that the Georgian govern­
ment prioritizes these reforms consistently, rather 
than in the weeks and months preceding foreign 
visits, donor conferences, and other similar 
events.
■ Develop a strategy for reducing the level of U.S. 
assistance to Georgia.
Returning to prewar levels of assistance in 2011 
will likely cause profound damage to Georgia's 
economy. However, the United States should not 
commit to maintaining its current level of support 
indefinitely. Therefore, the United States should 
create a three- to five-year strategy for reduc­
ing its assistance to Georgia. This will allow the 
Georgian government to plan for reductions in 
assistance while making it clear that Georgia can­




There is a temptation to look at the U.S.-Georgia re­
lationship as an enduring alliance between two countries 
that share similar values and goals. It is also tempting to 
see Georgian history over the last six years as that of a 
democratizing country which, while still not fully con­
solidated, is stable and continuing to move generally in 
the right direction. If this narrative, which U.S. policy 
makers seem at least publicly to subscribe to, serves as 
the foundation for U.S. policy toward Georgia, then the 
United States should simply continue to support Georgia 
financially and politically without being concerned about 
the political impact of this support or what will happen 
when it runs out. Similarly, the United States should 
maintain close ties with the Georgian government by 
nudging it privately to reform while praising it publicly, 
and wait patiently for Georgia's democracy and economy 
to flourish so that Abkhazia and South Ossetia feel com­
pelled to rejoin Georgia. Although appealing to some, 
this report has shown that this approach would not only 
be overly simplistic and grounded in questionable as­
sumptions, but it also risks further entangling the United 
States and dragging it into possible crises in Georgia and 
the South Caucasus.
Georgia's contribution of troops to the effort in Af­
ghanistan and willingness to allow the United States to 
move troops and equipment through its territory as part 
of the Northern Distribution Network (NDN) are impor­
tant, and elevate Georgia's strategic import to the United 
States. These arrangements also underscore the need for 
a stable and dependable Georgia. During the last several 
years, Georgia's stability has been tenuous at times and 
its dependability has been compromised by a govern­
ment that is prone to whimsical and erratic decision mak­
ing which often has had severe and destabilizing conse­
quences. The United States can choose to downplay this 
reality or dismiss it as inaccurate, but it does so at its own 
peril. Simply put, if things go wrong in Georgia, the im­
pact on the United States will be substantial, particularly 
as much of the international community and the region 
views Georgia as Washington's client and responsibility.
There is, however, political space for the United 
States to craft a relationship that will strengthen its 
partnership with Georgia by better understanding the 
U.S.-Georgia relationship; the complex dynamics be­
tween Georgia, Russia, and the disputed territories; and 
internal developments in Georgia itself. This approach 
would allow the United States to constructively engage 
with Georgia to increase its stability and level of democ­
racy, which would strengthen U.S. credibility and fur­
ther U.S. interests in the region more broadly. This is 
the political space in which we seek to place this report.
U.S.-Georgia Charter on Strategic Partnership
The U.S.-Georgia Charter is an important document 
and has the potential to serve as a solid foundation for 
the future of U.S.-Georgia relations. The Charter can 
play a key role in depersonalizing the nature of the U.S.- 
Georgia relationship through the interagency working 
groups it has established for the major components of 
the charter. In order for the Charter to have an impact, it 
is critical to work within its structures and broad param­
eters, particularly with regards to security engagement, 
training, and assistance.
Politically, the Charter is considerably more impor­
tant for Tbilisi, where it is viewed as a major statement of 
U.S. support for Georgia, than for Washington; outside 
of the U.S. government, few U.S. observers pay it much 
attention. Troublingly, the nature of the Charter's provi­
sions on security cooperation are often misrepresented in 
Tbilisi, even by those who have a close understanding of 
the Charter's content. We have observed that Georgian 
media, commentators, and even highly-placed govern­
ment figures routinely and incorrectly state that under the 
Charter, the United States guarantees Georgia's territo­
rial security. U.S. officials have consistently disavowed 
such a guarantee.
Although the Georgian government has demonstrat­
ed its satisfaction with the Charter and the current level of 
U.S. assistance to Georgia, a number of individuals with­
in the government and government-friendly commenta­
tors in the media still question U.S. support for Georgia. 
This is generally done for domestic political reasons or 
as part of a poorly thought-out strategy to increase U.S. 
support for Georgia against Russia. The United States 
must be very wary of such rhetorical flourishes and pub­
lic narratives. Given the government influence over the 
media in Georgia, these comments can quickly crystal­
lize public perceptions about U.S. policy. It is not helpful 
to have U.S. support questioned in Tbilisi because it con­
tributes to growing, but still minor, anti-American senti­
ment. More seriously, such comments escalate the cur­
rent sense of fear in Georgia that they stand alone against 
Russia, which in turn further militarizes the country's 
political culture and constricts the space available for le­
gitimate public debate on democracy and security issues. 
Georgia presents itself as a dependable partner of the
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United States, but its actual record suggests otherwise. 
Erratic behavior by the Georgian government over the 
course of the last several years demonstrates that Georgia 
is prone to bouts of unpredictable and unreliable conduct; 
the 2007 crackdown on public demonstrators, the closing 
of the television station Imedi in November 2007, being 
goaded into striking first in August 2008, the attempt to 
send hundreds of untrained election observers to Ukraine 
in January 2010, and the fake Russian invasion hoax on 
Imedi TV in March 2010 all exemplify this behavior. 
The United States needs reliable allies that will make 
predictable and transparent decisions, not countries that 
rely on the United States for assistance but are given to 
irrational and often dangerous decision making.
Accordingly, Georgia's value as a U.S. partner lies in 
its democratic aspirations and continued commitment to 
integrating with the West. Genuine democracy in Georgia 
will help make it more stable and reliable. However, Geor­
gia's strategic import as a security ally or energy hub, while 
helpful, should not be exaggerated for political purposes.
Democratic Development in Georgia
While Georgia is still freer than the other countries 
in the South Caucasus and Central Asia, there has been 
little meaningful advance of democracy since the days 
following the Rose Revolution. The current lack of me­
dia freedom, sustained pressure on business against sup­
porting opposition political parties, absence of real judi­
cial independence, weak civil society, and dominance of 
the ruling United National Movement (UNM) Party have 
combined to severely limit Georgia's democracy.
These democratic shortcomings are exacerbated by a 
political space that doesn't allow meaningful divergence 
from official views on key issues, such as policy towards 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and relations with Russia. 
Politicians who stray too far from the government line 
on these issues risk being labeled Russian stooges of one 
kind or another.1
Georgia is approaching yet another key period for 
its democratic development with elections for Parliament 
occurring in 2012 and for president in 2013. A peaceful 
transition that is viewed as legitimate by the Georgian 
people, either to another UNM president or somebody 
from another party, should be the United States' goal for 
these key elections. Without early and serious U.S. en­
gagement on a broad range of democracy issues, howev­
er, it is unlikely that Georgia will enter 2012 or 2013 with 
a real chance of a trouble-free transition. These elections 
will be very important for Georgia, but they should not
1. There are likely ties between Russia and some elements of the 
Georgian opposition, but the Georgian government and their support­
ers in civil society and the media have sought, at times, to tar virtually 
all political opponents with this brush, no matter how implausible the 
accusation.
be viewed as tests of Georgia's democratic intentions. 
The time for tests has passed because Georgia has failed 
too many of them. Instead, U.S. officials should focus 
more on doing the work and providing the financial and 
political support that is vital for getting Georgia's demo­
cratic development back on track.
The increase in funding for democratic develop­
ment and civil society that followed the war in Georgia 
is helpful, but it would have a far greater impact if it were 
matched with political support from the United States. 
This is not to say that the United States should put forth 
a constant stream of criticism regarding Georgia's demo­
cratic credentials; the current policy of rarely offering 
any public criticism and generally expressing satisfac­
tion with the Georgian government's reform efforts, 
however, only sets democracy back in Georgia.
The U.S. government remains extremely important 
in Georgia, and its words continue to be influential. If 
U.S. statements about Georgia reflected a more balanced 
and depersonalized stance toward Georgia and an honest 
recognition of its democratic shortcomings, the Geor­
gian government would be more likely to confront these 
shortcomings. The policy of only very rarely speaking 
out publicly about Georgia's problems has not served the 
United States well at all, and has instead emboldened the 
Georgian government to veer away from democracy and 
to make erratic, and occasionally dangerous, decisions.
Abkhazia and South Ossetia
The United States needs a clear policy on Abkha­
zia and South Ossetia, a policy that serves U.S. interests. 
Deferring to Tbilisi, which has been the U.S. policy for 
most of the last decade, has not facilitated the resolution 
of the conflicts; moreover, this policy has not enabled 
the United States to restrain the Georgian government 
from taking military action to reclaim the disputed terri­
tories. Within this political climate, statements support­
ing Georgia's territorial integrity and suggesting a need 
for strategic patience are at best platitudes, and at worst 
quite dangerous. As the Russian annexation of these ter­
ritories accelerates, U.S. patience becomes less useful or 
strategic, while asserting support for Georgia's territorial 
integrity emboldens hard liners in Tbilisi. This dynamic 
makes it even more difficult to engage with Sukhumi or 
begin to resolve the problem.
An effective U.S. strategy towards the region must 
differentiate between the two breakaway territories for 
several reasons. First, Abkhazia displays some elements 
of an autonomous and viable polity. South Ossetia, on 
the other hand, does not, and never will be a viable inde­
pendent political entity. We do not suggest in any way 
that the United States should facilitate or support Abkha­
zia's aspirations for statehood. Still, those aspirations are
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more plausible and should be considered more seriously 
when crafting an Abkhaz strategy.
U.S. strategy towards Abkhazia must reflect that 
the Russia-Georgia war has fundamentally changed the 
“facts on the ground” there. The defense forces provided 
by Russia have made the Abkhaz more secure; the rec­
ognition of their independence by Russia has crystallized 
their expectations of statehood, and offered them a part­
ner to begin building their state. Although chances that 
Abkhazia's independence will be broadly recognized re­
main quite low, the Abkhaz themselves take this process 
very seriously; they are committed to it and are encour­
aged by even the modest successes they have already 
achieved. The difficulty of changing Abkhazia's expec­
tation of independence should not be underestimated. It 
also necessitates bolder and more creative thinking about 
possible future sovereign models when the United States 
approaches the issue of Abkhazia's final status.
Additionally, returning to Georgia is no longer given 
much consideration by Abkhaz leaders. They no longer 
fear a Georgian attack as had previously been the case; 
they also do not see their future as being linked to that of 
Georgia at all. Moreover, the lack of interest in reinte­
grating with Georgia on the part of the Abkhaz will likely 
increase as time goes by and Russian influence grows, 
underscoring the need for the United States and the West 
to somehow engage with Abkhazia sooner rather than 
later.
Not surprisingly, this decoupling of Abkhazia from 
Georgia, at least in the minds of the Abkhaz leadership, 
influences the Abkhaz approach to the question of inter­
nally displaced persons (IDPs). Indeed in Georgia, the 
question of IDPs has been a major issue since they fled 
Abkhazia in the early 1990s. The Abkhaz leadership has 
not made any serious proposals on resolving this prob­
lem, but without serious efforts to address this problem 
the Abkhaz argument for statehood is much weaker and 
unacceptable to most of the international community.
Abkhazia's complex relationship with Russia must 
also inform U.S. policy toward the IDP question. The 
new security, economic, and political ties between Ab­
khazia and Russia now threaten Sukhumi's autonomy 
and its newly acquired sovereignty. Internal debates have 
emerged within Sukhumi about the extent to which Rus­
sia's political influence threatens the political indepen­
dence of Abkhazia, but the reality remains that Abkhaz 
independence still looks a lot like Russian annexation. 
Importantly, as Russia has emerged as the guarantor of 
Abkhaz security, the primary security concern for Ab­
khazia has become not the possibility of future Georgian 
aggression, but that Moscow's commitment to support­
ing Abkhazia's legal independence may be soft. Ac­
cordingly, several Abkhaz commentators and analysts 
fear that, should there be a future broad reconciliation
between Georgia and Russia, Moscow may dismember 
and divide Abkhazia.
Georgia, for its part, does not have many good op­
tions for achieving its goal of bringing Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia back to Georgian sovereignty. This has 
been generally true since the mid-1990s, though the 
challenge is much greater now. In 2010, the Georgian 
government sought to move away from a postwar poli­
cy towards Abkhazia and South Ossetia based on angry 
rhetoric and proposed a reintegration strategy. The Geor­
gian Strategy for Reintegration contains some positive 
elements and project proposals that deserve the atten­
tion and support of the Transatlantic Community. How­
ever, given the current relationship between Tbilisi and 
Sukhumi, the implementation of this strategy will be a 
great challenge for Georgia. Accordingly, the Transat­
lantic Community must also take steps to formulate poli­
cies towards the breakaway territories, independent of 
Georgia, so that international efforts are not tied up in 
a Georgian strategy which is likely to simply be ignored 
by Abkhazia.
One of the reasons it is relatively easy for Abkha­
zia to ignore Georgia's strategy and Georgia entirely is 
that the West, and particularly the United States, has so 
little leverage there. The U.S. and European policy of 
isolating Abkhazia and letting Georgia dictate policy 
on the issue has meant that the United States and Eu­
rope have few contacts with Abkhazia and no way to 
pressure the breakaway region through offering a mix 
of carrots and sticks. This is why a U.S. policy of en­
gagement without recognition - the establishment of 
informal political, economic, and civic ties - should 
begin immediately. This strategy would include both 
offering Sukhumi alternative sources of international 
contacts from Russia and beginning to establish some 
Western leverage there that could in turn be used to 
bring Abkhazia into a meaningful dialog with Georgia.
U.S. Assistance to Georgia
The United States has provided Georgia with a gen­
erous assistance package which has helped it recover 
from the damage of the war and avoid some of the more 
dire consequences of the global economic downturn. 
Although there has been very little outright corruption 
or theft of the assistance funds, there have been several 
reports of political pressure being applied to direct U.S. 
assistance-funded contracts to businesses with ties to the 
government. Corruption should not, however, be the 
United States' major concern about assistance to Geor­
gia.
The more significant challenge that the United 
States faces is to use its assistance to help cement a gen­
uine partnership between the two countries rather than 
reinforce a patron-client relationship. Central to this goal
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will be ensuring that the high levels of postwar assistance 
are understood to be a temporary response to the crisis 
created by the war with Russia rather than an enduring 
part of U.S.-Georgia ties.
While this has been the position of the United States, 
cutting assistance to Georgia by as much as 80% in 2012 
is unrealistic and will have a serious impact on the coun­
try's economy. The impact of the drop-off in U.S. as­
sistance will be worsened by the looming debt explosion 
Georgia is likely to confront in 2013 and the increased 
political impact of any economic downturn as national 
elections are scheduled to be held in 2012 and 2013. Ac­
cordingly, the United States needs a clear and public plan 
for reducing Georgia's dependence on U.S. funds, which 
while firm, is not too fast or extreme for Georgia.
U.S. policymakers also cannot ignore the political 
impact of assistance to Georgia. U.S. aid helped prevent 
the Georgian state from collapsing, but it also provided 
substantial political support to Saakashvili's administra­
tion by helping to keep that government in power and 
weather the potential political fallout from a military de­
feat and economic crisis. The ruling UNM Party, for ex­
ample, naturally trumpets several infrastructure projects 
as its concrete achievements; these improvements would 
not have been possible without U.S. postwar assistance. 
Thus, regardless of the United States' intentions, the as­
sistance disrupted what would likely have been a natural 
backlash against the UNM.
The size of U.S. support, particularly the $250 
million that goes directly to Georgia's state budget, 
has therefore enmeshed the United States more deeply 
into Georgian politics. Because of this involvement, 
U.S. officials no longer have the luxury of stand­
ing back and claiming that Georgia must work out its 
own domestic problems. The United States' silence 
in the face of poorly thought out statements regard­
ing foreign policy, further movement away from de­
mocracy, or erratic decisions by the government, for 
example, will continue to be viewed, both domesti­
cally and internationally, as support for these policies.2 
U.S. Georgia Policy
The U.S.-Georgia relationship is more precarious 
than it looks. The scenarios under which U.S.-Georgia 
relations could go off track are numerous, and include: 
further instability in Georgia as a result of dissatisfaction 
with an increasingly undemocratic regime, the United 
States being dragged into an international conflict be­
cause of impulsive decisions by the Georgian govern­
2. U.S. Ambassador John Bass's statement following the March 13th 
program on the television station Imedi which showed a fake invasion 
of Georgia by Russia is an example of the kind of involvement and 
statements which the United States should continue to make. See 
“U.S. Ambassador on Imedi TV's Fake Report,” Civil.ge, March 14, 
2010, http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=22082.
ment, and Georgia developing an acute and enduring 
financial dependency on the United States. In order to 
prevent these contingencies, U.S. policy needs to be re­
crafted and clearly articulated. It cannot be just left as is.
Both Georgia and the United States want to see 
Georgia become a reliable partner, not an undependable 
client, of the United States. However, without a cohe­
sive strategy of nuanced engagement, a well-considered 
understanding of U.S. interests in the region, and a clear­
eyed view of Georgia, the United States will end up with 
the latter.
Timeline 1
Major Military and Legal Events Regarding Abkhazia, 
Ajara, and South Ossetia Since 1921
1921
The Red Army invasion; Georgia becomes a Soviet 
Socialist Republic (SSR). Abkhazia and Ajara named 
autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics (ASSRs). South 
Ossetia becomes an autonomous region within the 
Georgian SSR.
1931
Abkhazia incorporated into the Georgian Soviet Social­
ist Republic as an autonomous region.
1936
Ajara incorporated into the Georgian SSR as an autono­
mous region.
1989
Approximately 20 Georgian pro-independence activ­
ists are killed by Soviet troops in Tbilisi. Georgians and 
Ossetians clash over demands for greater autonomy 
for South Ossetia. Protests break out in Abkhazia amid 
fears that Georgia will move towards independence 
from the Soviet Union; dozens of protestors are killed 
and hundreds are injured.
1990
South Ossetia declares its intention to secede from 
Georgia and become a sovereign territory within the 
Soviet Union. Russian and Georgian Interior Ministry 
troops sent to South Ossetia as violence breaks out at 
the end of the year.
1991
The conflict in South Ossetia worsens, with both sides 
alleging atrocities. Tens of thousands of residents of 
South Ossetia flee north to Russia and south to Georgia. 
Abkhazia votes to preserve the Soviet Union. In Ajara, 
Aslan Abashidze is appointed head of the Supreme 
Council, and he begins to clash with the authorities in 
Tbilisi and to develop his own power base in Ajara. 
Georgia leaves the Soviet Union in April, following a 
referendum on independence. Weeks later, Zviad Gam- 
sakhurdia is elected first leader of democratic Georgia. 
In December, a coup d'etat is launched against Gam- 
sakhurdia.
1992
Jan. -Mar. After intense fighting in Tbilisi between 
government and opposition troops, Georgian 
President Gamsakhurdia is deposed, and Eduard 
Shevardnadze takes power. South Ossetians vote 
for independence from Georgia in a referendum 
that is not recognized by Georgia.
Jun. Russian, South Ossetian, and Georgian leaders 
meet, renouncing the use of force and agreeing to 
a joint peacekeeping force in South Ossetia.
Jul. Abkhazia announces that it is seceding from 
Georgia.
Aug. Georgia responds to Abkhazia's announcement 
by sending troops to Sukhumi, Abkhazia's capital, 
capturing much of the region's territory and shut­
ting down its Parliament.
Sep. Georgian and Abkhaz forces agree to a ceasefire, 
which quickly collapses.
Nov. -Dec. The United Nations opens an office in 
Tbilisi to assist with peacemaking in Abkhazia. 
The Conference for Security and Co-operation 
in Europe (CSCE, later the OSCE) establishes a 
mission in Georgia to monitor the peacekeeping 
mission in South Ossetia.
1993
Mar. Georgia shoots down Russian warplane over 
Abkhazia.
May The U.N. Secretary General appoints a Special 
Envoy for Georgia.
Jul. The conflicting parties in Abkhazia agree to a 
second ceasefire.
Aug. The United Nations deploys international ob­
servers to monitor compliance with the ceasefire. 
The Security Council later establishes the United 
Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UN- 
OMIG).
Sep. Georgian troops are driven out of Abkhazia by 
a joint Abkhaz-Russian paramilitary force after 
renewed fighting. Thousands of ethnic Georgians 
flee Abkhazia amid widespread violence against 
them by Abkhaz and Russian forces.
Nov. South Ossetia drafts its own constitution.
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1994
A UN-brokered ceasefire is signed between Tbilisi and 
Abkhaz separatists. Russian peacekeepers, under the 
auspices of the Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS), begin to patrol the disputed region. In July, the 
U.N. Security Council greatly expanded the mandate of 
UNOMIG.
1995
Georgia adopts a new constitution that provides for 
a strong presidency. Later, Eduard Shevardnadze is 
elected president of Georgia.
1996
South Ossetia elects its first president, Lyudvig Chibi- 
rov, who remains in office until 2006.
1998
Violence breaks out in the Gali district of Abkhazia 
between returning ethnic Georgians and Abkhaz forces. 
After Abkhaz forces retake control over Gali district, 
Georgian and Abkhaz forces reach a truce. The UN and 
other institutions begin to monitor the ceasefire.
1999
Abkhazia unilaterally declares its independence from 
Georgia.
2000
Eduard Shevardnadze reelected as president of Georgia. 
Russia and Georgia sign an agreement to revitalize the 
economy in South Ossetia.
2001
Georgia and Abkhazia sign an agreement against the use 
of force in their dispute, but a series of skirmishes takes 
place in summer and early fall. The Secretary General's 
Special Representative finalize the “Basic Principles 
for the Distribution of Competences between Tbilisi 
and Sukhumi,” meant to serve as the basis for future 
negotiations on the status of Abkhazia within Georgia. 
South Ossetia elects Eduard Kokoity as its president in 
elections not recognized by Georgia.
2002
Russia accuses Georgia of harboring Chechen militants 
and threatens to respond with military action.
2003
In March, the Russian and Georgian presidents reach 
agreements on key issues, emphasizing economic co­
operation, the return of internally displaced persons and 
refugees, and political and security matters. Georgian 
President Shevardnadze is ousted in Rose Revolution.
Aslan Abashidze declares a state of emergency in Ajara.
2004
Jan. Mikheil Saakashvili wins presidential elections. 
The result is not recognized by Ajara, whose 
leader Aslan Abashidze reacts by destroying 
bridges connecting the area to the rest of Georgia. 
Saakashvili orders Abashidze to disarm his forces 
or face removal. Abashidze resigns.
Mar. Tensions rise between Tbilisi and Ajara, with 
Tbilisi imposing sanctions against the region and 
closing the border.
May Tbilisi refuses to recognize parliamentary elec­
tions held by South Ossetia. Tensions rise after 
Georgian troops take part in anti-smuggling 
maneuvers in South Ossetia. Ajaran forces destroy 
bridges between the rest of Georgia and the 
region, fearing an impending attack by Tbilisi. 
Thousands march to demand the resignation of 
Ajara's leader, Aslan Abashidze. Abashidze abdi­
cates to Russia.
Aug. Georgian and South Ossetian soldiers clash. 
Georgia claims it captured key points within 
South Ossetia, but then pulls back.
Oct.-Dec. Abkhazia holds elections that again are not 
recognized by Tbilisi. Moscow unsuccessfully 
attempts to mediate between the incumbent and 
opposition Abkhaz candidates. Georgian President 
Saakashvili voices his support for opposition lead­
er Sergey Bagapsh. The crisis ends on December 
6 with a power-sharing agreement signed by both 
parties.
2005
South Ossetia rejects a Georgian offer of autonomy. 
Saakashvili tells Abkhazia that no similar offer will be 
considered unless Georgian refugees are allowed to 
resettle in their former homes
2006
Feb. The Georgian parliament votes unanimously for 
international peacekeepers to replace Russian 
forces in South Ossetia.
Mar. Georgia announces compensation packages for 
displaced people who lost their property during 
South Ossetian crisis.
May Georgian and Abkhaz officials hold the first 
meeting since 2001 of the UN-chaired joint Co­
ordinating Council in Tbilisi. During the meeting, 
the Abkhaz side hands a new peace plan to the 
Georgian side. Georgians submit their own Ab­
khaz peace plan to Parliament. Tensions between 
Russia and Georgia rise amid Georgian demands
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that Russian peacekeepers in South Ossetia obtain 
visas.
Jun. An international donor conference in Brussels 
pledges 10 million Euros ($12.6 million) toward 
rebuilding infrastructure in Georgian-Ossetian 
conflict zone and adjacent areas.
Nov. South Ossetia holds a referendum to reaffirm its 
independence from Georgia. The West declares 
the vote illegal, while Russia states that the vote 
should be respected.
Nov. Russia's State Duma ratifies friendship treaties 
with Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
2009
Jun. The UN Observer Mission in Georgia is closed 
as its mandate lapses due to inaction by the Secu­
rity Council.
Compiled by Matthew Schaaf
2007
Mar. Abkhazia holds a parliamentary election that was 
again condemned by Tbilisi as illegal. The results 
of the poll are inconclusive, and only 18 members 
are elected to the 35-seat parliament.
Apr. The Georgian parliament creates a pro-Georgian 
administration for South Ossetia.
Oct. OSCE-sponsored talks between South Ossetian 
and Georgian sides break down.
Nov. Saakashvili orders police to crush anti-govern­
ment protests, then declares a state of emergency. 
Russia announces that it had removed all troops 
that remained in Georgia since the fall of the 
Soviet Union, except for those Russian peace­
keepers participating in the Commonwealth of 
Independent States' missions in Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia.
2008
Jan. Mikheil Saakashvili is reelected president of 
Georgia.
Mar. Abkhazia and South Ossetia ask the United Na­
tions to recognize their independence.
Apr. Abkhaz and Georgian troops narrowly avoid 
confrontation. Russia deepens ties with Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia amid claims by Georgia that it 
is attempting the de facto annexation of the ter­
ritories.
Jul. Abkhaz authorities cut all ties with the Georgian 
government. Tensions between Georgia and Rus­
sia increase as the result of several explosions in 
Abkhazia
Aug. Conflict breaks out in South Ossetia, involving 
forces from Georgia, Russia, and South Ossetia. 
Abkhaz fighters occupy areas held by Georgian 
forces. On August 26, the Russian Federa­
tion recognizes South Ossetia and Abkhazia as 
independent states. On August 28, the Georgian 
parliament declares the two territories occupied 
by Russia.
Oct. The CIS peacekeeping force in Abkhazia is ter­
minated on October 15.
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Timeline 2
Russian-Georgian Relations from 2003 to 2008
2003
Georgian President Shevardnadze resigns in Novem­
ber after meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Igor 
Ivanov and Georgia's lead opposition activist Mikheil 
Saakashvili. Interim president Nino Burjanadze visited 
Moscow in December, seeking to normalize relations 
with Russia.
Oct. Georgian parliament adopts a resolution on 
peacekeepers in the conflict zones which exposed 
the names of Russian citizens that held “high- 
level positions in the separatist power structures.”
Nov. Russia calls on Georgia to respect the results of 
a referendum held in South Ossetia aimed at reaf­
firming independence from Georgia.
2004
Jan. Mikheil Saakashvili elected president of Geor­
gia, pledging to renew relations with Russia.
Feb. Saakashvili visits Moscow, where he pledges to 
take Russia's interests
into account and states that one of his priorities is to 
improve Russian-Georgian relations.
Apr. Russia and Georgia conclude a series of bilat­
eral agreements, including one on cooperation in 
the area of security.
May Deposed Ajaran leader Aslan Abashidze, who 
had sought support from Moscow in his standoff 
with Tbilisi, abdicates to Russia.
Aug. Russia sends military assistance to South Os­
setia and volunteer fighters pour into the region 
from Russia to fend off efforts by Tbilisi to 
establish police posts and checkpoints in order 
to combat smuggling in South Ossetia. Georgia's 
Parliament adopts a statement characterizing Rus­
sia as a party to the conflicts in South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia rather than a peacekeeper or mediator.
Nov. Saakashvili announces that Georgian forces 
will fire upon ships approaching Georgian waters 
without official authorization, including those 
with Russian passengers. Earlier in the year, Saa­
kashvili warned Russian tourists against visiting 
Abkhazia.
2005
Mar. Georgian parliament unanimously votes to 
require the government to blockade Russian 
military bases in Georgia, stop issuing visas to 
Russian military personnel, and cut off utilities 
to Russian bases unless Russia agrees to a timely 
withdrawal.
Apr. Russia largely agrees to Georgia's demands 
on the withdrawal of Russian troops, pledging to 
leave by the end of 2008.
2006
Jan. A Russian gas pipeline and an electric power 
transmission line explode within hours of each 
other, cutting of gas and electricity to much of 
Georgia. Georgia accuses Russia of sabotage and 
blackmail.
Feb. Georgian parliament votes unanimously for inter­
national peacekeepers to replace Russian-led CIS 
forces in South Ossetia.
Mar. Russia bans imports of wine from Georgia (and 
briefly, mineral water), alleging that Georgian 
wine is often counterfeit and that it contains 
heavy metals and pesticides. Before the ban, 
Georgia had exported an overwhelming majority 
of its wine to Russia.
May Saakashvili announces that Georgia will review 
the utility of its membership in the Common­
wealth of Independent States. Tensions between 
Russia and Georgia rise amid Georgian demands 
that Russian peacekeepers in South Ossetia obtain 
visas.
Jul. Georgian parliament votes to suspend the
peacekeeping operations in Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia. Russian Duma then passes a resolution 
authorizing Russian forces to operate anywhere in 
defense of Russian citizens. Georgia sends Inte­
rior Ministry troops to Abkhazia's Kodori Gorge 
in order to reassert control over the area after a 
local warlord begins re-arming former militiamen. 
Georgian officials allege that Russian and Abkhaz 
forces provided assistance to the rebels, while 
Russian authorities accuse Georgia of violating 
the 1994 cease-fire agreement prohibiting the use 
of force in Abkhazia.
Sep. Georgia arrests four Russian military officers on 
charges of espionage, later charging them with 
spying. Russia recalls its ambassador from Geor­
gia in protest.
Oct. The detained officers are turned over to the
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OSCE in Georgia and then returned to Russia. 
Days later, Russia suspends all transportation and 
postal links with Georgia, and stops issuing visas 
to Georgian citizens. Police in Moscow raid and 
shut down Georgian businesses, claiming links 
to organized crime. Russian authorities deport 
hundreds of Georgian citizens on visa violations 
and ask public schools to submit lists of students 
with Georgian surnames for further investigation 
of their parents' background. The leaders of both 
countries trade gibes and allude to the potential 
for a breakout of violence over the row. Russia's 
State Duma ratifies treaties with Georgia that 
were signed earlier in the year on the withdrawal 
of Russian military forces from Georgia and on 
transit rights that would allow Russia to access its 
military base in Armenia.
2007
Jan. Russia returns its ambassador to Tbilisi and lifts 
some of the sanctions that it had imposed against 
Georgia in 2006.
Mar. Georgia accuses Russia of sending helicopters 
to attack a village in the Kodori Gorge, where 
the Georgian-backed Abkhaz authorities were 
headquartered. A U.N. report on the incident is 
inconclusive.
Aug. Georgia accuses Russia of attacking the Geor­
gian village of Tsitelubani with two fighter jets.
Sep. Georgia claims that it fired on Russian fighter 
jets that had violated its airspace.
Oct. Georgia accuses Russian peacekeepers of trying 
to take control of a Georgian youth camp located 
in Georgian-controlled territory near the Geor­
gian-Abkhaz demarcation line.
Nov. Russia announces that it completed the removal 
of all troops that had remained in Georgia since 
the fall of the Soviet Union, except for those 
based in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Georgian 
officials accuse Russian spies of working with the 
political opposition in Georgia to sow unrest and 
effect regime change.
additional troops to Abkhazia. NATO votes to al­
low Georgia to accede to the alliance in the future.
May Russia sends railway troops to Abkhazia on a 
“humanitarian mission.”
Jul. Russia acknowledges that its fighter jets had 
flown a sortie over Georgia. Georgia recalls its 
ambassador from Moscow. Tensions between 
Georgia and Russia increase as several explosions 
rocked Abkhazia.
Aug. Conflict breaks out in South Ossetia, involving 
forces from Georgia, Russia, and South Ossetia. 
Abkhaz fighters occupy areas held by Georgian 
forces. On August 26, the Russian Federa­
tion recognizes South Ossetia and Abkhazia as 
independent states. On August 28, the Georgian 
parliament declares the two territories occupied 
by Russia.
Oct. The CIS peacekeeping force in Abkhazia is 
terminated on October 15.
Nov. Russia's State Duma ratifies friendship treaties 
with Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
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Apr. Amid Georgian claims that Russia was at­
tempting the de facto annexation of Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia, Russian President Putin orders 
government ministries to assist and cooperate 
with authorities in the territories. Georgia accuses 
Russia of shooting down a Georgian reconnais­
sance drone over Abkhazia, a claim that was later 
supported by a U.N. investigation. Russia sends
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Timeline 3 
June to October 2008
June
6 Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili and Rus­
sian President Dmitri Medvedev meet in Moscow 
to reduce simmering tensions, though the two fail 
to resolve “all of their problems.”
7 Russia announces that it will withdraw the railway
troops it sent to Abkhazia on a “humanitarian mis­
sion” in May.
14-15 Georgian and Ossetian forces trade accusa­
tions that the other shelled villages in South 
Ossetia.
17 Georgian police detain four Russian peacekeepers 
on the Georgian side of the Abkhaz administrative 
border, accusing them of the unauthorized trans­
port of military hardware. Days later, a Russian 
official warns of “bloodshed” if such provocations 
continued.
23 Abkhaz forces conduct military training exer­
cises.
25 Russian state-controlled gas company Gazprom 
announces its intention to build a gas pipeline 
to Abkhazia and explore for gas and oil in the 
region.
29 -30 Four bomb blasts occur in markets in Abkha­
zia, injuring nearly a dozen people.
July
4 Two people are killed and seven injured when 
Georgian forces shell areas near Tskhinvali. 
Georgia claims that it was responding to fire from 
South Ossetian forces.
6 Several explosions occur on the Abkhaz side of 
the administrative border. Russian and Georgian 
authorities implicate each other in the blasts.
8 South Ossetian forces detain four Georgian sol­
diers.
15 Russia begins Caucasus-2008, a large-scale 
military exercise in Russia's south, including the 
North Caucasus regions bordering Georgia.
19 A Georgian police post on the Abkhaz adminis­
trative border is attacked; according to Georgian 
forces, one assailant was killed. Abkhaz forces 
report the death of one border guard but deny that 
the post was attacked.
21 Georgia captures four South Ossetians on the 
Georgian side of the South Ossetian administra­
tive border and charges them with illegal arms 
and drug possession.
21 The UN Security Council meets behind closed 
doors to discuss Russia's admission that it had 
sent several fighter jets on a sortie over Abkhazia.
25 Russia announces that it will withdraw its railroad 
troops from Abkhazia beginning July 29.
29 Georgia accuses South Ossetian militants of firing 
on a Georgian post. South Ossetia reinforces its 
positions on the perimeter of the conflict zone.
30 South Ossetia reiterates its desire to be annexed 
by Russia.
August
1 Five Georgian police are injured in bomb explo­
sions in Georgian-controlled South Ossetia.
2 Six people, among them South Ossetian police
officers, are killed by snipers near the Georgian 
border. Seven Georgian citizens are injured in the 
shelling of Georgian-controlled villages in South 
Ossetia. South Ossetian leader Eduard Kokoity 
warns that he will call for a general mobilization, 
including forces from Russia's North Caucasus. A 
Russian military commander states that his troops 
are ready to deploy to South Ossetia.
3 Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov warns that
an “extensive military conflict” is about to erupt 
in South Ossetia.
4 South Ossetia begins evacuating hundreds of
women and children to Russia.
5 Russia issues a statement that it will defend its
citizens living in South Ossetia.
6 Georgia and Ossetian forces trade accusations
that the other had shelled ethnic Georgian and 
Ossetian (respectively) villages in South Os­
setia. South Ossetian authorities refuse to attend 
bilateral peace talks that are scheduled for the 
following day.
7 Russia sends forces through the Roki tunnel into
South Ossetia early in the morning; later, Russia 
claims that it was rotating its peacekeepers in the 
region. Three Georgian soldiers are injured in a 
grenade attack launched by South Ossetian forces. 
South Ossetian authorities announce that 18 
people were injured as a result of intense shelling. 
Georgian President Saakashvili orders a ceasefire 
and offers South Ossetia “unrestricted autonomy.” 
Late at night, Georgia sends forces into South Os­
setia, taking control of Tskhinvali and surround­
ing towns.
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8 Russia launches a counteroffensive, sending tanks
and troops south through the Roki Tunnel and 
into Tskhinvali to fend off the Georgian offen­
sive. With Russian support, Abkhaz separatist 
forces seize the opportunity to launch an attack on 
Georgian forces in the contested Kodori Gorge. 
Georgian President Saakashvili declares a “state 
of war.” The UN Security Council meets in an 
early-morning emergency session that is called by 
Russia the previous day to discuss the conflict, but 
it is unable pass a resolution on the matter.
9 Russian forces announce that they had retaken
Tskhinvali. Russian planes drop bombs in and 
around the Georgian city of Gori, just outside of 
South Ossetia. Russian Prime Minister Vladimir 
Putin accuses Georgia of conducting “genocide” 
in South Ossetia, while Georgian President Saa­
kashvili accuses Russia of trying to “annihilate” 
Georgia. Abkhaz authorities state they are work­
ing to clear Georgian forces out of the Kodori 
Gorge.
10 Russia continues to launch air attacks on targets 
within Georgia. Georgia begins to withdraw its 
forces from South Ossetia, calls a ceasefire, and 
offers to begin talks with Russia on ending hostili­
ties. Russian naval forces blockade Georgia's 
coast. Russian officials claim that 2,000 people 
are dead in South Ossetia as a result of the hostili­
ties. Georgia claims that 130 Georgian civilians 
had been killed and 1,165 injured. The UN Secu­
rity Council meets again to discuss the conflict.
11 Georgia announces that it has withdrawn its 
forces from South Ossetia and that it will cease 
hostilities. Russia continues to mount air attacks 
on Georgia. Russia sends thousands of troops 
and hundreds of armored vehicles into Abkhazia. 
Russian forces move from Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia into uncontested Georgian territory, taking 
control of the cities of Gori, Senaki, and Zugdidi. 
French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner ar­
rives in Georgia to help negotiate a ceasefire. The 
U.N. Security Council meets in a closed session 
to discuss the conflict. A French-drafted UN Secu­
rity Council resolution is circulated; the document 
calls for an end to hostilities and for negotiations 
to begin. Hundreds of Georgian troops return 
from Iraq on U.S. military transport planes.
12 Russian and Georgian leaders agree to a ceasefire 
brokered by French President Nicolas Sarkozy. 
Abkhaz separatists announce that they had taken 
the Kodori Gorge from Georgian forces. Geor­
gian President Saakashvili declares Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia occupied territories and states that 
the Russian forces were the occupiers. Georgia
applies to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
to begin proceedings against Russia, alleging that 
Russia had violated the International Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Dis­
crimination; Georgia also asks the ICJ to institute 
provisional measures to prevent racial discrimina­
tion by Russia.
13 The first shipment of U.S. humanitarian aid since 
the outbreak of the conflict arrives in Georgia.
15 Georgian President Saakashvili signs a six-point, 
EU-brokered ceasefire agreement committing 
Georgia to an immediate end of the use of force in 
the conflict and a pullback of its forces from the 
conflict zone.
16 Russian President Medvedev signs the EU-bro­
kered ceasefire but says that additional security 
measures will need to be implemented before the 
withdrawal of Russian troops.
19 The U.N. Security Council meets for a briefing 
and discussion of the situation in Georgia. The 
French delegation to the UN Security Council 
circulates a second draft resolution on the conflict.
20 Russia rejects the second UN Security Council 
draft resolution and floats its own resolution en­
dorsing the initial EU-brokered deal that allowed 
Russia to implement “additional security mea­
sures” before fully withdrawing its troops.
21 Large rallies are held in Abkhazia and South Os­
setia to demand independence from Georgia.
22 Russia announces the full withdrawal of its 
forces from Georgia but states that it will main­
tain peacekeepers and checkpoints in a buffer 
zone outside of the two breakaway regions. U.S. 
President George W. Bush and French President 
Sarkozy declare that Russia was not complying 
with the terms of the ceasefire.
23 Displaced civilians begin to return to Tbilisi and 
Gori. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees 
reports that the conflict displaced 30,000 ethnic 
Ossetians, most of whom fled to the Russian 
republic of North Ossetia, and 128,000 ethnic 
Georgians, who fled to Georgia proper.
24 A U.S. warship carrying humanitarian aid docks 
at Batumi, as Russian troops still hold the port of 
Poti.
25 Georgia amends its request to the International 
Court of Justice in light of changing circum­
stances.
26 Russian President Medvedev signs decrees 
recognizing the independence and sovereignty of 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia and authorizing Rus­
sia to establish diplomatic relations and conclude 
treaties with the two territories.
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28 The UN Security Council meets to discuss the 
conflict in Georgia. The Georgian parliament 
passes a unanimous resolution declaring Abkha­
zia and South Ossetia occupied territories and 
identifying Russian peacekeepers as the occupy­
ing force.
29 Georgia declares void the 1994 Moscow Agree­
ment, which codified a ceasefire and created a 
no-heavy-weapons zone around Abkhazia.
September
1 Georgia notifies the CIS of its decision to terminate 
the organization's peacekeeping operations in 
Abkhazia.
9 Russia announces that it will station thousands of 
regular troops in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 
Russia establishes formal diplomatic relations 
with Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
15 The European Union establishes a monitoring 
mission in Georgia to verify compliance with the 
six-point ceasefire agreement signed by Georgia 
and Russia.
October
1 The European Monitoring Mission in Georgia 
officially launches operations as observers begin 
monitoring the buffer zone around South Ossetia.
9 The UN Security Council extends the mandate of 
the UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) 
until February 15, 2009.
15 The International Court of Justice orders both 
Russia and Georgia to facilitate humanitarian 
assistance and refrain from racial discrimination 
and any activity that might aggravate the dispute. 
Internationally sponsored talks begin in Geneva 
on the promotion of security and stability in 
Georgia and the breakaway territories. The talks 
immediately break down over disagreements on 
procedure.
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Major Agreements Signed between
the Russian Federation and Abkhazia, 
August 2008-March 2010*
1. Agreement between Russia and Abkhazia on a
Joint Russian Military Base
19. Agreement on Cooperation in Combating
Crime
2. Agreement on Military Cooperation 20. Agreements on Cooperation between the Min-
3. Agreements with Abkhazia and South Ossetia istry of Internal Affairs of Russia and Abkhazia
on Joint Border Protection 21. Agreement on Assistance to the Republic of
4. Agreement on Visa-free Travel Abkhazia for Socio-economic Development
5. Agreements on Inter-parliamentary Coopera- 22. Agreement on Strategic Partnership
tion 23. Agreement on Friendship, Cooperation and
6. Agreement on Scientific-Methodological and Mutual Assistance
Organizational Collaboration [in the area of 
elections]
24. Agreement on the Mutual Establishment of 
Trade Missions
7. Agreement on the Principles of Cooperation in 
Transport
25. Agreement on the Principles of Development 
of New Energy Projects and the Transit of
8. Agreement on Air Transport Electricity
9. Agreement on Air Services 26. Agreement on Joint Actions in the Field of
10. Agreement on Cooperation in Air Transport Tourism
11. Agreements on the Transfer to the Russian 
Federation the Responsibility for Providing Air
27. Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of En­
ergy, Agriculture, Communications and Health
Traffic Services in the Airspace of the Re­
public of Abkhazia, the Publication of Aero-
28. Agreement on the Trade Regime between Rus­
sia and Abkhazia
nautical Information, and the Organization of 
Aviation Search and Rescue
29. Agreement on the Mutual Establishment of 
Trade Missions
12. Agreement on Cooperation in Maritime and 
Aviation Search and Rescue in the Black Sea
30. Agreement on Cooperation in Training Quali­
fied Diplomatic Personnel in Abkhazia
13. Agreements on Cooperation in Maritime
Transport
31. Agreement on Cooperation between the Cham­
ber of Commerce of the Russian Federation
14. Agreement Regulating the Issues of Coopera­
tion in Rail Transport
and the Chamber of Commerce of the Republic 
of Abkhazia
15. Agreement about the Accommodation of the
Diplomatic Missions of Russia in Abkhazia Compiled by Matthew Schaaf
and the Diplomatic Missions of Abkhazia in 
the Russian Federation
16. Agreement on the Expansion and Protection of 
Investments
17. Agreement on Cooperation in Trade, Eco­
nomic, Scientific-technical, Humanitarian, and 
Cultural Fields
18. Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of 
Culture
*This compilation is incomplete and is based on official Abkhaz news (http://wwwabkhaziagovorg) and Russian media reports. Some agree­
ments may be duplicates due to inconsistencies in their titles and their bundling in news reports.
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